Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of excessive speeding. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Petitioner sought review of the judgment of the ICA, challenging for the first time the sufficiency of the charge on the grounds that the amended complaint did not allege the required state of mind to prove the charge of excessive speeding. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that, inasmuch as the amended complaint against Petitioner failed to allege the requisite state of mind, which was an essential fact of the offense of excessive speeding, the amended complaint must be dismissed. View "State v. Pierce " on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of prostitution. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The ICA sua sponte raised the issue of whether the charge was deficient for failing to allege the requisite mens rea, which was an essential fact of the offense of prostitution. The ICA, inter alia, held that Petitioner “waived any sufficiency to the charge for failure to allege a mens rea” by not objecting on this basis and by not asserting the claim on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that, inasmuch as the complaint against Petitioner failed to allege the requisite state of mind for the offense of prostitution, the complaint must be dismissed. View "State v. Shyanguya " on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (Count I) and one count of accidents involving damage to vehicle or property (Count II). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Petitioner sought review of the judgment of the ICA, raising a challenge to the sufficient of the complaint with respect to Count II. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that Count II failed to charge a requisite state of mind. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the lower courts, holding that inasmuch as Count II of the complaint against Petitioner failed to allege the requisite state of mind, it must be dismissed. View "State v. Tongg " on Justia Law

Trustee alleged that Defendants owned an interest in a parcel of land and moved for summary judgment to partition their interest along with the remainder of the parcel. The circuit court granted summary judgment for partition, directed that the parcels be sold at a public auction, and ordered the sale proceeds to be distributed pursuant to court order. Defendants’ property was sold to Trustee at the public auction. The sale was confirmed to Trustee pursuant to a confirmation order. Defendants appealed from the confirmation order. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed Defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction because no final judgment had been entered in the case. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s dismissal order and remanded to the ICA for disposition of the appeal, holding that the confirmation order met the requirements of appealability under the doctrine announced in Forgay v. Conrad, which addresses the narrow relaxation of the finality rule for orders transferring property. View "Lambert v. Teisina" on Justia Law

The district court adjudged Petitioner guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the trial for a fourth day because it had already determined that the trial would not be completed on the third day; but (2) the OVUII charge was deficient by failing to state the offense of OVUII where it did not allege the attendant circumstance that Defendant operated his vehicle on a public roadway. Remanded. View "State v. Akitake " on Justia Law

Because of a property dispute, Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondents. The trial court granted Respondents judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on Petitioner’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. The jury then rendered a special verdict against Petitioner on the remainder of Petitioner's claims. After the verdict was read into the record and the jury was discharged, the trial court recalled the jury. The jurors were polled, and one juror responded that the verdict as read did not reflect his verdict. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) sustained the verdict, holding that a jury cannot be recalled following an order discharging the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the ICA, holding (1) a court may recall a jury following a formal discharge if the jury is subject to the control of the court; (2) the jurors’ statements that they misunderstood the legal effect of their answers to a special verdict question did not provide a basis for overturning the jury’s verdict in favor of Respondents; and (3) JMOL was correctly granted on Petitioner’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. View "Lahaina Fashions, Inc. v. Bank of Hawai’i" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for temporary foster custody over Mother’s son, T.M. At a combined permanency hearing and termination of parental rights hearing several months later, Mother was not yet represented by counsel. Counsel was subsequently appointed for Mother. The family court later vacated Mother’s parental rights. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that the family court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint counsel to represent Mother earlier in the proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and the family court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to counsel in parental termination proceedings, and henceforth, courts must appoint counsel for indigent parents once DHS files a petition to assert foster custody over a child; and (2) the family court in this case abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel for Mother until almost nineteen months after DHS filed a petition for temporary foster custody over T.M. Remanded for a new hearing. View "In re TM" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with electronic enticement in the first degree (Count 1) and promoting child abuse in the third degree (Count 2). The charges were severed. The State then proceeded to trial on Count 1 and appealed the circuit court’s suppression order as it related to count 2. In relevant part, the court suppressed a statement made by Defendant after he was arrested and evidence seized from Defendant’s residence pursuant to a misdated search warrant. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of electronic enticement. Both parties appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction and vacated the suppression order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in affirming Defendant’s conviction for electronic enticement; (2) suppression of Defendant’s statement was proper where law enforcement officers failed to obtain a voluntary waiver of Defendant’s Miranda rights; and (3) the circuit court erred in suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. Remanded. View "State v. McKnight" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 712-1240.8. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a concurrent term of imprisonment of five years in both counts as a young adult defendant pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-667. The State filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that the court's decision to sentence Defendant under section 706-667 ran contrary to law. The circuit court denied the order. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing under section 712-1240.8. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the phrase "notwithstanding...any other law to the contrary" found in the sentencing provision of section 712-1240.8 overrode sentencing under section 706-667 as "contrary." The Supreme Court held that it did not, reversed the ICA's judgment, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence and order denying the State's motion to correct illegal sentence.View "State v. Casugay-Badiang" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with abuse of family and household members. Prior to trial, a Korean language interpreter was sworn in to translate the proceedings for Petitioner. During the trial, Petitioner's attorney informed the court Petitioner was not going to testify on his own behalf. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed, claiming that his right to testify was violated because the court's Tachibana colloquy was deficient. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) under State v. Tachibana, a colloquy between the judge and a defendant involves a verbal exchange in which the judge ascertains the defendant's understanding of his or her rights; (2) here, the advisement by the family court did not adequately ascertain whether Petitioner understood his constitutional right to testify or not to testify; (3) further, Petitioner's need for an interpreter during the trial heightened the necessity for the court to insure Petitioner understood the rights he waived; and (4) the error in this case was not harmless. Remanded. View "State v. Han" on Justia Law