Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the offense of assault in the first degree as an included offense of the charge of murder in the second degree. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s and circuit court’s judgments, holding (1) assault in the first degree is an included offense of murder in the second degree; and (2) the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury upon the included offense of assault in the first degree. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Kaeo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a ward at a youth correctional facility, filed a complaint against Scott Rosete, a youth correctional officer, in his individual and official capacities, the State, and other defendants, alleging assault and battery as against Rosete, among other claims. Rosete was found liable for sexual assault. The circuit court granted in part Rosete’s, in his individual capacity, motion for a new trial based on an irreconcilable conflict in the jury’s answers to special verdict questions. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order granting Rosete a new trial, holding (1) the issues on retrial should be limited to the measure of general and special damages each defendant should pay, with the jury properly instructed on when each defendant can be held liable in his individual, versus official, capacity; and (2) Haw. Rev. Stat. 662-10 did not operate to bar contemporaneous judgments against both the State and Rosete in his individual capacity. View "Costales v. Rosete" on Justia Law

The Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA) filed a grievance against the University Laboratory School (ULS), alleging that the ULS refused to implement the proper salary placement for teachers as agreed to in a supplemental agreement negotiated by the HSTA and the Hawaii Board of Education. The ULS argued that the step placement chart the HSTA sought to enforce had never been agreed upon or incorporated into the agreement. The HSTA subsequently filed a grievance and a motion to compel arbitration of its grievance. The circuit court denied the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying HSTA’s motion, determining that the Hawaii Labor Relations Board had primary jurisdiction over the issues raised in the HSTA’s grievance and that the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration was premature. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that because the parties agreed to leave questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration after concluding that an arbitration agreement existed. Remanded. View "Haw. State Teachers Ass’n v. Univ. Lab. Sch." on Justia Law

Richard Cohan sued Marriott Hotel Services and RRB Restaurants for damages he incurred when he was injured at a restaurant at Marriott’s. The case was placed in the Court Annexed Arbitration Program. Marriott asked Cohan to sign authorizations to obtain medical and employment records, but Cohan refused. Marriott subsequently moved for an order compelling Cohan to sign the authorizations so it could obtain the records via subpoena. The arbitrator ordered Cohan to sign the authorizations as well as a qualified protective order. The order, however, did not limit the use or disclosure of Cohan’s health information to the underlying litigation. The Honorable Bert Ayabe, the arbitration judge, affirmed the arbitrator’s decision. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered Judge Ayabe to vacate the order affirming the arbitration decision and order that the qualified protective order and the authorizations for release of medical records be revised consistent with this opinion, holding that the privacy provision of Haw. Const. art. I, 6 protected Cohan’s health information against disclosure outside the underlying litigation. View "Cohan v. Circuit Court (Ayabe)" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after license and privilege have been suspended or revoked for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. On appeal, the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the district court’s judgment, determining that the charge against Defendant was defective for failing to allege the requisite state of mind, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. Defendant filed an application for writ of certiorari, contending that the ICA gravely erred in failing to address his arguments that insufficient evidence sustained the conviction and that double jeopardy precluded retrial. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) a reviewing court is required to address an express claim of insufficiency of the evidence prior to remaining for a new trial based on a defective charge; but (2) substantial evidence supported the conviction in this case, and therefore, double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Raymond Gurrobat, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, filed an action against HTH Corporation and Pacific Beach Corporation (collectively, Defendants), asserting claims of unlawful withholding of wages and unfair methods of competition (UMOC) for Defendants’ alleged failure to distribute the entirety of the service charges they received from customers to service employees and for failing to disclose to customers their practice of retaining a portion of those charges. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gurrabat on the unlawful withholding of wages claim but in favor of Defendants on the UMOC claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s order granting Gurrobat’s motion for class certification; (2) affirmed in large part the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on Gurrobat’s claims for unpaid wages but vacated the portion of the order granting Gurrobat’s motion for summary judgment as to damages that imposed joint and several liability on Defendants; and (3) vacated the circuit court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Gurrobat’s UMOC claim, as Gurrobat alleged sufficient facts to survive summary judgment on this claim. Remanded. View "Gurrobat v. HTH Corp." on Justia Law

John McLaren represented a claimant in a workers’ compensation case before the Disability Compensation Division (“Division”) of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (“Department”) that resulted in a settlement awarding the claimant benefits for disability and disfigurement. McLaren requested attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $7,105. The Director of the Department approved the request but reduced the amount to $3,729. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board dismissed McLaren’s appeal as untimely and denied McLaren’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the ICA erred in concluding that McLaren’s appeal was untimely made and that his requests to the Division for reconsideration were insufficiently supported; (2) the ICA did not err in concluding that McLaren did not have a right to a contested case hearing before the Division; but (3) the Division was required to provide its reasons for reducing McLaren’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. View "McLaren v. Paradise Inn Haw., Inc." on Justia Law

Homeowners filed a complaint against the County and certain Developers, alleging that the Mayor had unlawfully exempted certain projects from a height restriction law (“Law”). On December 31, 2008, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Homeowners and entered an order for declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court subsequently denied Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine. After the parties appealed, the Maui County Council passed a bill making the Mayor’s previously illegal conduct legal. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the circuit court’s December 31, 2008 order because the Law issue was frustrated based on mootness, and (2) concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court (1) vacated that portion of the ICA’s judgment that vacated the circuit court’s judgments and order, holding (i) when a case is mooted while on appeal, the appellate could should remand the case to the trial court for a consideration of the vacatur issue, and (ii) the ICA did not properly analyze the vacatur issue; and (2) affirmed that portion of the ICA’s judgment that affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees. Remanded. View "Goo v. Arakawa" on Justia Law

After a contested case hearing, the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) entered an order imposing a financial assessment for damages to state conservation land against Pila’a 400, LLC. Specifically, the BLNR held Pila’a 400 responsible for remedial, restoration, and monitoring costs for despoilment of the state land, including near-pristine coral reef, resulting from unauthorized land use. The circuit court and intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BLNR was not required to engage in rule-making before imposing the financial assessment for damages to state land against Pila’a 400; (2) the BLNR had jurisdiction to institute the enforcement action; and (3) Pila’a 400 was afforded a full opportunity to be heard at the contested case hearing following reasonable notice. View "Pila'a 400, LLC v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res." on Justia Law

The State filed a third amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that public funds ported to certain unions under the Hawaii Public Employees Health Fund’s porting program exceeded the amounts allowed by law. The circuit court’s declaratory ruling interpreting the statutory phrase “actual monthly cost of the coverage” in Haw. Rev. Stat. 87 essentially ended the State’s case, and the court entered judgment against the State. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in interpreting “actual monthly cost of the coverage,” and (2) the State’s factual allegations did not constitute a violation of the provisions of chapter 87. View "State v. Haw. Gov’t Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law