Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of terroristic threatening in the second degree and kidnapping. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in (1) instructing the prosecutor to inform the jury during closing arguments that the complaining witness was unavailable because she was dead - a fact not in evidence - and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) admitting the complaining witness’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial in violation of Petitioner’s right to confrontation, and the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Nofoa" on Justia Law

C. Brewer and Company, Ltd. (C. Brewer) sold the Kaloko Dam to James Pflueger. The Dam subsequently collapsed, resulting in seven deaths and extensive property damage. Pflueger filed suit seeking damages and indemnification from C. Brewer for claims against him arising out of the Dam’s failure. C. Brewer filed a complaint against James River Insurance Company (James River) seeking a ruling regarding James River’s obligations under a commercial general liability policy issued to C. Brewer that was in effect at the time of the Dam's failure. The circuit court granted summary judgment for James River, concluding that a Designated Premises Endorsement (DPE) precluded coverage. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that the intent of the parties as to the DPE was ambiguous and thus remanded for a determination of the parties’ intent as to the DPE. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for James River and that the ICA erred in concluding it was necessary to determine the parties’ intent as to the DPE, as the DPE did not limit liability to injury and damage occurring on the designated premises. Remanded. View "C. Brewer & Co. v. Indus. Indemnity Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Defendants violated Hawaii law by charging customers of certain hotels service charges without fully disclosing to customers that the charges were not entirely being distributed to non-managerial service employees. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s wage law claims and granted summary judgment for Defendants on the unfair methods of competition (UMOC) claim. Defendants appealed, and Plaintiff cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the unpaid wages but vacated the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment for Defendants on the UMOC claim and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff then requested an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for the appeal and cross-appeal and an award of post judgment interest on the damages. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff was entitled to attorneys’ fees for both the appeal and the cross-appeal, and Defendants were jointly and severally liable for the payment of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs; and (2) post judgment interest was not appropriate under the circumstances of this case. View "Gurrobat v. HTH Corp." on Justia Law

The State Director of Taxation retroactively assessed ten online travel companies for unpaid general excise tax (GET) and transient accommodations tax (TAT) for periods beginning between 1999 and 2001 and continuing until 2011. The Director also assessed penalties. The online travel companies appealed the assessments. The tax court (1) ruled in favor of the Director with regard to the GET assessments; but (2) ruled in favor of the online travel companies with regard to the TAT assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment in regard to the GET assessments and penalties and affirmed in regard to the TAT assessments, holding (1) the GET apportioning provision was misapplied in this case; and (2) the TAT was not applicable to the online travel companies in the assessed transactions. Remanded. View "In re Tax Appeal of Travelocity.com, L.P." on Justia Law

In 1994, Investors Equity Life Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd. (IEL) was liquidated. The State Insurance Commission was appointed as IEL’s liquidator (Liquidator). In 1996, Investors Equity Life Holding Company (IELHC), the former parent company and sole shareholder of IEL, surrendered all of its shares in IEL to the Commissioner as part of a settlement agreement to resolve claims relating to IEL’s insolvency. The Liquidator proceeded to administer IEL’s estate. In 2008, IELHC wrote to the Liquidator claiming that it held legal or equitable title to all of IEL’s stock and demanding that the Liquidator turn over to IELHC all shares and assets remaining in IEL’s estate. The Liquidator denied the claim. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that IELHC asserted a claim against IEL’s estate and that the claim was time barred; (2) the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over IELHC’s claim and personal jurisdiction over IELHC; (3) there were no grounds for abating the adjudication of IELHC’s claim; and (4) the circuit court’s procedures met due process requirements. View "Ito v. Investors Equity Life Holding Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for a position with CDM Media, USA, Inc. Plaintiff was not hired for the position. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that CDM had decided not to hire her because of her age, and therefore, she had been subjected to employment discrimination. The circuit court granted summary judgment for CDM, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that CDM’s reasons for not hiring her were pretextual. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, as CDM did not satisfy its burden to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire Plaintiff. View "Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted in counts I and III upon the charge of electronic enticement of a child in the first degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-756. Defendant moved to dismiss counts I and III, arguing that section 707-756 violates the dormant commerce clause and that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based upon the plain language of section 707-756, its legislative history, and principles of statutory construction, the felonious intent of the statute applies only to the agreement element of that statute; and (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, and its application does not violate the dormant commerce clause. View "State v. Alangcas" on Justia Law

This labor dispute arose out of a negotiation between the State and other governmental entities (collectively, the State) and United Public Workers (UPW) regarding the renewal and modification of a collective bargaining agreement. The State and UPW failed to reach an agreement, and the case proceeded to arbitration. Because the parties were unable to select a neutral arbitrator, the Hawai’i Labor Relations Board (HLRB) ordered the American Arbitration Association to select the neutral arbitrator. Both parties challenged the actions of the HLRB. The circuit court affirmed the HLRB’s rulings. On appeal, UPW asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute regarding the selection of the arbitrator. The Intermediate Court of Appeals disagreed, determining that HLRB had exclusive original jurisdiction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 89-14. UPW appealed, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dispute regarding selection of the arbitrator under Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HLRB had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over the selection of the arbitrator under chapter 89, as the arbitration was required by statute as part of the legislatively mandated process for resolving impasses in collective bargaining; and (2) chapter 658A was not applicable to this case. View "State v. Nakaneula" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crystal methamphetamine. Petitioner was released in 2003 and began a radiological technician (radtech) degree program. In 2007, after graduating from the program, Petitioner applied for a vacant radtech position at Hawai’i Health Systems Corporation (HHSC), d/b/a Hilo Medical Center (HMC) (collectively, HHSC/HMC). HHSC/HMC rejected Petitioner’s application because of his prior drug conviction. Petitioner filed suit, alleging violations of Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-2 and Haw. Const. art. I, 5. The circuit court granted summary judgment for HHSC/HMC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment where HHSC/HMC did not establish the existence of a rational relationship between the radtech possession and Petitioner’s prior drug conviction that would entitle HHSC/HMC to summary judgment. View "Shimose v. Haw. Health Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint contesting the second special election for councilmember for District IV, City and County of Honolulu, alleging errors in the counting of the votes and the handling of the ballots. Plaintiff, a nonpartisan candidate for the District IV councilmember seat, had lost the election by forty-one votes. The Supreme Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, the Chief Election Officer and the State Office of Elections, holding that Plaintiff failed to show in his pleadings actual information of errors, mistakes, or irregularities sufficient to change the outcome of the election. View "Waters v. Nago " on Justia Law