Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bank of America, N.A. filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on Homeowner’s property. Homeowner asserted numerous defenses, including that the Bank was not the lawful holder of the note and mortgage and therefore was not entitled to foreclosure. Homeowner also asserted four counterclaims. The circuit court granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss Homeowner’s counterclaims. Thereafter, the court granted Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the Bank was the “current holder” of the note and mortgage and was therefore entitled to foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the property. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and vacated the circuit court’s judgment to the extent it granted summary judgment to Bank of America, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) the ICA erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction over the circuit court’s order granting the Bank’s motion to dismiss Homeowner’s counterclaims. Because the ICA did not reach the merits of Homeowner’s appeal with respect to the dismissal of her counterclaims, the case must be remanded to address the merits of Homeowner’s appeal of the dismissal of her counterclaims. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a non-judicial foreclosure conducted pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667 Part I, which was repealed by the legislature by Act 182. Russell Hungate, the property owner, filed a complaint and first amended complaint alleging that Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) and David B. Rosen and his law office (collectively, Rosen), the attorney hired by Deutsche Bank to conduct the foreclosure of Hungate’s property, violated statutory, contractual, and common law duties and committed unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The circuit court granted Rosen’s motion to dismiss and then granted Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated in part the circuit court’s orders, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing the majority to Hungate’s claims alleging Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667 Part I violations against Deutsche Bank; (2) Duetsche Bank must use reasonable means to obtain the best price for a foreclosed property; and (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing Hungate’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices claim against Deutsche Bank, but property dismissed Hungate’s claim against Rosen. View "Hungate v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The Association of Apartment Owners (the AOAO) filed a notice of default and intention to foreclose a unit of the Century Center condominiums. The AOAO purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and then filed a complaint for summary possession against Respondents. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 604-5(d), which provides that the district court “shall not have cognizance of…actions in which the title to real estate comes in question.” The district court denied the motion and, after a hearing, filed a judgment for possession and a writ of possession in favor of the AOAO. Respondents appealed, arguing that because they established that title over the property was in question, the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the case. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) agreed, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondents’ affidavit asserting claim of title satisfied District Court Rules of Civil Procedure 12.1 and that the ICA did not err in considering as part of its analysis the quitclaim deed attached to the AOAO’s complaint. View "Association of Apartment Owners of Century Center, Inc. v. An" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison for numerous sexual assaults on a minor. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but reversed his sentence, holding (1) the circuit court did not explain adequately its reasons for imposing multiple consecutive prison terms on Defendant; and (2) the circuit court improperly appeared to use Defendant’s refusal to accept guilt - or his lack of remorse - as an aggravating factor in imposing his sentence. Remanded for resentencing before another judge. View "State v. Barrios" on Justia Law

This appeal was the most recent development in litigation concerning the ownership and control of the Marn family business. Alexander Marn sought a declaratory judgment and specific performance regarding his rights to the business. Despite a jury demand, the circuit court held a bench trial. Thereafter, the circuit court entered partial final judgment against Alexander. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the circuit court did not err in conducting a bench trial instead of a jury trial. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal, holding that the ICA gravely erred in affirming the circuit court’s decision to conduct a bench trial, as Alexander was entitled to a jury trial on his declaratory judgment action, and a jury trial was properly demanded and preserved. Remanded. View "In re Marn Family Litigation" on Justia Law

Defendant was placed under arrest for theft in the fourth degree. At the time of the arrest, Defendant was issued a trespass warning. Defendant subsequently violated the trespass warning. That violation was used as the underlying basis for Defendant’s ensuing charge of burglary in the second degree. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the State’s reliance on the written trespass warning failed to establish probable cause that he violated the second-degree burglary statute. The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The intermediate court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was probable cause to support the charge of burglary in the second degree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the violation of a trespass warning may not be used as an underlying basis for a charge of second-degree burglary; and (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was no probable cause to support the felony information. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

The State filed an application for judicial determination of probable cause for the warrantless arrest and extended restraint of Ethan Ferguson (the Ferguson Probable Cause Application, or FPCA). The FPCA, a publicly accessible document, contained personal information in contravention of Rule 9 of the Hawaii Court Records Rules. The State subsequently requested that the court seal the FPCA to protect the wrongly included personal information. Judge Takase granted the motion. One week later, the State filed a redacted version of the FPCA, which omitted the personal information at issue. Oahu Publications Inc. subsequently filed a petition seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Takase from enforcing her order sealing the FPCA and a writ of mandamus ordering the judge to make public the sealed FPCA. This case required the Supreme Court to consider the procedures that courts should follow when a personal information has been included in a publicly accessible document that was filed in violation of Rule 9. The Supreme Court held (1) the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine applied in this case; and (2) because the relief Oahu Publications requested had either already been provided or was unnecessary, the requested relief was not warranted. View "Oahu Publications, Inc. v. Takase" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by complaint with one count of unauthorized possession of confidential personal information (UPCPI). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The circuit court granted the motion in part. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the UPCPI statutes are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In a separate dismissal motion, Defendant alleged that the complaint failed to provide him fair notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. The circuit court dismissed the case, concluding (1) the complaint was fatally defective because it denied Defendant of his right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and (2) the UPCPI statutes were not void for vagueness but were overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the complaint was legally insufficient; (2) the UPCPI statutes are not facially overbroad; and (3) portions of the UPCPI statutes are unconstitutionally vague, but they are severable from the constitutional parts of the statutes. View "State v. Pacquing" on Justia Law

This case arose out of dispute between the Association of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha, its former property managers, and its former commercial tenants. The AOAO installed an electricity submetering system and submitted readings of each unit’s electricity submeter to the managing agent, who would bill each owner for electricity. For certain years, some commercial tenants were never billed for electricity, and some were erroneously billed for a portion of those electricity costs. The AOAO sued its former property managers for, inter alia, breach of contract for the billing errors. The AOAO also sued the commercial tenants to recover the unbilled or erroneously billed electricity costs. The circuit court granted summary judgment for all defendants, concluding that all claims were barred under the doctrine of laches. The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the defense of laches applies only to equitable claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that laches is a defense to legal and equitable claims alike. View "Association of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha v. Certified Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary in the second degree. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to compel discovery requesting access to the property where he allegedly committed the criminal offense. The circuit court denied the motion to compel. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to compel discovery and that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was wrongly denied access to the crime scene, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Tetu" on Justia Law