Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

AS, a minor child, was taken into foster custody after her birth. The Department of Human Services (DHS) recommended that AS be placed permanently with her maternal aunt. The family court, however, awarded custody of AS to AS’s non-relative foster parents. DHS appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed after reviewing DHS’s permanent placement recommendation under a best interests of the child standard, rather than an abuse of discretion standard. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment and clarified the ICA’s opinion to hold, inter alia, that (1) the party challenging DHS’s permanent placement recommendation bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the permanent placement is not in the child’s best interests; (2) there is no relative placement preference in the Child Protective Act (CPA) with regard to permanent placement of foster children, and therefore, to the extent that DHS’s police directives mandate such a preferences, those policies impermissibly alter the CPA and its legislative history; and (3) In re Doe does not stand for the proposition that the family court must relieve DHS of its permanent custodianship if the family court disagrees with DHS’s permanent placement decision. View "In re AS" on Justia Law

Defendant John Walton and his codefendant, Courage Lee Elkshoulder, were indicted for attempted murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. The circuit court consolidated Walton’s and Elkshoulder’s trials and denied Walton’s and Elkshoulder’s motions for severance. During trial, Walton and Elkshoulder each argued that the other had stabbed the complaining witness. The jury found Walton guilty of both attempted murder and robbery but found Elkshoulder guilty only of assault and robbery. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Walton’s motion for severance, and, under the circumstances, Walton was prejudiced and denied a fair trial. View "State v. Walton" on Justia Law

William and Maryann Acker, a married couple, were involved in a string of crimes in California and Hawaii in 1978. In California, Maryann was convicted of Cesario Arauza’s murder. In Hawaii, William pleaded guilty to robbing Lawrence Hasker, and Maryann was found guilty of Hasker’s murder and other charges regarding the robbery of Joseph Leach. William later testified under oath in California that he was solely responsible for Hasker’s murder. In 2007, Maryann was granted a new trial in relation to the charge for Hasker’s murder and was again convicted of Hasker’s murder. Maryann challenged her retrial, claiming she was denied a fair trial for several reasons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that defense counsel opened the door to evidence concerning Maryann’s convictions in California, but the error was harmless; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maryann’s motion for mistrial; (3) the prosecution did not engage in misconduct; (4) the circuit court did not err in refusing to enforce a subpoena recalling William to testify in Maryann’s case; and (5) the circuit court’s jury instructions on murder and accomplice liability were not erroneous. View "State v. Acker" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree for allegedly fondling the breast of the complaining witness while she slept. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of a police detective, a veteran of the Sex Crimes Detail, that probable cause existed for arresting Defendant because the officer’s testimony invaded the province of the jury by bolstering the complaining witness’s credibility where the officer was imbued with “an aura of expertise” due to his experience. View "State v. Calara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a claim against the State Procurement Policy Board challenging the validity of Haw. Admin. R. 3-122-66, claiming it was contrary to the “minimum of three” persons requirement in Haw. Rev. Stat. 103D-304(g) and should be struck down. Plaintiff also sought a declaration that every government contract issued under the invalid authority of Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff had standing to bring the action and that Rule 3-122-66 was invalid, but the court declined invalidate all contracts issued under Rule 3-122-66. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner had standing to bring his claim based on his status as an “interested person” and in order to satisfy the “needs of justice”; (2) Rule 3-122-66 is invalid because manifestly exceeds the scope of authority given by the legislature to the Board; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to rule that every government contract issued under Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. View "Asato v. State Procurement Policy Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of several drug-related offenses. The Hawaii Paroling Authority (HPA) fixed minimum terms of imprisonment and categorized Petitioner as a Level III offender. After the ICA reversed one of Petitioner’s convictions, the HPA reset Petitioner’s minimum terms to the same terms that had previously been imposed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Haw. R. Penal P. 40. The petition was denied. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a second Rule 40 petition challenging his minimum term and his status as a Level III offender. The circuit court denied the second petition, concluding that Petitioner waived his claims for not including them in his first petition. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments, holding (1) because Petitioner presented evidence that did not receive notice that, on remand, the HPA reset his minimum term to the same minimum term in time for him to have raised the issue in his first petition, Petitioner’s second petition should not have been denied without a hearing on the basis that his claims had been waived; and (2) inasmuch as Petitioner’s offenses did not meet the prescribed criteria to classify Petitioner as a Level III offender, the HPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Remanded. View "Fagaragan v. State" on Justia Law

VP & PK purchased an insurance policy from Lexington Insurance Company for work on a construction site. Kila Kila, one of VP & PK’s subcontractors, purchased an insurance policy from Nautilus Insurance Company. Both policies contained an “other insurance” provision and included duties to defend and indemnify. When VP & PK and Kila Kila were sued for damages resulting from the construction, Nautilus funded the defense of both Kila Kila and VP & PK. Lexington satisfied the judgment against VP & PK but did not contribute to the defense costs. Nautilus filed a complaint seeking (1) a declaration that Lexington owed VP & PK a duty to defend, which it breached; and (2) equitable contribution from Lexington for defense costs. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Lexington, holding that Lexington’s policy was in excess to Nautilus’s policy, and therefore, Lexington’s duty to defend was not triggered. The Hawaii Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the court of appeals and held, inter alia, that (1) an “other insurance” clause purporting to release an otherwise primary insurer of the duty to defend if the insurer becomes excess as to liability is enforceable, but only as between two or more insurers seeking to allocate or recover defense costs; and (2) an otherwise primary insurer who becomes an excess insurer by operation of an “other insurance” clause has a duty to defend as soon as a claim is tendered to it and there is the mere possibility that coverage of that claim exists under its policy. View "Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer and supervisors, alleging that he suffered discriminatory conduct while employed as a car salesman. Plaintiff asserted claims for state harassment and retaliation, federal harassment and retaliation, unlawful termination as against public policy, and breach of his employment contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and one of Defendant’s supervisors on the state harassment and retaliation claims and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the federal harassment and retaliation claims and the public policy claim, and (2) otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the ICA’s judgment on the state harassment and retaliation claims with respect to Plaintiff’s supervisor, holding that individual employees are not liable as employers under Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-2(1)(A) and 378-2(2); and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co." on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court convicted Defendant of exceeding the speed limit, finding that the State met its burden of proof that Defendant’s vehicle was traveling sixty-five miles per area in an area where the speed limit was fifty miles per hour. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in failing to sustain Defendant’s foundation and hearsay objections to the admission of a speed reading from a police officer’s laser gun. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed error in admitting the speed into evidence because the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the introduction of the laser gun reading. Remanded. View "State v. Amiral" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Marn Family Litigation, which had been ongoing for nearly fifteen years and concerned the ownership and control of the Marn family business. Petitioner Alexander Marn filed the instant appeal before the Supreme Court pro se before the intermediate court of appeals (ICA). The ICA dismissed Alexander’s appeal for failure to comply with the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure in his opening brief. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA’s dismissal of Alexander’s appeal without notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond was a violation of Haw. R. App. P. 30. Remanded. View "In re Marn Family Litig." on Justia Law