Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured while he was working for his former employer. Appellant made a workers’ compensation claim against his former employer and its insurance carrier (collectively, Defendants). The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) concluded that substantial evidence rebutted the presumption that that Appellant’s injuries were related to his work accident and, further, limited Plaintiff’s TTD benefits based on deficiencies in the certificates of disability submitted by Appellant’s attending physicians. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the LIRAB’s decision and order, holding that the LIRAB erred in (1) concluding that Defendants adduced substantial evidence that rebutted the presumption that Appellant’s injuries were covered work-related injuries; and (2) relying on the deficiencies in Appellant’s physicians’ reports in limiting Appellant’s TTD benefits. Remanded. View "Panoke v. Reef Dev. of Hawaii, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violation of a protective order. The date of the trial was continued for one month because the trial judge was ill. This continuance resulted in Defendant’s trial not beginning until fourteen days after the six-month period under Haw. R. Penal P. 48 for trying a criminal defendant expired. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The family court denied the motion, concluding that the continuance due to the judge’s illness extended the Rule 48 trial deadline by one month because the illness constituted “good cause” for delay under Rule 48(c)(8). After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the family court erred in determining that the trial judge’s illness constituted good cause to exclude one month under Rule 48. Remanded. View "State v. Abregano" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Landlord and Tenant. Landlord served a forty-five-day eviction notice on Tenant stating that the lease would be terminated, but Tenant refused to leave the premises. Tenant filed a complaint alleging claims for, inter alia retaliatory eviction, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Landlord filed a motion for leave to file a summary possession counterclaim. The district court granted the motion. After a trial, the district court entered a judgment for possession and writ of possession in favor of Landlord. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and vacated the district court’s judgment for possession and writ of possession, holding (1) the ICA erred in affirming the district court’s judgment for possession and writ of possession based on the forty-five-day notice to vacate because when Landlord issued to Tenant the forty-five-day notice to vacate, Haw. Rev. Stat. 521-74(a) rendered the notice ineffective; (2) there were no grounds to remove Tenant based on a failure to pay rent; and (3) the ICA erred in determining that the district court did not prevent Tenant from fully presenting evidence for the court’s consideration on the issue of summary possession. View "Cedillos v. Masumoto" on Justia Law

Defendant’s vehicle struck Minor in or near a crosswalk as Minor crossed Farrington Highway on foot. A jury returned a unanimous special verdict finding Defendant not negligent. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the circuit court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or, in the alternative, for new trial, holding (1) the jury instructions erroneously focused on a pedestrian’s obligation to obey all traffic laws rather than a driver’s obligation to avoid collisions, and the erroneous instructions were prejudicial; (2) the circuit court erred in excluding certain testimony on Defendant’s speed; and (3) the circuit court erred in excluding a photograph with markings made or authorized by a witness during his deposition that placed Minor in a crosswalk. Remanded. View "Samson v. Nahulu" on Justia Law

The University of Hawai’i at Hilo applied for approval from the Board of Land and Natural Resources (Board) to construct a thirty meter telescope on Mauna Kea on the island of Hawai’i. Despite objections, the Board voted to approve the permit, subject to a number of conditions. The Board further directed that a contested case hearing be conducted and included a condition in the permit that no construction could be undertaken until the contested case hearing was resolved. After the contested case hearing, the hearing officer recommended that the permit be approved. The Board adopted that recommendation. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s action. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and the permit issued by the Board, holding that, by voting on the permit before the contested case hearing was held, the Board violated the Hawai’i Constitution’s guarantee of due process. Remanded. View "Hou v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res." on Justia Law

This case arose from a construction contract dispute between homeowners Ramon Romero and Cassie Romero and contractor Noel Madamba Contracting LLC (Madamba). The case proceeded to arbitration. Arbitrator Patrick K.S.L. Yim issued a partial final arbitration award concluding that Madamba breached the construction contract and that the Romeros were entitled to compensatory damages. Following the issuance of the partial final award, the parties learned that the law firm representing the Romeros throughout the arbitration had been retained by the administrator of Yim’s personal retirement accounts. Madamba moved to vacate the arbitration award based on this previously undisclosed information. The circuit court denied the motion, determining that Yim’s failure to disclose this information did not constitute evident partiality. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that Yim’s failure to disclose his relationship with the Romeros’ counsel’s law firm constituted evident partiality requiring vacatur of the arbitration award. Remanded with instructions to vacate the arbitration award. View "Noel Madamba Contracting, LLC v. Romero" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police officers while driving his vehicle and was subsequently arrested for operating his vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. Defendant was asked to submit to a test for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. The police informed Defendant of his right to refuse to consent to a bodily search but told him if he exercised that right, his refusal to consent would result in a potential thirty-day term of imprisonment. The intermediate court of appeals upheld Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test and the statutory scheme imposing sanctions for withdrawing consent. Defendant appealed, arguing that the BAC evidence in this case was obtained in an unconstitutional manner and should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the result of Defendant’s breath test, the product of a warrantless search, was not admissible into evidence because voluntary consent was not demonstrated, and no other exception to the warrant requirement was applicable. View "State v. Won" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of committing robbery in the second degree. The jury was not required to find that Defendant had any prior convictions. The prosecution filed a post-conviction motion for the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and introduced into evidence the judgment for Defendant’s prior convictions. The circuit court took judicial notice on file for both of Defendant’s prior convictions and granted the State’s motion for imposition of mandatory minimum period of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that, in accordance with Alleyne v. United States, a jury should have considered the facts alleged in the prosecution’s motion for imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) repeat offender sentencing under section 706-606.5 enhances the penalty of the crime committed, and therefore, a defendant’s predicate prior conviction(s) must be alleged in the charging instrument; (2) a jury is required to find that the defendant’s prior conviction(s) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to trigger the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under section 706-606.5; but (3) these rules are given prospective effect only. View "State v. Auld" on Justia Law

After Leigh Matsuyoshi fell behind on her mortgage payments, the property was auctioned off at a foreclosure sale. Thereafter, the mortgagee, who was also the purchaser of the foreclosed property, executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to Kondaur Capital Corporation. Kondau filed a complaint for possession of the property against Matsuyoshi. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Kondaur. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) ultimately affirmed. Matsuyoshi appealed, citing Ulrich v. Security Investment Co. and arguing that the ICA misapplied the summary judgment standard by requiring her to present evidence when Kondaur had failed to present a prima facie case establishing that the sale of the property was valid. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the duties set forth in Ulrich remain viable law and are applicable to non-judicial foreclosures of real property mortgages; (2) when a mortgagee acts as both the seller and the purchaser of property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, that mortgagee or its quitclaim transferee bears the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of Ulrich; and (3) in this case, because Kondaur failed to satisfy its initial burden of showing that the foreclosure sale was conducted in compliance with the requirements of Ulrich, the burden never shifted to Matsuyoshi, and summary judgment was erroneously granted. View "Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The charging instrument did not allege that the offense took place on a public way, street, road, or highway. Two years later, the Supreme Court held in State v. Wheeler that operation of a vehicle on “a public way, street, road, or highway” is an attendant circumstance of the offense of OVUII and must be stated in the charge. Based on Wheeler, Defendant filed a petition to vacate and set aside the judgment under Haw. R. Penal P. 40, arguing that the complaint was fatally defective, thereby conferring no subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court. The district court denied the Rule 40 petition, concluding that Wheeler did not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the criminal jurisdiction of the district court is provided by Haw. Rev. Stat. 604; and (2) in this case, the district court had jurisdiction over the OVUII charge by satisfaction of the requirements set forth in chapter 604, and the fact that the OVUII charge failed to allege an element of the offense did not extinguish the criminal jurisdiction of the district court. View "Schwartz v. State" on Justia Law