Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle without motor vehicle insurance in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 431:10C-104 and sentenced to a $500 fine. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and requested waiver of her transcript costs pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 802-7. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) denied Defendant’s request for waiver, concluding that Defendant was not a “criminal defendant” as required by the statute. Defendant proceeded with her appeal, arguing that the district court erred by failing to adjudicate her case pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 291D. The ICA affirmed, holding that Chapter 291D does not apply to violations of section 431:10C-104. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and remanded, holding (1) the ICA correctly determined that Chapter 291D did not apply to Defendant’s section 431:10C offense; but (2) the ICA erred in denying Defendant’s request for transcript costs under section 802-7 on the basis that she was not a criminal defendant. View "State v. Godines" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced, a settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree provided that both parents would have joint physical custody of their child but if either parent moved more than two hundred miles away then sole custody would automatically revert to the remaining parent. Mother later filed a petition to change the custody arrangement arguing that her anticipated relocation constituted a material change in circumstances requiring the family court to examine whether the change of custody would be in their child’s best interests. The family court enforced the divorce decree and awarded sole physical custody of the child to Father without explicitly finding that the change of custody was in the child’s best interests, concluding that because the parties had contemplated a future relocation in the divorce decree, there was no material change in circumstances. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments, holding that the family court erred in enforcing the divorce decree and awarding sole physical custody of the child to Father without considering the best interests of the child. Remanded. View "Waldecker v. O’Scanlon" on Justia Law

In 2010 and 2012, the Commission issued charges against William Boyd, a charter school employee, for alleged violations of Haw. Rev. Stat. 84-14 that occurred in 2006 and 2007. Boyd filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate proceedings against him because he was not an employee of the State subject to the code of ethics contained in Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 84. The Commission denied Boyd’s motion and concluded that Boyd was an “employee” as defined in Haw. Rev. Stat. 84-3. The Commission then concluded that Boyd committed several violations of Chapter 84 and imposed a total administrative fine of $10,000. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Boyd as an “employee” under section 84-3 and was thus subject to the code of ethics in Chapter 84. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the determination. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments and the Commission’s decision and order, holding (1) in accordance with Haw. Rev. Stat. 302B-9(a), charter school employees were exempt from Haw. Rev. Stat. 84-14 at the relevant time period in this case; and (2) therefore, the Commission did not have the authority to adjudicate the proceedings against Boyd. View "Boyd v. Haw. State Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Green Party of Hawaii and seven registered voters who voted in the 2012 General Elections (collectively, Green Party) filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain methodologies and procedures used by the Office of Elections in the 2012 election were invalid under the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Office of Elections, concluding that the challenged procedures were not subject to HAPA rulemaking requirements. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment in part, holding that the procedures used to determine that there will be a sufficient number of ballots ordered for each precinct for a general or primary election and the policy for counting votes cast on ballots for the incorrect precinct are rules under HAPA and, therefore, are subject to HAPA’s rulemaking requirements. View "Green Party of Hawaii v. Nago" on Justia Law

Husband and wife seek review of the ICA's judgment affirming in part and vacating in part the June 2013 Divorce Decree. The court held that the ICA erred in vacating the property division and alimony awards to require a recalculation of these awards based on a segregation of proceeds from the illegal marijuana operation; the family court erred, either by characterizing the entire $1,511,477 expended from husband’s inheritance account as Marital Partnership Property or by characterizing the $2,051,293 remaining in his inheritance account as Marital Separate Property, because the $1,511,447 expended included payment of inheritance taxes on husband’s entire inheritance, and if inheritance taxes are paid out of Marital Partnership Property, the remaining inheritance cannot be classified as Marital Separate Property; the family court erred in summarily ruling before trial that all funds expended by husband from his Marital Separate Property inheritance account constituted Category 3 Marital Partnership Property for which he was entitled to be repaid, without requiring husband to fulfill his burden of establishing that such expenditures were in the nature of a contribution to or an investment in Marital Partnership Property, and then compounded the error by failing to allow and consider evidence of donative intent; the family court erred in ordering an equal distribution of alleged partnership capital losses before deciding whether equitable considerations justified deviation from an equal; and the family court improperly applied marital partnership principles to fashion a property division award that was not just and equitable. The court found no error in the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Hamilton v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint and an amended complaint against the University of Hawaii at Manoa that was dismissed without prejudice. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint against the University of Hawaii (UH). The circuit court denied the motion. The circuit court then granted UH’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the allegations pleaded in the first amended complaint were barred as a matter of law. After entry of a post-judgment order relating to attorneys’ fees and costs, the circuit court entered a final amended judgment (Final Amended Judgment). Plaintiff appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal as untimely, determining that the Original Judgment was the operative judgment for purposes of the appeal. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the filing of the Final Amended Judgment triggered the date for filing the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the ICA’s dismissal order, holding (1) the Final Amended Judgment amended the Original Judgment in a material and substantial respect such that the appeal deadline began to run from the date that the Final Amended Judgment was filed; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff’s appeal was timely. View "Wiesenberg v. Univ. of Hawaii" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for possession of methamphetamine after a routine traffic stop. Defendant was convicted and sentenced for promotion of a dangerous drug in the third degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence recovered as a result of a canine narcotics screen that was performed on his vehicle. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA erred in affirming the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, as the canine screen was a separate unlawful seizure not reasonably related in scope to the original traffic stop. Remanded. View "State v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

This dispute revolved around the administration of two trusts established by now-deceased Thomas H. Gentry. When the beneficiaries and co-trustees disputed how the trust assets should be distributed, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Petitioner, a beneficiary of both trusts, filed a petition to enforce settlement agreement and appoint receiver. The probate court denied Petitioner’s petition to enforce (enforcement judgment) and granted in part and denied in part the co-trustees’ petition for instructions regarding the distribution of the assets (distribution judgment). Petitioner appealed from the enforcement judgment, arguing that the probate court ignored the settlement agreement in refusing to grant her petition to enforce. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that because Petitioner had failed to directly appeal the distribution judgment, Petitioner’s appeal of the enforcement judgment constituted a collateral attack on the distribution judgment. Because it was unable to grant Petitioner effective relief, the ICA dismissed her appeal as moot. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA erred in concluding that Petitioner’s appeal was an impermissible collateral attack and that Petitioner’s appeal was moot. Remanded. View "In re Thomas H. Gentry Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

In 1998, Husband and Wife were divorced. Pursuant to the decree, the parties were awarded joint legal custody and shared physical custody of their two children. This case stemmed from a dispute involving the correct interpretation of the divorce decree and an amendment to that decree that governed Husband’s child support obligations. In 2011, Husband filed a motion asking the family court to retroactively terminate his child support obligation for Daughter to 2010 when daughter began college and to require Wife to reimburse him for amounts he allegedly overpaid in child support for Son and Daughter. The family court denied Husband relief. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the decision of the family court and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part the ICA judgment and affirmed to the extent that it vacated the decision of the family court, holding (1) the ICA erred in concluding that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Husband was precluded from seeking reimbursement for his overpayment of child support for Son; and (2) the ICA erred by failing to address certain issues regarding Daughter’s child support. Remanded. View "Herrmann v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Kamehameha Investment Corporation (KIC), the developer of a hillside area, and Sato and Associates, Inc. and Daniel Miyasato (collectively, Sato), the civil engineer. KIC tendered defense against Plaintiffs’ claims to Sato pursuant to a hold harmless clause in a project consultant agreement between Sato and KIC. KIC filed a cross-claim against Sato, alleging that Sato had agreed to defend and indemnify KIC against Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court granted KIC’s motion for partial summary judgment against Sato. Relying on Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that Sato had a contractual duty to defend KIC in the wrongful death action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 431:10-222 renders invalid any provision in a construction contract requiring the promisor to defend “the promisee against liability for bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of willful misconduct of the promisee, the promisee’s agent or employees, or indemnitee”; (2) Pancakes does not apply to defense provisions in construction contracts; and (3) the scope of a promisor’s duty to defend imposed by a construction contract is determined at the end of litigation. Remanded. View "Arthur v. State, Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands" on Justia Law