Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this custody dispute regarding Son, Mother moved to modify custody terms contained in a divorce decree, alleging that circumstances had changed because Father planned to move Son to Arizona. The family court ultimately found that Mother failed to establish a material change in circumstance since Father’s relocation was contemplated at the time the decree was entered and that it was still in Son’s best interest to live with Father. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the family court properly excluded Mother’s proffered evidence of Father’s pre-decree domestic violence on relevance grounds because the evidence was not related to the material change in circumstances preliminarily found to exist by the family court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court erred in excluding the evidence of Father’s pre-decree domestic violence as, (1) in Waldecker v. O’Scanlon, the Court overruled several ICA cases that suggested that a material change in circumstances was required before a court can modify a custody order according to the best interests of the child; and (2) in order to determine Son’s actual best interests as mandated by Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-46, the family court was required to address the specific and direct allegations of domestic violence before making its custody determination. View "Tumaneng v. Tumaneng" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and assault. Defendant was found unfit to proceed due to mental disease or disorder, and the proceedings against him were suspended until further court order. Defendant was committed to the custody of the Director of Health. The Director then moved for a transfer of Defendant’s custody from the Hospital to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that pending a ruling that he had regained fitness, as an unfit person, Defendant could not be transferred to the DPS. The day after the Director’s appeal, the circuit court found Defendant fit to proceed and committed him to the custody of the DPS. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the Director’s appeal as moot, ruling that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal because custody of Defendant had already been transferred from the Director to the DPS and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s order, holding that the ICA erred in not considering the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. Remanded. View "State v. Tui" on Justia Law

The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) granted a permit for the University of Hawaii to construct the Advanced Technology Solar Telescope at an area set aside for astronomical observations located within a conservation district near the summit of Haleakala on the island of Maui. Kilakila 'O Haleakala (Kilakila) challenged BLNR’s approval of the permit. Both the circuit court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed BLNR’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the permit approval process was not procedurally flawed by prejudgment or by impermissible ex parte communication; and (2) BLNR validly determined that the telescope met the applicable permit criteria and was consistent with the purposes of the conservation district. View "Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a proposed project for constructing a new telescope at an area set aside for astronomical research located within a conservation district near the summit of Haleakala on the island of Maui. The University of Hawaii (UH) prepared a Management Plan containing guidelines applying to facilities within the astronomical site area. UH found that the Management Plan would not have a significant environmental impact and, therefore, that an environmental impact statement was not required. Kilakila ‘O Haleakala (Kilakila) brought a court action to challenge UH’s finding. During discovery, Kilakila sought to obtain documents and admissions from UH and the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) relating to the environmental assessment. UH and DLNR sought a protective order regarding Kilakila’s discovery request, contending that judicial review was restricted to the administrative record. The circuit court granted the protective order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while judicial review of the agency’s determination was not restricted to the administrative record, the circuit court did not err because the parties were permitted to submit documents beyond those contained within the agency record, and the court did not foreclose further discovery requests; and (2) UH’s conclusion that the Management Plan would not cause significant environmental impacts was not clearly erroneous. View "Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. Univ. of Hawaii" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for the attempted murder of his wife. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Haw. Const. art. I, 7 by denying his motion to suppress. The Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the circuit court erred in applying the plain view doctrine to the discovery of certain evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the ICA’s judgment on appeal and affirmed the trial court’s amended judgment of conviction, holding (1) the ICA adopted an interpretation of the plain view doctrine that is contrary to the Court’s prior decisions and the protections and limits of the rights guaranteed under Haw. Const. art. I, 7; and (2) the warrantless seizure of the evidence at issue was lawful. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Certified Construction, Inc. (CCI) submitted a bid proposal on a public works project by the County of Hawaii. The County disqualified CCI’s bid on the basis that the project required a C-44 license. CCI filed a bid protest with the County, arguing that nothing in the bid solicitation strictly required a C-44 license. The Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed the protest as untimely, concluding that CCI’s protest was a challenge to the contents of the bid solicitation rather than to the disqualification of its bid proposal. The circuit court disagreed and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the hearings officer determined that CCI failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief. The circuit court affirmed. CCI appealed from the circuit court’s second order, and the County appealed from the circuit court’s first order. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that CCI’s protest was untimely and that the OAH lacked jurisdiction to consider CCI’s protest. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal, holding that the ICA erred in concluding that CCI’s bid protest challenged the contents of the County’s bid solicitation because the protest, in fact, challenged the County’s disqualification of CCI’s bid proposal. View "Certified Construction, Inc. v. Crawford" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a divorce action by Husband against Wife. Husband tendered a settlement offer to Wife, but Wife did not agree to the offer. The case was tried, and the family court ultimately issued a divorce decree that divided the parties’ marital assets. Following an unsuccessful appeal by Wife, Husband moved for an award of post-offer attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Hawaii Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 68. The family court granted the motion as to Husband’s post-offer trial fees and costs and denied the motion as to Husband’s appellate fees and costs. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the family court order, ruling that appellate fees are recoverable under Rule 68. The court remanded the case to the family court to determine whether an award of appellate fees to Husband would be inequitable pursuant to the provisions of Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47. Husband appealed, arguing that he was entitled to appellate fees as a matter of law. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the 2006 and 2015 versions of HFCR Rule 68 do not apply to family court cases governed by Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47; and (2) therefore, Husband is not entitled to appellate attorney’s fees under Rule 68. View "Cox v. Cox" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of murder in the second degree. Before he was sentenced, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw plea, arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because he felt pressured by his public defender and interpreter to plead guilty. The circuit court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, as the record did not establish that Defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea with an understanding of the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of his plea. View "State v. Krstoth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a furloughee on extended furlough in the community, failed to check in with his case manager. The State charged Appellant with escape in the second degree, in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 710-1021. Section 710-1021 states that a person commits the offense of escape in the second degree if the person “intentionally escapes from a correctional or detention facility or from custody.” Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state an offense, arguing that the escape charge failed to define “custody,” an essential element of the offense. The circuit court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed for insufficiency of the evidence, holding that, under the facts of this case, failure to check in while on extended furlough is not punishable as escape in the second degree. View "State v. Paris" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle without motor vehicle insurance in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 431:10C-104 and sentenced to a $500 fine. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and requested waiver of her transcript costs pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 802-7. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) denied Defendant’s request for waiver, concluding that Defendant was not a “criminal defendant” as required by the statute. Defendant proceeded with her appeal, arguing that the district court erred by failing to adjudicate her case pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 291D. The ICA affirmed, holding that Chapter 291D does not apply to violations of section 431:10C-104. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and remanded, holding (1) the ICA correctly determined that Chapter 291D did not apply to Defendant’s section 431:10C offense; but (2) the ICA erred in denying Defendant’s request for transcript costs under section 802-7 on the basis that she was not a criminal defendant. View "State v. Godines" on Justia Law