Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The district court adjudged Petitioner guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the trial for a fourth day because it had already determined that the trial would not be completed on the third day; but (2) the OVUII charge was deficient by failing to state the offense of OVUII where it did not allege the attendant circumstance that Defendant operated his vehicle on a public roadway. Remanded. View "State v. Akitake " on Justia Law

Because of a property dispute, Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondents. The trial court granted Respondents judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on Petitioner’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. The jury then rendered a special verdict against Petitioner on the remainder of Petitioner's claims. After the verdict was read into the record and the jury was discharged, the trial court recalled the jury. The jurors were polled, and one juror responded that the verdict as read did not reflect his verdict. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) sustained the verdict, holding that a jury cannot be recalled following an order discharging the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the ICA, holding (1) a court may recall a jury following a formal discharge if the jury is subject to the control of the court; (2) the jurors’ statements that they misunderstood the legal effect of their answers to a special verdict question did not provide a basis for overturning the jury’s verdict in favor of Respondents; and (3) JMOL was correctly granted on Petitioner’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. View "Lahaina Fashions, Inc. v. Bank of Hawai’i" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for temporary foster custody over Mother’s son, T.M. At a combined permanency hearing and termination of parental rights hearing several months later, Mother was not yet represented by counsel. Counsel was subsequently appointed for Mother. The family court later vacated Mother’s parental rights. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that the family court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint counsel to represent Mother earlier in the proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and the family court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to counsel in parental termination proceedings, and henceforth, courts must appoint counsel for indigent parents once DHS files a petition to assert foster custody over a child; and (2) the family court in this case abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel for Mother until almost nineteen months after DHS filed a petition for temporary foster custody over T.M. Remanded for a new hearing. View "In re TM" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with electronic enticement in the first degree (Count 1) and promoting child abuse in the third degree (Count 2). The charges were severed. The State then proceeded to trial on Count 1 and appealed the circuit court’s suppression order as it related to count 2. In relevant part, the court suppressed a statement made by Defendant after he was arrested and evidence seized from Defendant’s residence pursuant to a misdated search warrant. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of electronic enticement. Both parties appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction and vacated the suppression order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in affirming Defendant’s conviction for electronic enticement; (2) suppression of Defendant’s statement was proper where law enforcement officers failed to obtain a voluntary waiver of Defendant’s Miranda rights; and (3) the circuit court erred in suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. Remanded. View "State v. McKnight" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 712-1240.8. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a concurrent term of imprisonment of five years in both counts as a young adult defendant pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-667. The State filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that the court's decision to sentence Defendant under section 706-667 ran contrary to law. The circuit court denied the order. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing under section 712-1240.8. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the phrase "notwithstanding...any other law to the contrary" found in the sentencing provision of section 712-1240.8 overrode sentencing under section 706-667 as "contrary." The Supreme Court held that it did not, reversed the ICA's judgment, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence and order denying the State's motion to correct illegal sentence.View "State v. Casugay-Badiang" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with abuse of family and household members. Prior to trial, a Korean language interpreter was sworn in to translate the proceedings for Petitioner. During the trial, Petitioner's attorney informed the court Petitioner was not going to testify on his own behalf. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed, claiming that his right to testify was violated because the court's Tachibana colloquy was deficient. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) under State v. Tachibana, a colloquy between the judge and a defendant involves a verbal exchange in which the judge ascertains the defendant's understanding of his or her rights; (2) here, the advisement by the family court did not adequately ascertain whether Petitioner understood his constitutional right to testify or not to testify; (3) further, Petitioner's need for an interpreter during the trial heightened the necessity for the court to insure Petitioner understood the rights he waived; and (4) the error in this case was not harmless. Remanded. View "State v. Han" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with harassment. Before trial commenced, the district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that disjunctive wording in the complaint made it difficult to prepare a defense. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because the complaint charged two forms of non-synonymous conduct disjunctively, the charge did not provide Defendant with adequate notice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when charging a defendant under a single subsection of a statute, the charge may be worded disjunctively in the language of the statute as long as the acts charged are reasonably related so that the charge provides sufficient notice to the defendant; and (2) the complaint in this case met due process requirements regardless of whether the disjunctively charged acts were synonymous or non-synonymous. View "State v. Codiamat" on Justia Law

The State indicted Petitioner on kidnapping and assault in the second degree. A jury found Petitioner guilty of kidnapping and of the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. Petitioner filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing (1) the State failed to prove venue was proper in this case; and (2) the Class A felony kidnapping should be reduced to Class B kidnapping because the complainant did not sustain serious or substantial injury as shown by the jury acquitting Petitioner of assault in the second degree. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) because several witnesses testified that the offense occurred on the island of Oahu, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate the first judicial circuit was the correct venue; and (2) while the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that substantial bodily injury was caused by Defendant in order to disprove the mitigating defense that reduces the offense of kidnapping from a Class A felony to a Class B felony, the State disproved one of the three elements of the Class B mitigating defense beyond a reasonable doubt to establish that Defendant was not entitled to the defense. View "State v. Bailey " on Justia Law

In April 2010, the State Senate expressly rejected Duane Kanuha's nomination for a second term as a commissioner on the State Land Use Commission (LUC). Following the Senate's rejection, Kanuha continued to serve on the board and to participate in the LUC's consideration of a development project involving the reclassification of agricultural land for urban use. Sierra Club filed an action to disqualify Kanuha from serving on the LUC and to invalidate the actions Kanuha had taken with regard to the development project. The LUC denied the action. That same day, LUC voted to approve the development project. Without Kanuha's vote, the LUC lacked the requisite number of votes to approve the reclassification. The circuit court reversed the LUC's decision and order. The ICA reversed, determining that Kanuha continued to serve as a valid holdover member of the LUC after the Senate's rejection of his nomination for a second term. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Kanuha was not a valid holdover when he voted on the reclassification; (2) Kanuha did not qualify as a de facto member of the LUC; and (3) therefore, Kanuha's actions taken with respect to the reclassification petition were invalid. View "Sierra Club v. Castle & Cooke Homes Haw., Inc. " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree. The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction of first degree assault but affirmed his conviction of second degree robbery, holding (1) Petitioner could not be convicted of both robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree inasmuch as the element of infliction of severe bodily injury was common to both offenses, the jury relied on the same conduct of Petitioner to satisfy this element for both offenses, and the findings incorporated in the verdicts were inconsistent; and (2) a specific unanimity instruction was not required in this case. View "State v. Santiago" on Justia Law