Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In January 2007, Choy rear-ended Jiminez's vehicle, pushing that vehicle forward, so that it hit the rear of a vehicle driven by Aggasid. Medeiros testified that she was helping Aggasid transport a patient to a doctor’s appointment at the time of the accident and that she began to experience pain in her back after the impact, leading to physical therapy and two surgeries. Medeiros was unable to work for more than three years. Through worker’s compensation, Medeiros received $153,949.75 in medical bill reimbursements and $105,356.62 in temporary and permanent disability benefits. Medeiros sued Choy. Medeiros unsuccessfully sought to preclude witnesses from testifying regarding the presence of an unrestrained child in Aggasid’s vehicle. Choy disputed whether Medeiros was in the course of her employment at the time of the accident and argued that she had lied to secure an unwarranted payout. The jury found that Choy was not the legal cause of her injuries. The Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated, holding that a requested jury instruction, barring consideration of Medeiros’s motive, should have been given. The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed and remanded for a new trial. The plaintiff’s motives for bringing suit were irrelevant to the merits of her claim and her credibility as a witness. Given the evidence adduced at trial, the jury should have been instructed as Medeiros requested. View "Medeiros v. Choy." on Justia Law

Harrison, an owner of two commercial apartments within a mixed-use development project managed by Casa, sued, alleging she was improperly assessed for expenses that should have been charged only to residential apartment owners, related to elevators, lanai railings, drains, cable television, and pest control. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Casa’s favor, concluding that the disputed assessments were not for limited common elements exclusive to the residential apartments, but were for common elements, and were, therefore, expenses for which Harrison must pay her pro rata share. The circuit court further concluded Harrison was estopped from disputing the expenses because she knew or should have known that Casa had been assessing her for the disputed items for quite some time. The Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated and remanded. Citing the Restated Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime and Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 514A and the declaration of condominium ownership, the court held that the elevators and lanai railings are limited common elements and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the drains and cable television wires are common elements. Harrison is not responsible for expenses of limited common elements. The court rejected the claim of estoppel. View "Harrison v. Casa De Emdeko, Inc." on Justia Law

Haw. R. Civ. P. 56O(e) does not preclude an affidavit from being self-serving, nor does it require an affidavit to be corroborated by independent evidence. Further, an affidavit is conclusory if it expresses a conclusion without stating the underlying facts or reaches a conclusion that is not reasonably drawn from the underlying facts.In this case involving a claim brought by an employee against her former employer alleging that she was terminated on the basis of her gender, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in rejecting the employee’s declarations as uncorroborated, self-serving, and conclusory; (2) erred in striking a declaration submitted by an employee in opposition that complied with the circuit court’s order allowing supplemental briefing; and (3) erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reasons for the employee’s termination were based on pretext. View "Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, holding that the record did not support a conclusion that Defendant’s waiver of the right to testify at trial was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the district court’s end-of-trial Tachibana colloquy was adequate and that Defendant’s waiver of the right to testify was validly made. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, holding (1) the Tachibana colloquy was deficient where the district court did not engage in a true colloquy with Defendant to ascertain her understanding of the stated constitutional principles and to ensure that Defendant’s decision not to testify was made with an understanding of these principles; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Celestine" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in failing to continue trial because of the unavailability of a defense witness.Defendant was found guilty of second degree robbery. On the first day of his trial, defendant moved to continue because the police officer who had arrested him and spoken with him shortly after the alleged robbery was unavailable to testify. The circuit court denied the motion. Following closing arguments, Defendant filed a motion for mistrial, which the circuit court denied. After he was found guilty, Defendant moved for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion because the police officer’s testimony was relevant and material testimony that benefitted Defendant; and (2) accordingly, Defendant’s right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor was violated. View "State v. Williander" on Justia Law

Hawaii’s extended term sentencing scheme was invalid based on the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the sentencing scheme allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to determine facts that resulted in extended sentences.In the instant case, Appellant pled guilty to various offenses in multiple cases and was sentenced to extended term sentences. The sentences became final in 2003. In 2014, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was illegal because a judge, rather than a jury, found a relevant fact used to enhance his sentence in violation of Apprendi. The circuit court denied the petition. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court, holding that Appellant’s extended term sentences were imposed in an illegal manner. View "Flubacher v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) ruling that some of the grounds of Albert Batalona’s post-conviction petition raised colorable claims for relief and that the circuit court correctly denied the petition with regard to the remaining grounds, holding (1) the grounds of Batalona’s petition asserting that defense counsel’s failure to challenge the denial of Defendant’s request for a copy of discovery materials resulted in the impairment of his right to present a complete defense and adversely affected his waiver of the right to testify raised colorable claims for relief; and (2) the ICA properly denied a hearing with regard to the remaining grounds set forth in the petition except as to ground 18, which the Court dismissed with prejudice. With respect to the State’s certiorari application, the Court affirmed the ICA’s determination that the ground of Defendant’s petition asserting that defense counsel failed to exercise a good faith effort to obtain a robbery co-participant’s attendance at trial raised a colorable claim for relief. View "Batalona v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) ruling that some of the grounds of Albert Batalona’s post-conviction petition raised colorable claims for relief and that the circuit court correctly denied the petition with regard to the remaining grounds, holding (1) the grounds of Batalona’s petition asserting that defense counsel’s failure to challenge the denial of Defendant’s request for a copy of discovery materials resulted in the impairment of his right to present a complete defense and adversely affected his waiver of the right to testify raised colorable claims for relief; and (2) the ICA properly denied a hearing with regard to the remaining grounds set forth in the petition except as to ground 18, which the Court dismissed with prejudice. With respect to the State’s certiorari application, the Court affirmed the ICA’s determination that the ground of Defendant’s petition asserting that defense counsel failed to exercise a good faith effort to obtain a robbery co-participant’s attendance at trial raised a colorable claim for relief. View "Batalona v. State" on Justia Law

The circuit court correctly ruled that this criminal case must be dismissed because Defendant’s Hawai’i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 48 rights had been violated where the twenty-one day period between Defendant’s arraignment and the first setting of the waiver or demand of a jury trial hearing was not excludable pursuant to Rule 48(c)(1) or (c)(8).The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss his criminal charges with prejudice for violation of Rule 48. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the dismissal order, holding (1) a twenty-one day period between Defendant’s arraignment and the first setting of the waiver/demand hearing was excludable from Rule 48 calculations under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(8); and (2) while the case should not have been dismissed, the circuit court also erred in failing to consider the factors identified in State v. Estencion, 625 P.2d 1040 (1981) in dismissing the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant’s Rule 48 rights were not violated under the circumstances of this case; and (2) upon remand, the circuit court must properly apply the Estencion factors to determine whether the case should be dismissed with or without prejudice. View "State v. Choy Foo" on Justia Law

Because restitution is part of the “maximum penalty provided by law” and is a direct consequence of conviction, defendants must be appropriately advised and questioned in open court regarding their understanding of this possibility before a court can accept their guilty or no contest plea.In a plea agreement with the State, to which the circuit court agreed to be bound, Defendant agreed to plead guilty in three criminal cases, provided that he would be sentenced to certain terms of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court violated the agreement by also sentencing him to pay restitution. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions without prejudice to him filing a Hawai’i Rule of Penal Procedure Rule 40 petition in the circuit court, holding (1) courts must advise defendants that restitution is a possible consequence of conviction before accepting their pleas; and (2) although the circuit court did not conduct a proper colloquy in Defendant’s case, Defendant never filed an appropriate motion in the circuit court. View "State v. Kealoha" on Justia Law