Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a coastal height setback requirement that limits development next to Waikiki’s shoreline. In 2010, Kyo-ya Hotels & Resorts LP submitted a land use permit to redevelop an existing hotel building with a twenty-six-story hotel and residential tower. The Director of the Department of Planning and Permitting granted partial approval of Kyo-ya’s variance application to allow the Project to encroach approximately seventy-four percent into the coastal height setback. Several entities (Petitioners) challenged the Director’s conclusion that Kyo-ya’s request for a variance from the coastal height Sstback met the requirements for issuance of a variance as set forth by the city charter. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) denied Petitioners’ appeal of the Director’s decision. The circuit court affirmed the ZBA order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kyo-ya met none of the three requirements for issuance of a variance. View "Surfrider Found. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted in six counts, but only counts I and IV were at issue in this appeal. Two separate trials ended in mistrial on the relevant counts. After a second trial on counts I through IV, the circuit court again declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. The circuit court later concluded that it had erred by not accepting an apparent unanimous verdict of guilty on count II, reconvened the jury, and accepted the guilty verdict as to count II. The court subsequently granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss counts I, III, and IV. The court also granted Defendant’s motion to vacate count II based on juror misconduct and ordered a retrial on that count. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Defendant and the State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ICA correctly concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing counts I, III, and IV under the factors set forth in State v. Moriwake; (2) the ICA did not err in concluding that retrial of count II was not barred by double jeopardy; and (3) the ICA did not err in declining to address whether the circuit court erred in recalling the jury. View "State v. Deguair" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old child (“Minor”) died from cardiac arrest caused by hypovolemic shock. Plaintiffs filed this action against the Queen’s Medical Center (“QMC”), Dr. Thinh T. Nguyen (“Defendant”), and The Emergency Group, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants failed to provide information required under the informed consent doctrine before treating Minor for vomiting and nausea with the medication Reglan. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law for Defendants on the informed consent claim. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part the ICA’s judgment on appeal as to Plaintiffs’ informed consent claims, holding (1) Plaintiffs presented sufficient expert medical evidence to advance their informed consent claim to the jury; and (2) the ICA erred in concluding that Plaintiffs waived the issue of Defendant’s failure to inform them of all statutorily mandated information. View "Ngo v. Queen's Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over the adequacy of concrete work Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. performed on a condominium construction project as a subcontractor to LPIHGC, LLC. The parties proceeded to arbitration. An arbitrator selected by the parties issued an arbitration award in favor of LPIHGC. LPIHGC moved to confirm, and Nordic moved to vacate, the arbitration award. The circuit court denied the motion to vacate and granted the motion to confirm. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to disclose various relationships with the law firms of LPIHGC’s attorneys. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s final judgment, thereby vacating the associated orders granting LPIHGC’s motion to confirm the arbitration award and denying Nordic’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, holding that because the factual and/or legal bases upon which the circuit court denied the motion to vacate were unascertainable, the Supreme Court was unable to appropriately review the circuit court’s ruling. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing and entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on Nordic’s motion to vacate. View "In re Arbitration of Nordic PCL Constr., Inc. v. LIPHGC, LLC" on Justia Law

The case arose from a dispute over the adequacy of concrete work Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. performed on a condominium construction project as a subcontractor to LPIHGC, LLC. The subcontract contained a binding arbitration clause. The arbitrator entered a partial final award and final award (collectively, the arbitration award), ruling in favor of LPIHGC. LPIHGC filed a motion to confirm, and Nordic filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing to address disputed issues of material fact. The circuit court granted LPIHGC’s motion and denied Nordic’s motion and entered final judgment in favor of LPIHGC. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed, concluding that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose various relationship with the law firms of LPIHGC’s attorneys established a reasonable impression of partiality requiring vacatur of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that because the circuit court did not explain the basis of its rulings on the record or enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, the Court was unable to determine whether the circuit court erred in denying Nordic’s motion to vacate. Remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing and entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on Nordic’s motion to vacate. View "Nordic PCL Constr., Inc. v. LIPHGC, LLC" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court found Defendant guilty of harassment. Defendant attended his sentencing hearing without his lawyer. After a brief colloquy with Defendant, the district court found that Defendant had validly waived his right to counsel. The court then sentenced Defendant to the maximum five-day jail term allowed for a term of probation for the harassment offense. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) upheld Defendant’s sentence, concluding that Defendant waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, holding that the record did not support a finding that Defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made. View "State v. Phua" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted for sex trafficking related crimes based on his conduct as a pimp for the complaining witness. Petitioner was present for voir dire and jury selection but failed to appear in court two days later despite instructions to do so. The trial was twice continued. After the second continuation, which lasted twenty-one days, the circuit court conducted trial in absentia. The intermediate court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for failing to object to disjunctive charging language in jury instructions; and (2) the trial court did not violate Rule 43 of the Hawai’i Rules of Penal Procedure or violate Defendant’s right to be present at trial by proceeding with trial despite Defendant’s absence. View "State v. Vaimili" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over a flag lot parcel of land in Puko’o, located on the Island of Moloka’i, County of Maui, State of Hawaii. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an order deciding a motion that was purportedly filed pursuant to Haw. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is appealable where the underlying ruling from which the party sought Rule 60(b) relief was not appealable. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order regarding the Rule 60(b) motion was not appealable because the circuit court had not entered a valid final judgment on the underlying claims at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that relief under Rule 60(b) requires an underlying judgment that comports with the principles of finality set forth in Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, and therefore, the ICA did not err in including that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the order regarding the Rule 60(b) motion. View "Bailey v. Duvauchelle" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation Airport Division (DOT-A), which leases Dillingham Airfield on the island of O’ahu from the United States Army, imposed landing fees on commercial users, including Petitioners. In 2012, DOT-A asserted that Petitioners owed DOT-A $264,995 in unpaid landing fees. Petitioners filed a complaint seeking the following relief: the return of landing fees paid under protest; injunctive relief preventing DOT-A from imposing additional fees against Petitioners; and a declaration that an administrative rule of DOT-A was invalid to the extent it established the rate of landing fees at the airfield. The circuit court denied injunctive relief and entered judgment on the merits in favor of DOT-A. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DOT-A is not precluded from setting and imposing landing fees at the airfield through a DOT-A procedure that references the Hawaii Administrative Rules for the landing fee rates. View "Pofolk Aviation Haw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. for State of Haw." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in a state district court and later moved to dismiss the case. The district court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice and awarded Defendant attorney’s fees pursuant to Hawai’i District Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which grants a trial court discretion to impose attorney’s fees as a term or condition of voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting attorney’s fees before the merits of the case had been decided and before a prevailing party was properly identified. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in awarding Defendant attorney’s fees in order to alleviate any prejudice resulting from the dismissal. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion by (1) not providing Plaintiff with an opportunity to choose between accepting this condition or withdrawing her motion to dismiss; and (2) failing to evaluate and make findings on whether the award and amount of attorney’s fees and costs accords substantial justice to both parties. View "Tagupa v. VIPDesk" on Justia Law