Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the excess insurer, and Defendant, the primary insurer, issued insurance policies to a travel service company. The company was sued for damages resulting from an accidental death. The case was settled in an amount in excess of Defendant’s policy limit. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that Defendant acted in bad faith by rejecting multiple settlement offers within the limit of its primary liability policy. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to assert a claim for insurer bad faith and that Plaintiff had no claim against Defendant for equitable subrogation. The federal district court certified a question to the Hawaii Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that an excess liability insurer can bring a cause of action under the doctrine of equitable subrogation against a primary liability insurer who, in bad faith, fails to settle a claim within the limits of the primary liability policy when the primary insurer has paid its policy limit toward settlement. View "St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After the County of Kaua’i and Kaua’i Police Department filled five police sergeant positions through internal promotions, the State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers (SHOPO) challenged, through the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the parties, the non-promotions of three police officers. The parties were unable to resolve the grievances, and the matter was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the promotions were subjective, arbitrary, and capricious in violation of the CBA and awarded the three officers promotions and back pay. The circuit court vacated the arbitrator’s remedy, concluding that it was beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s authority to award promotions. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated in part the circuit court’s orders and remanded to the circuit court for confirmation of the arbitrator’s decision in its entirety, concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in awarding promotions and that the circuit court erred in finding otherwise. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority under the CBA. View "In re Grievance Arbitration Between State of Haw. Org. of Police Officers" on Justia Law

Passed by voter initiative, the “Lowest Law Enforcement Priority of Cannabis” (LLEP) of the Hawai’i County Code provides that the cultivation, possession and use for adult personal use of cannabis shall be the lowest law enforcement priority for law enforcement agencies in the county. Petitioners, a group of pro se individuals, filed a complaint alleging that Defendants - members of the Hawai’i County Council, Hawai’i County prosecutors, and chief of police - failed to comply with the LLEP. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case, concluding that the LLEP was preempted by state law. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LLEP is preempted solely because it conflicts with state law; and (2) the entire LLEP is invalidated because it conflicts with, and is therefore preempted by, state law. View "Ruggles v. Yagong" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft of the proceeds of sale of the home of an individual for whom she was acting as a caregiver, changing the name of ownership of two joint accounts, and taking $8,000 from the joint account to pay off Chin’s car. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the actions of a jury foreperson in communicating with a main defense witness about possible employment was highly prejudicial. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the nature of the alleged deprivation did not rise to the level of being substantially prejudicial. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment on appeal and the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) in this case, the circuit court was required to investigate the circumstances surrounding the nontrivial communication between the defense witness and the juror; and (2) because the circuit court did not conduct such an investigation, it could not be said that Defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was not compromised. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Chin" on Justia Law

John Doe, a registered sex offender in the State of Washington, intended to vacation in Hawaii with his family. The Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center (HCJDC) informed Doe that his Washington conviction was a covered offense requiring registration in Hawaii under Haw. Rev. Stat. 846E-2. Doe wrote to the Attorney General, seeking a “declaration” as to whether he was required to register as a sex offender while present in Hawaii. HCJDC replied on behalf of the Attorney General again informing Doe that he would be required to register in Hawaii. Doe filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court with respect to the decision of the Attorney General. The circuit court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Doe’s communications with HCJDC did not present a contested proceeding that was appealable. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s affirmance of the circuit court’s dismissal of Doe’s agency appeal based on lack of jurisdiction, holding that a reasonable interpretation of HCJDC’s initial letter is as a denial of Doe’s petition for a declaratory order, thus affording Doe his right to appeal that decision to circuit court. View "Lawson v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to substitute retained counsel in place of his court-appointed counsel. The intermediate appellate court (ICA) affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for withdrawal and substitution of counsel, resulting in the denial of Defendant’s right to privately retained counsel of choice under Haw. Const. art. I, 14. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to continuous sexual assault of a minor under the age of fourteen and abuse of a family or household member. The family court accepted the plea agreement, found Defendant guilty as charged, and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. Before sentencing, the prosecutor submitted a letter and three exhibits to the probation office for inclusion in Defendant’s PSI report that included recommendations relevant to sentencing. The submission would have been forwarded to the Hawaii Paroling Authority for its consideration at the minimum term hearing. Defendant moved to withdraw his no contest plea, arguing that the prosecutor’s submission constituted a breach of the plea agreement. The family court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the family court’s findings and order, holding that the prosecutor’s submission of the letter and exhibits was a fair and just reason for Defendant’s withdrawal of his plea, and the State did not satisfy its burden to demonstrate substantial prejudice if the motion to withdraw the plea was granted. Remanded. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law

John Varel, the owner of a 1,000-acre parcel of property, filed a petition for injunction against harassment directed against Defendant. The circuit court granted the petition and entered an injunction order prohibiting Defendant from entering Varel’s “residence, including yard and garage.” When Defendant was discovered dirt biking on the outer limits of Varel’s property, he was charged with violating the injunction order. The district court concluded that Defendant violated the injunction order. Defendant appealed, arguing that the most reasonable construction of the term “yard,” as used in the injunction order, should not encompass the entire 1,000 acres of Varel’s property. The Intermediate Court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the meaning of “residence, including yard” encompasses only the house where Varel lives and the area directly adjacent to it, and therefore, the area of Varel’s property where Defendant was observed was outside the meaning of “residence, including yard”; and (2) accordingly, the conviction in this case was not supported by sufficient evidence and must be reversed. View "State v. Guyton" on Justia Law

Susan Gordon filed a complaint for divorce against Ira Gordon. The family court entered a divorce decree diving the parties’ property and awarding Susan alimony. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the decree as it pertained to the property division and otherwise affirmed, holding that the family court was able to identify and value marital assets without a property division chart but erred by distributing a property to Ira that was no longer in the parties’ possession at the time of the divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment to the extent that it vacated the family court’s decree and otherwise vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the family court’s divorce decree, holding that the family court (1) erred in failing to support its property division with sufficient documentation so that the parties and reviewing court could ensure the division was equitable and free from miscalculations or other errors; (2) erred in deviating from a fifty-fifty division of the martial estate in addition to a deduction for marital waste; and (3) erred in its award of alimony to Susan. View "Gordon v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individual condominium owners, entered into purchase agreements with the developer of a Maui condominium project. Homeowners received the condominium declaration, which contained an arbitration clause, and other documents governing the project along with their purchase agreements. When the condominium development began experiencing financial problems, Homeowners filed suit against Respondents, the development and management companies for the project. Respondents filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the circuit court summarily denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that a valid arbitration agreement existed, this dispute fell within the scope of that agreement, the arbitration terms were procedurally conscionable, and the arbitration clause was not an unenforceable contract of adhesion. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) because Plaintiffs did not unambiguously assent to arbitration, the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable; (2) the ICA erred by placing dispositive weight on procedural unconscionability without addressing the alleged substantive unconscionability of the arbitration terms; and (3) the ICA erred by concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate procedural unconscionability. View "Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co." on Justia Law