Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John McLaren represented a claimant in a workers’ compensation case before the Disability Compensation Division (“Division”) of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (“Department”) that resulted in a settlement awarding the claimant benefits for disability and disfigurement. McLaren requested attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $7,105. The Director of the Department approved the request but reduced the amount to $3,729. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board dismissed McLaren’s appeal as untimely and denied McLaren’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the ICA erred in concluding that McLaren’s appeal was untimely made and that his requests to the Division for reconsideration were insufficiently supported; (2) the ICA did not err in concluding that McLaren did not have a right to a contested case hearing before the Division; but (3) the Division was required to provide its reasons for reducing McLaren’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. View "McLaren v. Paradise Inn Haw., Inc." on Justia Law

Homeowners filed a complaint against the County and certain Developers, alleging that the Mayor had unlawfully exempted certain projects from a height restriction law (“Law”). On December 31, 2008, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Homeowners and entered an order for declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court subsequently denied Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine. After the parties appealed, the Maui County Council passed a bill making the Mayor’s previously illegal conduct legal. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the circuit court’s December 31, 2008 order because the Law issue was frustrated based on mootness, and (2) concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court (1) vacated that portion of the ICA’s judgment that vacated the circuit court’s judgments and order, holding (i) when a case is mooted while on appeal, the appellate could should remand the case to the trial court for a consideration of the vacatur issue, and (ii) the ICA did not properly analyze the vacatur issue; and (2) affirmed that portion of the ICA’s judgment that affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees. Remanded. View "Goo v. Arakawa" on Justia Law

After a contested case hearing, the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) entered an order imposing a financial assessment for damages to state conservation land against Pila’a 400, LLC. Specifically, the BLNR held Pila’a 400 responsible for remedial, restoration, and monitoring costs for despoilment of the state land, including near-pristine coral reef, resulting from unauthorized land use. The circuit court and intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BLNR was not required to engage in rule-making before imposing the financial assessment for damages to state land against Pila’a 400; (2) the BLNR had jurisdiction to institute the enforcement action; and (3) Pila’a 400 was afforded a full opportunity to be heard at the contested case hearing following reasonable notice. View "Pila'a 400, LLC v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res." on Justia Law

The State filed a third amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that public funds ported to certain unions under the Hawaii Public Employees Health Fund’s porting program exceeded the amounts allowed by law. The circuit court’s declaratory ruling interpreting the statutory phrase “actual monthly cost of the coverage” in Haw. Rev. Stat. 87 essentially ended the State’s case, and the court entered judgment against the State. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in interpreting “actual monthly cost of the coverage,” and (2) the State’s factual allegations did not constitute a violation of the provisions of chapter 87. View "State v. Haw. Gov’t Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law

AS, a minor child, was taken into foster custody after her birth. The Department of Human Services (DHS) recommended that AS be placed permanently with her maternal aunt. The family court, however, awarded custody of AS to AS’s non-relative foster parents. DHS appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed after reviewing DHS’s permanent placement recommendation under a best interests of the child standard, rather than an abuse of discretion standard. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment and clarified the ICA’s opinion to hold, inter alia, that (1) the party challenging DHS’s permanent placement recommendation bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the permanent placement is not in the child’s best interests; (2) there is no relative placement preference in the Child Protective Act (CPA) with regard to permanent placement of foster children, and therefore, to the extent that DHS’s police directives mandate such a preferences, those policies impermissibly alter the CPA and its legislative history; and (3) In re Doe does not stand for the proposition that the family court must relieve DHS of its permanent custodianship if the family court disagrees with DHS’s permanent placement decision. View "In re AS" on Justia Law

Defendant John Walton and his codefendant, Courage Lee Elkshoulder, were indicted for attempted murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. The circuit court consolidated Walton’s and Elkshoulder’s trials and denied Walton’s and Elkshoulder’s motions for severance. During trial, Walton and Elkshoulder each argued that the other had stabbed the complaining witness. The jury found Walton guilty of both attempted murder and robbery but found Elkshoulder guilty only of assault and robbery. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Walton’s motion for severance, and, under the circumstances, Walton was prejudiced and denied a fair trial. View "State v. Walton" on Justia Law

William and Maryann Acker, a married couple, were involved in a string of crimes in California and Hawaii in 1978. In California, Maryann was convicted of Cesario Arauza’s murder. In Hawaii, William pleaded guilty to robbing Lawrence Hasker, and Maryann was found guilty of Hasker’s murder and other charges regarding the robbery of Joseph Leach. William later testified under oath in California that he was solely responsible for Hasker’s murder. In 2007, Maryann was granted a new trial in relation to the charge for Hasker’s murder and was again convicted of Hasker’s murder. Maryann challenged her retrial, claiming she was denied a fair trial for several reasons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that defense counsel opened the door to evidence concerning Maryann’s convictions in California, but the error was harmless; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maryann’s motion for mistrial; (3) the prosecution did not engage in misconduct; (4) the circuit court did not err in refusing to enforce a subpoena recalling William to testify in Maryann’s case; and (5) the circuit court’s jury instructions on murder and accomplice liability were not erroneous. View "State v. Acker" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree for allegedly fondling the breast of the complaining witness while she slept. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of a police detective, a veteran of the Sex Crimes Detail, that probable cause existed for arresting Defendant because the officer’s testimony invaded the province of the jury by bolstering the complaining witness’s credibility where the officer was imbued with “an aura of expertise” due to his experience. View "State v. Calara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a claim against the State Procurement Policy Board challenging the validity of Haw. Admin. R. 3-122-66, claiming it was contrary to the “minimum of three” persons requirement in Haw. Rev. Stat. 103D-304(g) and should be struck down. Plaintiff also sought a declaration that every government contract issued under the invalid authority of Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff had standing to bring the action and that Rule 3-122-66 was invalid, but the court declined invalidate all contracts issued under Rule 3-122-66. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner had standing to bring his claim based on his status as an “interested person” and in order to satisfy the “needs of justice”; (2) Rule 3-122-66 is invalid because manifestly exceeds the scope of authority given by the legislature to the Board; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to rule that every government contract issued under Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. View "Asato v. State Procurement Policy Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of several drug-related offenses. The Hawaii Paroling Authority (HPA) fixed minimum terms of imprisonment and categorized Petitioner as a Level III offender. After the ICA reversed one of Petitioner’s convictions, the HPA reset Petitioner’s minimum terms to the same terms that had previously been imposed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Haw. R. Penal P. 40. The petition was denied. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a second Rule 40 petition challenging his minimum term and his status as a Level III offender. The circuit court denied the second petition, concluding that Petitioner waived his claims for not including them in his first petition. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments, holding (1) because Petitioner presented evidence that did not receive notice that, on remand, the HPA reset his minimum term to the same minimum term in time for him to have raised the issue in his first petition, Petitioner’s second petition should not have been denied without a hearing on the basis that his claims had been waived; and (2) inasmuch as Petitioner’s offenses did not meet the prescribed criteria to classify Petitioner as a Level III offender, the HPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Remanded. View "Fagaragan v. State" on Justia Law