Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The University of Hawai’i at Hilo applied for approval from the Board of Land and Natural Resources (Board) to construct a thirty meter telescope on Mauna Kea on the island of Hawai’i. Despite objections, the Board voted to approve the permit, subject to a number of conditions. The Board further directed that a contested case hearing be conducted and included a condition in the permit that no construction could be undertaken until the contested case hearing was resolved. After the contested case hearing, the hearing officer recommended that the permit be approved. The Board adopted that recommendation. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s action. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and the permit issued by the Board, holding that, by voting on the permit before the contested case hearing was held, the Board violated the Hawai’i Constitution’s guarantee of due process. Remanded. View "Hou v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res." on Justia Law

This case arose from a construction contract dispute between homeowners Ramon Romero and Cassie Romero and contractor Noel Madamba Contracting LLC (Madamba). The case proceeded to arbitration. Arbitrator Patrick K.S.L. Yim issued a partial final arbitration award concluding that Madamba breached the construction contract and that the Romeros were entitled to compensatory damages. Following the issuance of the partial final award, the parties learned that the law firm representing the Romeros throughout the arbitration had been retained by the administrator of Yim’s personal retirement accounts. Madamba moved to vacate the arbitration award based on this previously undisclosed information. The circuit court denied the motion, determining that Yim’s failure to disclose this information did not constitute evident partiality. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that Yim’s failure to disclose his relationship with the Romeros’ counsel’s law firm constituted evident partiality requiring vacatur of the arbitration award. Remanded with instructions to vacate the arbitration award. View "Noel Madamba Contracting, LLC v. Romero" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police officers while driving his vehicle and was subsequently arrested for operating his vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. Defendant was asked to submit to a test for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. The police informed Defendant of his right to refuse to consent to a bodily search but told him if he exercised that right, his refusal to consent would result in a potential thirty-day term of imprisonment. The intermediate court of appeals upheld Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test and the statutory scheme imposing sanctions for withdrawing consent. Defendant appealed, arguing that the BAC evidence in this case was obtained in an unconstitutional manner and should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the result of Defendant’s breath test, the product of a warrantless search, was not admissible into evidence because voluntary consent was not demonstrated, and no other exception to the warrant requirement was applicable. View "State v. Won" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of committing robbery in the second degree. The jury was not required to find that Defendant had any prior convictions. The prosecution filed a post-conviction motion for the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and introduced into evidence the judgment for Defendant’s prior convictions. The circuit court took judicial notice on file for both of Defendant’s prior convictions and granted the State’s motion for imposition of mandatory minimum period of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that, in accordance with Alleyne v. United States, a jury should have considered the facts alleged in the prosecution’s motion for imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) repeat offender sentencing under section 706-606.5 enhances the penalty of the crime committed, and therefore, a defendant’s predicate prior conviction(s) must be alleged in the charging instrument; (2) a jury is required to find that the defendant’s prior conviction(s) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to trigger the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under section 706-606.5; but (3) these rules are given prospective effect only. View "State v. Auld" on Justia Law

After Leigh Matsuyoshi fell behind on her mortgage payments, the property was auctioned off at a foreclosure sale. Thereafter, the mortgagee, who was also the purchaser of the foreclosed property, executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to Kondaur Capital Corporation. Kondau filed a complaint for possession of the property against Matsuyoshi. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Kondaur. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) ultimately affirmed. Matsuyoshi appealed, citing Ulrich v. Security Investment Co. and arguing that the ICA misapplied the summary judgment standard by requiring her to present evidence when Kondaur had failed to present a prima facie case establishing that the sale of the property was valid. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the duties set forth in Ulrich remain viable law and are applicable to non-judicial foreclosures of real property mortgages; (2) when a mortgagee acts as both the seller and the purchaser of property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, that mortgagee or its quitclaim transferee bears the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of Ulrich; and (3) in this case, because Kondaur failed to satisfy its initial burden of showing that the foreclosure sale was conducted in compliance with the requirements of Ulrich, the burden never shifted to Matsuyoshi, and summary judgment was erroneously granted. View "Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The charging instrument did not allege that the offense took place on a public way, street, road, or highway. Two years later, the Supreme Court held in State v. Wheeler that operation of a vehicle on “a public way, street, road, or highway” is an attendant circumstance of the offense of OVUII and must be stated in the charge. Based on Wheeler, Defendant filed a petition to vacate and set aside the judgment under Haw. R. Penal P. 40, arguing that the complaint was fatally defective, thereby conferring no subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court. The district court denied the Rule 40 petition, concluding that Wheeler did not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the criminal jurisdiction of the district court is provided by Haw. Rev. Stat. 604; and (2) in this case, the district court had jurisdiction over the OVUII charge by satisfaction of the requirements set forth in chapter 604, and the fact that the OVUII charge failed to allege an element of the offense did not extinguish the criminal jurisdiction of the district court. View "Schwartz v. State" on Justia Law

In 1996, Petitioner suffered a work-related injury while employed by Employer. Petitioner was subsequently awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. In 2008, Employer denied Petitioner’s request that he be fitted for a neuromonics device for treatment of his tinnitus condition and gave notice of its intent to terminate TTD payments. Petitioner requested a hearing challenging Employer’s actions. The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Disability Compensation Division, determined that Petitioner was not entitled to a neuromonics device and that he was no longer entitled to TTD benefits because he was able to resume work. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) affirmed the Director’s decision. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed LIRAB’s decision and order. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and LIRAB’s decision and order, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to show that the neuromonics device was reasonably needed for treating Petitioner’s tinnitus; and (2) based on that finding, Petitioner was not medically stable and unable to return to work, and therefore, Petitioner was entitled to reinstatement of TTD payments. View "Pulawa v. Oahu Constr. Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of one each each of harassment and trespass. After a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the complaining witness, which included restitution for a ten-day period when the complaining witness was unable to work due to her injuries. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the restitution order, holding that lost wages are not a compensable category of restitution pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-646. The Supreme Court vacated in part the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the district court’s order of restitution as it related to lost wages, holding (1) section 706-646 permits restitution for reasonable and verified lost wages in appropriate circumstances; and (2) the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Defendant to pay restitution for wages that the complaining witness lost as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct. View "State v. DeMello" on Justia Law

This case involved dibromochloropropane, a powerful nematode worm killer, and the litigation was multi-jurisdictional. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendants on statute of limitations grounds. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. At issue on certiorari was (1) whether the filing of a putative class action in another jurisdiction operated to toll the state of Hawaii’s statute of limitations, and (2) if so, at what point did such tolling end? The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding (1) the filing of a putative class action in another jurisdiction does toll the statute of limitations in the state of Hawaii because such “cross-jurisdictional tolling” supports a purpose of class action litigations, which is to avoid a multiplicity of suits; (2) under the circumstances of this case, cross-jurisdictional tolling ended when the foreign jurisdiction issued a final judgment that unequivocally dismissed the putative class action; and (3) Plaintiffs’ complaint was timely filed within the applicable limitations period and, therefore, was not time-barred. View "Patrickson v. Dole Food Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Plaintiff, Ka’upulehu Land LLC, and Defendants, heirs and assigns of Pahukula, et al., stemming from Plaintiff’s complaint to quiet title to certain property. Plaintiff, which obtained the property through paper title derived from a common grantor, claimed that neither it nor Defendants received valid title to the property because the common grantor had sold the property prior to his death. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to the entire property by adverse possession. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court’s judgment, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of a cotenancy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the common grantor was not vested with title to the property when he died, and therefore, title to the property descended in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the common grantor’s death to his heirs; and (2) Defendants and Plaintiff were cotenants because they both received their interests in the property through a series of conveyances stemming from the common grantor. View "Ka'upulehu Land LLC v. Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula " on Justia Law