Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle after license and privilege have been suspended of revoked for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in permitting the State to amend the charge against Defendant to allege the required mens rea for the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the defective charge did not constitute a jurisdictional defect that failed to confer subject-matter jurisdiction to the district court; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims lacked merit. View "State v. Gomez " on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). Defendant was subsequently taken to the police station where she read an implied consent form, which conveyed a threat of imprisonment and significant punishment for refusal to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test. Defendant chose to take a breath test. Defendant was later convicted of OVUII. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the breath test result, arguing that she did not constitutionally consent to the breath test because her consent was coerced by the implied consent form. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded to the district court, holding that, in light of State v. Won, the result of Defendant’s breath test is the product of a warrantless search. View "State v. Tavares " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of entering or remaining in a public park during posted closure hours in violation of Honolulu ordinances. Defendant waived the “involvement” of a public defender after consulting with the public defender’s office before trial. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was not knowingly and intelligently made, as the district court failed to conduct a formal inquiry regarding Defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel. View "State v. Deming " on Justia Law

Buyers bought a commercial property from Seller. Buyers subsequently filed a complaint against Seller challenging the adequacy of Seller’s disclosures. The circuit court dismissed the action without prejudice to allow the parties to engage in mediation. Because of a dispute between the parties regarding mediation, the mortgage payments were briefly interrupted. Seller subsequently brought a foreclosure action against Buyers. Seller then held a nonjudicial public foreclosure auction at which she purchased the property by submitting the highest bid. After a trial on Buyers’ claims for nondisclosure and misrepresentation, the circuit court ordered judgment in favor of Seller. The court also ordered judgment in favor of Seller and against Buyers on Seller’s counterclaims for breach of the note and mortgage and ejectment. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) Seller’s failure to disclose certain facts regarding the property’s sewer system was actionable under the nondisclosure and misrepresentation causes of action; and (2) Seller’s nonjudicial foreclosure of the property and ejectment of Buyers was wrongful. View "Santiago v. Tanaka" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault in the third degree. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to thirty days’ imprisonment and increased Defendant’s bail from $200 to $2,000 cash only pending execution of sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) the circuit court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury on mutual affray; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in increasing Defendant’s bail from $200 to $2,000 cash only. Because there was sufficient evidence for the conviction, the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Henley" on Justia Law

Appellants, The Sierra Club and Senator Clayton Hee, challenged the Land Use Commission’s (LUC) reclassification of 1525 acres of Appellee D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes’ land from the agricultural state land use district to the urban state land use district. The circuit court affirmed the LUC’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision and order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reclassification did not violate article XI, section 3 of the Hawai’i Constitution or Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-41 through -52; and (2) reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the LUC’s finding that the reclassification of the land at issue was consistent with the Hawai’i State Plan, would not substantially impair agricultural production, and was necessary for urban growth. View "Sierra Club v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while he was working for his former employer. Appellant made a workers’ compensation claim against his former employer and its insurance carrier (collectively, Defendants). The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) concluded that substantial evidence rebutted the presumption that that Appellant’s injuries were related to his work accident and, further, limited Plaintiff’s TTD benefits based on deficiencies in the certificates of disability submitted by Appellant’s attending physicians. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the LIRAB’s decision and order, holding that the LIRAB erred in (1) concluding that Defendants adduced substantial evidence that rebutted the presumption that Appellant’s injuries were covered work-related injuries; and (2) relying on the deficiencies in Appellant’s physicians’ reports in limiting Appellant’s TTD benefits. Remanded. View "Panoke v. Reef Dev. of Hawaii, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violation of a protective order. The date of the trial was continued for one month because the trial judge was ill. This continuance resulted in Defendant’s trial not beginning until fourteen days after the six-month period under Haw. R. Penal P. 48 for trying a criminal defendant expired. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The family court denied the motion, concluding that the continuance due to the judge’s illness extended the Rule 48 trial deadline by one month because the illness constituted “good cause” for delay under Rule 48(c)(8). After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the family court erred in determining that the trial judge’s illness constituted good cause to exclude one month under Rule 48. Remanded. View "State v. Abregano" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Landlord and Tenant. Landlord served a forty-five-day eviction notice on Tenant stating that the lease would be terminated, but Tenant refused to leave the premises. Tenant filed a complaint alleging claims for, inter alia retaliatory eviction, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Landlord filed a motion for leave to file a summary possession counterclaim. The district court granted the motion. After a trial, the district court entered a judgment for possession and writ of possession in favor of Landlord. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and vacated the district court’s judgment for possession and writ of possession, holding (1) the ICA erred in affirming the district court’s judgment for possession and writ of possession based on the forty-five-day notice to vacate because when Landlord issued to Tenant the forty-five-day notice to vacate, Haw. Rev. Stat. 521-74(a) rendered the notice ineffective; (2) there were no grounds to remove Tenant based on a failure to pay rent; and (3) the ICA erred in determining that the district court did not prevent Tenant from fully presenting evidence for the court’s consideration on the issue of summary possession. View "Cedillos v. Masumoto" on Justia Law

Defendant’s vehicle struck Minor in or near a crosswalk as Minor crossed Farrington Highway on foot. A jury returned a unanimous special verdict finding Defendant not negligent. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the circuit court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or, in the alternative, for new trial, holding (1) the jury instructions erroneously focused on a pedestrian’s obligation to obey all traffic laws rather than a driver’s obligation to avoid collisions, and the erroneous instructions were prejudicial; (2) the circuit court erred in excluding certain testimony on Defendant’s speed; and (3) the circuit court erred in excluding a photograph with markings made or authorized by a witness during his deposition that placed Minor in a crosswalk. Remanded. View "Samson v. Nahulu" on Justia Law