Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree for allegedly fondling the breast of the complaining witness while she slept. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of a police detective, a veteran of the Sex Crimes Detail, that probable cause existed for arresting Defendant because the officer’s testimony invaded the province of the jury by bolstering the complaining witness’s credibility where the officer was imbued with “an aura of expertise” due to his experience. View "State v. Calara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a claim against the State Procurement Policy Board challenging the validity of Haw. Admin. R. 3-122-66, claiming it was contrary to the “minimum of three” persons requirement in Haw. Rev. Stat. 103D-304(g) and should be struck down. Plaintiff also sought a declaration that every government contract issued under the invalid authority of Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff had standing to bring the action and that Rule 3-122-66 was invalid, but the court declined invalidate all contracts issued under Rule 3-122-66. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner had standing to bring his claim based on his status as an “interested person” and in order to satisfy the “needs of justice”; (2) Rule 3-122-66 is invalid because manifestly exceeds the scope of authority given by the legislature to the Board; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to rule that every government contract issued under Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. View "Asato v. State Procurement Policy Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of several drug-related offenses. The Hawaii Paroling Authority (HPA) fixed minimum terms of imprisonment and categorized Petitioner as a Level III offender. After the ICA reversed one of Petitioner’s convictions, the HPA reset Petitioner’s minimum terms to the same terms that had previously been imposed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Haw. R. Penal P. 40. The petition was denied. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a second Rule 40 petition challenging his minimum term and his status as a Level III offender. The circuit court denied the second petition, concluding that Petitioner waived his claims for not including them in his first petition. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments, holding (1) because Petitioner presented evidence that did not receive notice that, on remand, the HPA reset his minimum term to the same minimum term in time for him to have raised the issue in his first petition, Petitioner’s second petition should not have been denied without a hearing on the basis that his claims had been waived; and (2) inasmuch as Petitioner’s offenses did not meet the prescribed criteria to classify Petitioner as a Level III offender, the HPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Remanded. View "Fagaragan v. State" on Justia Law

VP & PK purchased an insurance policy from Lexington Insurance Company for work on a construction site. Kila Kila, one of VP & PK’s subcontractors, purchased an insurance policy from Nautilus Insurance Company. Both policies contained an “other insurance” provision and included duties to defend and indemnify. When VP & PK and Kila Kila were sued for damages resulting from the construction, Nautilus funded the defense of both Kila Kila and VP & PK. Lexington satisfied the judgment against VP & PK but did not contribute to the defense costs. Nautilus filed a complaint seeking (1) a declaration that Lexington owed VP & PK a duty to defend, which it breached; and (2) equitable contribution from Lexington for defense costs. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Lexington, holding that Lexington’s policy was in excess to Nautilus’s policy, and therefore, Lexington’s duty to defend was not triggered. The Hawaii Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the court of appeals and held, inter alia, that (1) an “other insurance” clause purporting to release an otherwise primary insurer of the duty to defend if the insurer becomes excess as to liability is enforceable, but only as between two or more insurers seeking to allocate or recover defense costs; and (2) an otherwise primary insurer who becomes an excess insurer by operation of an “other insurance” clause has a duty to defend as soon as a claim is tendered to it and there is the mere possibility that coverage of that claim exists under its policy. View "Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer and supervisors, alleging that he suffered discriminatory conduct while employed as a car salesman. Plaintiff asserted claims for state harassment and retaliation, federal harassment and retaliation, unlawful termination as against public policy, and breach of his employment contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and one of Defendant’s supervisors on the state harassment and retaliation claims and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the federal harassment and retaliation claims and the public policy claim, and (2) otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the ICA’s judgment on the state harassment and retaliation claims with respect to Plaintiff’s supervisor, holding that individual employees are not liable as employers under Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-2(1)(A) and 378-2(2); and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co." on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court convicted Defendant of exceeding the speed limit, finding that the State met its burden of proof that Defendant’s vehicle was traveling sixty-five miles per area in an area where the speed limit was fifty miles per hour. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in failing to sustain Defendant’s foundation and hearsay objections to the admission of a speed reading from a police officer’s laser gun. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed error in admitting the speed into evidence because the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the introduction of the laser gun reading. Remanded. View "State v. Amiral" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Marn Family Litigation, which had been ongoing for nearly fifteen years and concerned the ownership and control of the Marn family business. Petitioner Alexander Marn filed the instant appeal before the Supreme Court pro se before the intermediate court of appeals (ICA). The ICA dismissed Alexander’s appeal for failure to comply with the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure in his opening brief. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA’s dismissal of Alexander’s appeal without notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond was a violation of Haw. R. App. P. 30. Remanded. View "In re Marn Family Litig." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a no contest plea to a charge of sexual assault in the third degree. Defendant later tested positive for methamphetamine use in violation of his probation. Defendant’s probation officer subsequently filed a motion requesting a revocation of Defendant’s probation. During trial, the family court denied Defendant’s request for a continuance to obtain the testimony of a physician, who could have informed the court of whether Defendant was decompensating at the time of the violations. The court then revoked Defendant’s probation and sentenced him to five years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the family court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance and in revoking his probation where the evidence did not indicate that he willfully and inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his probation. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) inasmuch as Defendant satisfied the “good cause” standard in his request for a continuance, the family court abused its discretion in denying his request; and (2) in determining whether Defendant inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed by the probation order, the court must apply a test articulated within this opinion. View "State v. Villiarimo" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) recorded a statutory lien on Petitioner’s real and personal property for delinquent child support. More than a decade later, a law firm agreed to Appellant in an unrelated civil action in exchange for one-third of any recovery obtained. The action resulted in an arbitration award in Petitioner’s favor. The State and the law firm disputed whether the CSEA lien had priority over the attorneys’ lien. The circuit court concluded that the CSEA’s statutory lien had priority over Petitioner’s attorneys’ lien. On appeal, Petitioner argued (1) his attorneys’ lien constituted a property interest that was independent from his interest in the judgment, and (2) therefore, equitable and public policy considerations favored giving an attorneys’ lien priority over the CSEA’s lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 507-81 does not provide a superior or independent right for an attorney’s property interest in a judgment over a prior recorded CSEA lien; and (2) accordingly, CSEA’s lien took priority over Petitioner’s attorneys’ lien. View "Lopez v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the circuit court abused its discretion when it ruled that evidence of Petitioner’s prior assault conviction would be admissible to rebut the affirmative, mitigating defense of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED), which caused him to forego an instruction on the EMED defense. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the EMED defense when it is raised by the evidence even where neither party requests the instruction; (2) thus, a defendant may not waive an instruction on the EMED defense; and (3) therefore, the circuit court in this case was obligated to instruct the jury on the EMED defense upon determining that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the instruction, even where Petitioner waived the defense. Remanded. View "State v. Adviento" on Justia Law