Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissing Appellant's appeal in this workers' compensation case for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that the ICA erred when it dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.These consolidated cases consisted of the decision of the Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DCD) determining that Appellant sustained compensable work-related injuries but denying her claim for compensation relating to her alleged neck injury and sleep disorder. Following years of proceedings before the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) and DCD, the LIRAB issued several orders, including an order granting Employer/Insurer's two motions to compel and denying Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment. The ICA dismissed Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ICA had jurisdiction to review the LIRAB's order granting the motions to compel and denying partial summary judgment as to the order compelling Appellant to undergo an independent medical examination. View "Suzuki v. American Healthways, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of murder in the second degree and the imposition of two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Answering special verdict forms, the jury found that Defendant committed one of the two murders as a principal and accomplice and the other murder as an accomplice. During sentencing, the trial court enhanced each of Defendant's prison terms beyond the ordinary statutory maximum and ran those sentences consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury's verdict was not irreconcilably inconsistent; and (2) the trial court did not unlawfully enhance Defendant's two second-degree murder prison terms. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the district court ruling on a Haw. Rev. Stat. 604-10.5 petition to enjoin harassment (injunction petition) after ninety days elapsed from issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO), holding that the ICA correctly held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case.Further at issue before the Supreme Court, other than the jurisdictional matter, was whether a section 604-10.5 TRO expires after ninety days despite orders by the district court continuing the TRO beyond ninety days pending completion of a hearing and decision on the injunction petition. The Supreme Court held that if a district court has commenced hearing the merits of a section 604-10.5 injunction petition but, despite reasonable efforts, is unable to conclude the hearing within ninety days of the issuance of the ex parte TRO, the court has jurisdiction to continue the TRO pending its final decision on the injunction petition. View "Meyer v. Basco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts affirming the ruling of the Honolulu Police Commission that Louis Kealoha, Chief of Police for the Honolulu Police Department (HPD), was entitled to a defense attorney provided by the City and County of Honolulu to defend him against federal criminal charges, holding that Kealoha did not meet his burden of establishing entitlement to representation.The Commission concluded that four acts alleged in the first superseding indictment against Kealoha entitled Kealoha to representation because they were done in the performance of Kealoha's duty as a police officer, even if the acts were unlawful and regardless of motive. The circuit court and intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because nothing in the record indicated that Kealoha was acting to perform his duties as Chief of Police during the conduct at issue, he was not entitled to taxpayer-funded representation. View "City & County of Honolulu v. Honolulu Police Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the order of the circuit court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the Hawai'i Criminal Justice Data Center (HCJDC) and dismissing Phillip Barker's action seeking to require the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record, holding that the ICA gravely erred.Barker, who was convicted of disorderly conduct as a violation, applied for expungement of his arrest, asserting that because Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) provides that a violation does not constitute a crime, he was entitled to expungement pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 831-3.2. The HCJDC denied the application, concluding that Barker had been convicted of a "crime" within the meaning of section 831-3.2(a). The circuit court denied Barker's request for an order requiring the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments below, holding that under the plain language of Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) and §§ 831-3.2(a), a person arrested for or charged with a crime, including a petty misdemeanor, but convicted of a violation is eligible for expungement because a “violation” is not a “crime.” View "Barker v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing the second "Felony Information and Non-Felony Complaint" brought by the State recharging Defendant after the circuit court dismissed the charging document as insufficient, holding that, under the facts of this case, the circuit court erred.Defendant was charged with several crimes arising from a hit and run. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the charging language was fatally insufficient. The circuit court granted the motion, and the State appealed. Thereafter, the State recharged Defendant, attempting to correct the inadequacies identified in the first charging document. The circuit court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the second charging document while the first charging document remained pending on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's filing of the notice of appeal in the first case did not strip the circuit court of jurisdiction over the second case. View "State v. Michaeledes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversing the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this insurance broker malpractice case, holding that the circuit court and the ICA majority incorrectly analyzed Defendant's burden regarding the causation element.Plaintiff brought negligence and negligent malpractice claims against Defendant. In the original proceedings, judgment was granted for Plaintiff. The ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to include previously excluded testimony. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The ICA reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA"s order and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding (1) to negate the causation element of the negligence and negligent malpractice claims against it Defendant would need to demonstrate that Plaintiff's insurer (Insurer) would not have been legally obligated to advance Plaintiff's defense costs even if Plaintiff's grand jury subpoena matter were timely tendered to Insurer; and (2) the lower courts incorrectly analyzed Defendant's burden regarding the causation element, requiring remand. View "Pflueger, Inc. v. AIU Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for four counts, including murder in the second degree, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, there was no need for a "determination of death" within the meaning of Haw. Rev. Stat. 327C-1.Section 327C-1 defines the process for making "death determinations in the State" in all "civil and criminal actions." During Defendant's criminal trial, the medical examiner who performed the victim's autopsy testified that the cause of the victim's death was a gunshot wound to the head. Nine days after the verdict was rendered, Defendant filed a motion for arrest of judgment and dismissal, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over his case because the State failed to show at the grant jury proceeding that the victim had been determined to be brain dead. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was not required to met the requirements of section 327C-1 to prove the victim's death; and (2) Defendant's remaining arguments on appeal lacked merit. View "State v. Moon" on Justia Law

In this election contest, the Supreme Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs as to all claims stated in the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish a viable election challenge that would "cause a difference in the election results."The election result contested in this case was for the office of council member for the Wailuku-Waihe'e-Waikapu seat on the Maui County Council. On November 22, 2022, the final result was reported that Alice Lee received the most votes, with Nolan Ahia receiving 513 fewer votes. Plaintiffs, Ahia and thirty voters who resided within the election district, brought this complaint challenging the election result. The Supreme Court ordered that Lee received a majority of the votes cast and had been elected to the seat of the Wailuku-Waihe'e-Waikapu councilmember, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were unavailing. View "Ahia v. Lee " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals' upholding Defendant's convictions for burglary in the first degree and other crimes, holding that the State caused an unreasonable delay in sentencing Defendant and that the unreasonable delay deprived Defendant of the opportunity for allocution.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the State caused an unreasonable delay in sentencing, thus depriving Defendant of due process and a sentencing proceeding that was fundamentally fair, in violation of Haw. Const. art. 1, 5 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; and (2) the State's unreasonable delay in sentencing Defendant deprived him of the opportunity to allocution, in violation of Haw. Const. art. I, 5. View "State v. Canosa" on Justia Law