Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was adjudged guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1). Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the complaint against her for the first time on appeal, alleging that section 291E-61(a)(1) was deficient for failing to allege mens rea. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against Petitioner without prejudice, holding that because the complaint failed to charge a requisite state of mind, the ICA’s judgment must be vacated and the charge dismissed without prejudice because it violated due process. View "State v. Avilla " on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with committing the offense of assault in the third degree and was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was not adequately informed of his right to testify. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court’s right-to-testify colloquy was defective, and as a result, Defendant did not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive his right to testify; (2) the constitutional violation of Defendant’s right to testify was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction, and the prohibition against double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial in this case. View "State v. Pomroy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree and unauthorized entry into motor vehicle in the first degree. According to the State, Defendant’s co-defendant entered Jennifer Kincaid’s garage and Jeffrey Sampson’s van, while Defendant was the getaway driver. Kincaid, the only witness who identified Defendant as the driver in the incidents, identified Defendant in a field show-up procedure conducted shortly after she reported the burglary. Defendant and his co-defendant were the only two suspects present at the field show-up, prior to which the police informed Kincaid that they had stopped a vehicle that matched her description. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to give a specific instruction on field show-up identifications. Remanded. View "State v. Cabinatan" on Justia Law

The family court convicted Defendant of harassment in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 711-1106(1)(a). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the family court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the complaint did not sufficiently apprise Defendant of what he must be prepared to meet because the language was worded in the disjunctive. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the family court’s judgment, holding that, pursuant to State v. Codiamat, which held that a charge worded disjunctively in the language of the statute provides sufficient notice so long as the acts charged are reasonably related and are contained in a single subsection of a statute, the State’s charge provided Defendant with sufficient notice of what he must be prepared to meet. View "State v. Lockey " on Justia Law

The State charged three defendants (collectively, Petitioners) of entering or remaining within the Kaho’olawe Island Reserve without being specifically authorized to do so, thereby committing the offense of entrance into the reserve. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Petitioners were found guilty of the charges. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and the district court, holding that although the sufficiency of the complaints was not raised by either party, the complaints must be dismissed without prejudice because the charges failed to charge that Petitioners acted with the requisite state of mind by violating the law intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. View "State v. Armitage" on Justia Law

The owner of certain property and surveying company filed a shoreline certification application with the Department of Land and Natural Resources for the property. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal of the proposed shoreline certification. In an amended decision, the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) concluded that Petitioners failed to establish that the proposed certified shoreline was not proper. The Supreme Court vacated the BLNR’s amended decision, holding (1) in making a shoreline determination pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 205A-42, the BLNR must consider the historical evidence of the upper reaches of the wash of the waves; and (2) in this case, the BLNR’s amended decision establishing a certified shoreline for the subject property effectively failed to consider the historical evidence of the upper reaches of the wash of the waves and contained errors of law and erroneous findings of fact. Remanded. View "Diamond v. Dobbin" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of abuse of a family or household member. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the family court did not ensure that he had “fully” waived his right to a jury trial. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner had validly waived his right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the family court’s judgment, holding that the family court failed to ensure that Petitioner’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was voluntary. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of excessive speeding and no motor vehicle insurance. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the State did not lay sufficient foundation for the admission of the laser gun reading. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the ICA gravely erred in holding that the State laid sufficient foundation for the admission of the laser gun reading and challenging, for the first time, the sufficiency of the charge in the amended complaint because the amended complaint did not allege the requisite state of mind. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that inasmuch as the amended complaint against Petitioner failed to allege the requisite state of mind, the amended complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. View "State v. Pai " on Justia Law

In this dispute over a real estate transaction contract, final partial judgment and final judgment were entered against Szymanski. On September 19, 2011, Szymanski moved for reconsideration of the final partial and final judgments under Haw. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The circuit court denied the motion. On January 13, 2012, Szymanski filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his Rule 60(b) motion. The circuit court denied the motion on July 11, 2012. On August 10, 2012, Szymanski appealed from the order denying his Rule 60(b) motion and the order denying his motion for reconsideration. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal as untimely because Szymanski did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after the April 12, 2012 deemed denial of his January 13, 2012 motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because when a timely post-judgment tolling motion is deemed denied, it does not trigger the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal until entry of the judgment or appealable order. View "Title Guar. Escrow Servs., Inc. v. Waialea Resort Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Director of Labor and Industrial Relations seeking compensation for the aggravation of his asthma resulting from his exposure to vog while working as a school teacher. The Director denied Petitioner’s claim, and the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) affirmed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the LIRAB’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the LIRAB’s decision, holding that Petitioner was entitled to compensation pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-3(a), which provides that if an employee suffers an injury proximately caused by employment, the employee shall be paid compensation. Remanded to the Director for a determination of the amount of compensation to be awarded. View "Van Ness v. State, Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law