Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of committing the offense of prostitution. Defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to prove the commission of a prostitution offense. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal of the ICA and clarified the prior-to-trial advisement required by State v. Lewis, holding (1) the ICA did not err in concluding that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; (2) in order to more fully protect the right not to testify under the Hawaii Constitution, trial courts when informing the defendant of the right not to testify during the pretrial advisement must also advise the defendant that the exercise of this right may not be used by the fact finder to decide the case; and (3) although the court’s prior-to-trial advisement in this case did not inform Defendant that his silence could not be used against him if he did not testify, there was no error premised on the lack of judicial notice. View "State v. Monteil" on Justia Law

The Kahala Hotel and Resort collected a nineteen percent service charge on the purchase of food and beverages at Jason Kawakami’s reception. The hotel retained fifteen percent of the service charge as a “management share,” then reclassified and used that portion to pay for the banquet employees’ “wages.” Kawakami, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, sued, alleging that Kahala Hotel violated Haw. Rev. Stat. 481B-14. The circuit court agreed, holding that, pursuant to section 481B-14, customers are entitled to know that a portion of the service charge would not be paid to employes as tip income but would instead become the property of the hotel to be used as the hotel deemed appropriate. The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no disclosure was required because the hotel had reclassified its fifteen percent management share to pay its employees’ wages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding section 481B-14 requires a hotel or restaurant that applies a service charge for food or beverage services to either distribute the service charge directly as tip income to the non-management employees who provided the services or disclose to its customers its practice of retaining the service charge. View "Kawakami v. Kahala Hotel Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault against a law enforcement officer in the second degree, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. Before trial, the circuit court denied defense counsel’s motion for withdrawal and substitution of counsel. A jury found Defendant guilty of the three charges. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Defendant’s motion for withdrawal and substitution of counsel, and (2) failing to sua sponte hold a hearing to determine Defendant’s competence to stand trial. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court (1) committed prejudicial error in denying Defendant’s motion for withdrawal and substitution of counsel; and (2) abused its discretion in not ordering a fitness examination. View "State v. Harter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an election complaint to contest the November 2014 general election. Plaintiff was not listed on the ballot as a candidate for any officer in the November 2014 general election. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and, in the alternative, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle her to any type of relief from the results of the general election, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Dejean v. Nago" on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who were never married, were the biological parents of two minor children. Father sought custody of the children and sought to exclude Mother from visitation. The family court decided to consider the parties’ competing custody petitions in a trial for which it set a three hour limit. During the trial, which lasted approximately three hours, Father was able to present his evidence, but Mother’s evidence was cut short despite her motion for additional time. The family court awarded sole legal and physical custody to Father. The Supreme Court vacated the family court’s order, holding that the family court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for additional trial time, as the family court’s strict enforcement of the time limit unduly curtailed Mother’s ability to present evidence relevant to the proper determination of the children’s best interests. Remanded. View "AC v. AC" on Justia Law

In 1989, land in Waikoloa on Hawai’i Island was reclassified from agricultural to urban to allow for the development of a residential community. The reclassification was made subject certain conditions. The land changed hands several time over the years. In 2009, the landowner, Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC (Bridge), informed the Land Use Commission (LUC) that it intended to assign its interest in the land to DW Aina Le’a Development, LLC (DW). DW subsequently invested approximately $20 million in developing the site. Nevertheless, the LUC voted to revert the land to its former agricultural land use classification on the basis that Bridge and its predecessors in interest had failed to perform according to the conditions imposed. Bridge and DW each sought judicial review of the LUC’s decision and order. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that the LUC erred in reverting the property without complying with the requirements of Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-4; and (2) erred in concluding that Bridge’s and DW’s procedural and substantive due process rights and equal protection rights were violated. View "DW Aina Le'a Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC" on Justia Law

Ralph Mitchell, a condominium owner in the Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay (“AOAO”), submitted a petition to the AOAO to conduct a special meeting of the AOAO to remove one or more of the AOAO Board members. The AOAO filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the petition did not contain at least twenty-five percent of the owners’ signatures, and therefore, there was no basis for conducting a special meeting. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the AOAO. The AOAO subsequently sought fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-157(a) and (b). The circuit court granted the motion. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the AOAO’s refusal to mediate the dispute precluded it from an entitlement of any fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-161(a). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded for a determination of whether section 514B-161(a) applies in this case and, if so, directed the circuit court to take into consideration such refusal in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the County of Hawai’i for negligence, alleging that it breached a legal duty to use reasonable care in maintaining pertinent correspondence in its property files contained in the Planning Department and that this breach caused Plaintiff monetary damages. The circuit court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the County had no statutorily-based duty to maintain Planning Department records with unerring accuracy. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Rule 1-8 of the Hawai’i County Planning Department Rules of Practice and Procedure nor Haw. Rev. Stat. 92F provide a statutory basis for imposing negligence liability upon the County Planning Department based on a breach of any duty to maintain its property files in accurate and timely condition at all times; and (2) policy considerations counsel against the judicial creation of such a legal duty under the common law . View "Molfino v. Yuen" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Land Use Commission (LUC) granted Horton-Schuler Homes LLC’s petition to reclassify certain lands in ‘Ewa District, O’ahu from agricultural to urban use subject to certain conditions. The Sierra Club filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court requesting judicial review of the decision, and Friends of Makakilo (FOM), a non-profit corporation, filed a notice of cross-appeal. FOM did not file its cross-appeal within thirty days after service of the certified copy of LUC’s final decision and order as required by Haw. Rev. Stat. 91-14(b). The circuit court held that FOM’s cross-appeal was not allowed by law because aggrieved parties have no right to cross-appeal and that FOM’s cross-appeal was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of FOM’s cross-appeal as untimely, holding that an “aggrieved person” seeking judicial review of an administrative decision under the Hawai’i APA must institute review proceedings within thirty days after service of the final decision and order. View "Friends of Makakilo v. D.R. Horton-Schulder Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, filed a first amended class action complaint alleging that Gentry Homes, Ltd. constructed Plaintiffs’ home without adequate high wind protection. Gentry filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty (HBLW) between Gentry and Plaintiffs. The circuit court ordered Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against Gentry but severed and struck an arbitrator-selection provision for potential conflict of interest. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court should have enforced the HBLW’s arbitrator-selection provision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court orders, holding (1) the ICA erred in required a party challenging an arbitrator-selection provision to show evidence of “actual bias”; and (2) in resolving a challenge to an arbitrator-selection provision, the “fundamental fairness” standard should be applied, and under this standard, the arbitrator-selection provision was fundamentally unfair. View "Nishimura v. Gentry Homes, Ltd." on Justia Law