Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the former Chief of the General Medical & Preventative Services Division at the Hawaii Department of Health, filed a tort complaint against the State and Senator Rosalyn Baker, alleging that Baker eliminated his position in retaliation for whistleblowing activities. Baker filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that she was immune from suit based on legislative immunity, that the claims were untimely, and that the complaint failed to state a claim. The circuit court granted in part and denied in part Baker’s motion to dismiss, finding, as relevant to this appeal, that Baker was not entitled to dismissal on the basis of legislative immunity. Baker appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s order and remanded to the ICA for determination of the appeal on the merits, holding that the ICA had jurisdiction to hear Baker’s appeal because the circuit court’s order was an immediately appealable collateral order. View "Greer v. Baker" on Justia Law

Lloyd Anastasi loaned $2.4 million to a third party in exchange for a mortgage on a property supposedly owned by that third party. Fidelity Insurance Company insured that the third party had good title, but the warranty deed purporting to give title to the third party was forged. Anastasi was sued by the owners of the property, and Fidelity accepted tender of the claim under a reservation of rights. Anastasi later filed a bad faith and breach of contract claim against Fidelity, alleging that the lawsuit was used by Fidelity to delay paying him under the title insurance policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Fidelity. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded in part and vacated in part. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ICA’s judgment insofar as it remanded to the circuit court an order allowing Fidelity to withhold certain documents that Anastasi requested during discovery under the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine; and (2) vacated the ICA’s judgment insofar it it concluded that Anastasi failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that Fidelity acted in bad faith. View "Anastasi v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) and taken to the police station. After reading an implied consent form, Defendant elected to take a breath test. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the breath test result. The district court denied the motion. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of OVUII. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the district court’s judgment, holding that, in accordance with State v. Won, the result of Defendant’s breath test was the product of a warrantless search. Remanded. View "State v. Shimkus " on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle after license and privilege have been suspended or revoked for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial based on the district court’s misstatement of the standard of proof. On certiorari, Defendant argued that the ICA erred in concluding that the district court properly allowed the State to amend the charge against Defendant to allege the required mens era for the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ICA correctly determined that the district court properly permitted the State to amend the charge; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims lacked merit. View "State v. Abordo " on Justia Law

Petitioner was found guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting his blood alcohol test results into evidence in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights because the implied consent form that apprised him of the criminal refusal penalties was contrary to his constitutional right to withdraw his consent to a warrantless search. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that the result of Defendant’s blood test was the product of a warrantless search, and therefore, the district court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress the blood test result. View "State v. Terasako " on Justia Law

Petitioner was found guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a breath alcohol test that he took after he was arrested, arguing that he did not constitutionally consent to the breath test because the implied consent form conveyed a threat of imprisonment and significant punishment for his refusal to submit to the test. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the result of Petitioner’s breath test was the product of a warrantless search, and therefore, the district court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress the breath test result. Remanded. View "State v. Cheek-Enriques " on Justia Law

Petitioner entered a conditional plea to the charges of habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant and of driving while license suspended or revoked. Petitioner subsequently appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a breath alcohol test that he took after he was arrested. Specifically, Petitioner contended that he did not constitutionally consent to the breath test because his consent was coerced by the implied consent form, which conveyed a threat of imprisonment and significant punishment for his refusal to submit to the test. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments, holding that the result of Petitioner’s breath test was the product of a warrantless search because the implied consent form was coercive. Remanded with instructions to enter an order granting Petitioner’s motion to suppress and to allow Petitioner to withdraw his conditional guilty plea as to both charges. View "State v. Lee " on Justia Law

After being arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) Defendant was taken to the police station, where she was read an implied consent form. Defendant chose to take a breath test, which resulted in an elevated breath alcohol content. The district court adjudged Defendant guilty of OVUII. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the district court’s judgment, holding that Defendant’s consent was coerced by the implied consent form, which conveyed a threat of imprisonment and significant punishment for refusal to submit to a breath test. Consequently, the result of Defendant’s breath test was the product of a warrantless search, and the district court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the breath test result. View "State v. Murphy " on Justia Law

The district court adjudged Defendant guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. On certiorari, Defendant argued that he did not constitutionally consent to a breath test that was taken after his arrest for OVUII because his consent was coerced by an implied consent form that conveyed a threat of imprisonment and punishment for refusal to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the district court’s judgment, holding that the result of Defendant’s breath test was the produced of a warrantless search, and therefore, the motion to suppress should have been granted. Remanded. View "State v. Gladman " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in (1) denying his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal on statute of limitations grounds, and (2) denying his request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated Defendant’s conviction on the ground that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on sexual assault in the third degree. Defendant appealed, challenging the ICA’s rejection of his claim that his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted by the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; but (2) erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts establishing the timeliness of the prosecution, but this error was harmless. View "State v. Abdon" on Justia Law