Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and wife seek review of the ICA's judgment affirming in part and vacating in part the June 2013 Divorce Decree. The court held that the ICA erred in vacating the property division and alimony awards to require a recalculation of these awards based on a segregation of proceeds from the illegal marijuana operation; the family court erred, either by characterizing the entire $1,511,477 expended from husband’s inheritance account as Marital Partnership Property or by characterizing the $2,051,293 remaining in his inheritance account as Marital Separate Property, because the $1,511,447 expended included payment of inheritance taxes on husband’s entire inheritance, and if inheritance taxes are paid out of Marital Partnership Property, the remaining inheritance cannot be classified as Marital Separate Property; the family court erred in summarily ruling before trial that all funds expended by husband from his Marital Separate Property inheritance account constituted Category 3 Marital Partnership Property for which he was entitled to be repaid, without requiring husband to fulfill his burden of establishing that such expenditures were in the nature of a contribution to or an investment in Marital Partnership Property, and then compounded the error by failing to allow and consider evidence of donative intent; the family court erred in ordering an equal distribution of alleged partnership capital losses before deciding whether equitable considerations justified deviation from an equal; and the family court improperly applied marital partnership principles to fashion a property division award that was not just and equitable. The court found no error in the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Hamilton v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint and an amended complaint against the University of Hawaii at Manoa that was dismissed without prejudice. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint against the University of Hawaii (UH). The circuit court denied the motion. The circuit court then granted UH’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the allegations pleaded in the first amended complaint were barred as a matter of law. After entry of a post-judgment order relating to attorneys’ fees and costs, the circuit court entered a final amended judgment (Final Amended Judgment). Plaintiff appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal as untimely, determining that the Original Judgment was the operative judgment for purposes of the appeal. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the filing of the Final Amended Judgment triggered the date for filing the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the ICA’s dismissal order, holding (1) the Final Amended Judgment amended the Original Judgment in a material and substantial respect such that the appeal deadline began to run from the date that the Final Amended Judgment was filed; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff’s appeal was timely. View "Wiesenberg v. Univ. of Hawaii" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for possession of methamphetamine after a routine traffic stop. Defendant was convicted and sentenced for promotion of a dangerous drug in the third degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence recovered as a result of a canine narcotics screen that was performed on his vehicle. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA erred in affirming the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, as the canine screen was a separate unlawful seizure not reasonably related in scope to the original traffic stop. Remanded. View "State v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

This dispute revolved around the administration of two trusts established by now-deceased Thomas H. Gentry. When the beneficiaries and co-trustees disputed how the trust assets should be distributed, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Petitioner, a beneficiary of both trusts, filed a petition to enforce settlement agreement and appoint receiver. The probate court denied Petitioner’s petition to enforce (enforcement judgment) and granted in part and denied in part the co-trustees’ petition for instructions regarding the distribution of the assets (distribution judgment). Petitioner appealed from the enforcement judgment, arguing that the probate court ignored the settlement agreement in refusing to grant her petition to enforce. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that because Petitioner had failed to directly appeal the distribution judgment, Petitioner’s appeal of the enforcement judgment constituted a collateral attack on the distribution judgment. Because it was unable to grant Petitioner effective relief, the ICA dismissed her appeal as moot. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA erred in concluding that Petitioner’s appeal was an impermissible collateral attack and that Petitioner’s appeal was moot. Remanded. View "In re Thomas H. Gentry Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

In 1998, Husband and Wife were divorced. Pursuant to the decree, the parties were awarded joint legal custody and shared physical custody of their two children. This case stemmed from a dispute involving the correct interpretation of the divorce decree and an amendment to that decree that governed Husband’s child support obligations. In 2011, Husband filed a motion asking the family court to retroactively terminate his child support obligation for Daughter to 2010 when daughter began college and to require Wife to reimburse him for amounts he allegedly overpaid in child support for Son and Daughter. The family court denied Husband relief. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the decision of the family court and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part the ICA judgment and affirmed to the extent that it vacated the decision of the family court, holding (1) the ICA erred in concluding that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Husband was precluded from seeking reimbursement for his overpayment of child support for Son; and (2) the ICA erred by failing to address certain issues regarding Daughter’s child support. Remanded. View "Herrmann v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Kamehameha Investment Corporation (KIC), the developer of a hillside area, and Sato and Associates, Inc. and Daniel Miyasato (collectively, Sato), the civil engineer. KIC tendered defense against Plaintiffs’ claims to Sato pursuant to a hold harmless clause in a project consultant agreement between Sato and KIC. KIC filed a cross-claim against Sato, alleging that Sato had agreed to defend and indemnify KIC against Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court granted KIC’s motion for partial summary judgment against Sato. Relying on Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that Sato had a contractual duty to defend KIC in the wrongful death action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 431:10-222 renders invalid any provision in a construction contract requiring the promisor to defend “the promisee against liability for bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of willful misconduct of the promisee, the promisee’s agent or employees, or indemnitee”; (2) Pancakes does not apply to defense provisions in construction contracts; and (3) the scope of a promisor’s duty to defend imposed by a construction contract is determined at the end of litigation. Remanded. View "Arthur v. State, Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unauthorized entry into motor vehicle in the first degree. Before trial, the State filed a motion to determine the voluntariness of a statement Defendant made to the police. The circuit court granted in part and denied in part the State’s motion, finding that Defendant’s statement to a police officer that “I wouldn’t have to punch people if they didn’t upset me” was a voluntary statement and was admissible. The statement was made during the police officer’s “effort to make small talk and calm [Defendant] down.” The intermediate court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the absence of prior Miranda warnings by the police officer did not provide a basis to suppress Defendant’s “spontaneous and volunteered statement.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s right against self-incrimination was violated because the police officer subjected Defendant, a person in custody pursuant to an arrest, to “interrogation” without the protection of a Miranda advisement; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of 2006 prior bad acts. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Kazanas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - Pacific Radiation Oncology LLC (PRO) and several doctors - sued Queens Medical Center (QMC), which provided radiation oncology therapy services to patients of PRO using equipment and services provided by QMC, after QMC notified Plaintiffs that only physicians employed by QMC could provide professional radiation oncology services at QMC. QMC counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiffs steered cancer patients away from QMC in violation of unfair competition principles. During litigation, QMC’s law firm publicly filed a list naming 132 patients PRO was alleged to have diverted. The patients were not parties to the underlying lawsuit, but nineteen of them were granted intervenor status. Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent further violations of patient privacy. The magistrate judge found the 132 cancer patients’ confidential medical records to be relevant to the parties’ claims and counterclaims. On appeal, the district court certified questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) pursuant to Haw. Const. art. I, 6 the parties cannot use or be compelled to produce confidential patient medical records, even if sufficiently de-identified, in litigation where the patient is not a party; and (2) that provision protects the health information of the patient intervenors to this case. View "Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Civil Beat requested the disciplinary records of twelve Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers who were suspended for various types of misconduct. HPD denied the request in its entirety. Civil Beat then filed a complaint seeking an order directing HPD to disclose the information Civil Beat sought. The circuit court ruled in favor of Civil Beat, concluding that police officers have a “non-existent” privacy interest in their disciplinary suspension records. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that police officers have a significant privacy interest in their disciplinary suspension records, and disclosure of the records is appropriate when the public interest in access to the records outweighs this privacy interest. Remanded for a determination of whether the public interest outweighs the officers’ significant privacy interests. View "Peer News LLC v. City & County of Honolulu" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the State, Department of the Attorney General, filed a workers’ compensation claim after he was diagnosed with depression and was later terminated. The sole question before the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) was whether Plaintiff sustained a personal psychological injury arising out of and in the course of employment. LIRAB found that Plaintiff’s psychological injury was attributed to a “Notice to Improve Performance" (NTIP) issued by his employer. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff’s injury resulted solely from “disciplinary action,” and therefore, Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim was barred by Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-3(c). The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff’s NTIP was not “disciplinary action,” as that term is defined by Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-1 and 386-3; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim is not barred by section 386-3(c). Remanded to LIRAB for further proceedings. View "Gao v. State" on Justia Law