Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1919, a company filed an application in the Hawaiʻi Land Court to register fee simple title to several parcels of land in Lāhainā, Maui, asserting ownership by deed or adverse possession. The land included three main lots, with Lot 3 later subdivided; the dispute here centers on Lot 3A. The last known owner of Lot 3A died in 1877, leaving numerous heirs. Over the next century, the case was marked by long periods of inactivity, incomplete service on heirs, and defaults entered against many descendants. Some descendants appeared at various times to contest the company’s claims. In 2009, a successor company was substituted as applicant. In 2019 and 2020, the Land Court awarded the successor company title to Lots 1 and 2 based on paper title, and a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse possession, with the remaining interest allocated to appearing heirs.The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the Land Court’s decisions. It held that the descendants who appeared lacked standing to defend the interests of their defaulted cotenants against the adverse possession claim and did not address other alleged errors.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case. It held that cotenants have standing to defend the interests of all cotenants against a claim of adverse possession. The court further held that the adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A should have been dismissed for laches, given the unreasonable 100-year delay and resulting prejudice to the heirs, including the loss of witnesses and evidence. The court vacated the lower courts’ decisions regarding Lot 3A, affirmed the award of Lots 1 and 2, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the application as to Lot 3A. View "In re Application of Pioneer Mill Company, Limited." on Justia Law

A property owner purchased a 17.547-acre parcel in North Kohala, Hawai‘i Island, in 2018. According to the official 1974 State Land Use District Boundaries map, about 4.794 acres of the property are within the conservation district, and the remainder is in the agricultural district. The owner contended that the conservation district boundary was incorrectly drawn, following the location of an old road rather than a newer road built in 1961. If the boundary had followed the newer road, 1.813 acres currently classified as conservation would have been agricultural. The owner petitioned the Land Use Commission (LUC) for a declaratory order to interpret the boundary under Hawai‘i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 15-15-22, arguing that the map contained a mistake and that the boundary should be corrected.The LUC held a public hearing, where the property owner presented evidence and testimony. The Office of Planning and Sustainable Development opposed the petition, stating there was insufficient reason to believe the official boundary was incorrect. The County of Hawai‘i took no position. The LUC unanimously denied the petition, finding that the evidence was not “conclusive” or “compelling” enough to show a mapping error or that the boundary was intended to follow the newer road. The LUC concluded that the map was properly drawn and that the boundary interpretation provided by staff was correct.The property owner appealed to the Circuit Court for the Third Circuit, and the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i. The Supreme Court held that, absent rulemaking to the contrary, the proper burden of proof for factual findings in such proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence standard. Because the LUC applied a heightened burden of proof, the Supreme Court vacated the LUC’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the preponderance of the evidence standard. View "Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

A man was charged with invasion of privacy in the first degree after he placed his iPhone on the outside ledge of a bathroom window to record a 15-year-old girl showering inside a house. The indictment alleged that he intentionally or knowingly installed or used a device in a “private place” without the consent of the person entitled to privacy, in violation of Hawai‘i law. Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the charge was insufficient because it did not include the statutory definition of “private place,” which he claimed was ambiguous. The circuit court denied the motion, and a jury found him guilty. He was sentenced to probation and appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA).On appeal, the defendant argued that the indictment was deficient for failing to specify what constituted the “private place.” The ICA, in a plurality summary disposition order, agreed that the charge was deficient and ordered the conviction vacated and the indictment dismissed without prejudice. The ICA did not address the defendant’s other points of error. Judges on the ICA differed in their reasoning, with one judge finding the evidence insufficient to support conviction and another finding the indictment provided adequate notice.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case on certiorari. The court held that “private place” is an attendant circumstance element of the offense, but the statutory definition does not create an additional element requiring inclusion in the indictment. The term “private place” is not generic and is readily understood by persons of common understanding. The court further found that, based on information available to the defendant before his motion to dismiss, he had actual notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining appellate issues. View "State v. Kaakimaka" on Justia Law

A state agency issued a new revocable permit to a company for seed research operations on state-owned conservation land. The agency declared that an environmental assessment (EA) was not required, reasoning that the land’s use was not changing and that there would be minimal or no significant environmental impact. In making this determination, the agency relied on a 1982 finding of no significant impact (FONSI) that had been issued for sugar cane cultivation, not for seed research involving restricted use pesticides and genetically modified organisms. The agency did not analyze the potential environmental impacts of the new seed research activities.A group of plaintiffs challenged the agency’s exemption declaration in the Environmental Court of the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the agency failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts and did not follow proper procedures under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). The environmental court granted summary judgment in favor of the agency and the company, upholding the exemption. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) found that there were genuine issues of material fact and gaps in the agency’s record, and remanded the case to the environmental court for further proceedings to reassess the exemption.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered appropriate factors in declaring an EA exemption are questions of law reviewed de novo. The court concluded that the agency did not follow proper procedures or consider appropriate factors in its exemption declaration, as its record was insufficient and failed to address the environmental impacts of seed research operations. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the environmental court’s orders, and remanded the case with instructions that the agency must prepare an EA regarding the possible environmental impacts of the seed research use. View "Ke Kauhulu O Mn v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A food and beverage server brought a class action lawsuit against several hotel and resort entities, alleging that from 2010 to 2016, the hotels imposed service charges on customers but failed to distribute the full amount of those charges as gratuities to employees. Instead, the hotels retained a portion of the service charges without clearly informing customers that not all of the service charge would go to employees as tips. The disclosures provided by the hotels during this period stated that “a portion” of the service fee was allocated to employees as “tips or wages” and another portion to cover other costs, but did not specify the exact amount or percentage distributed to employees.In the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, both parties moved for summary judgment. The circuit court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the hotels’ disclosures were insufficient because they did not specify the portion of the service charge distributed to employees. The hotels appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed the circuit court’s decision. The ICA held that the statute did not require disclosure of the specific amount or percentage distributed to employees and that the hotels’ disclosures were sufficient.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that the ICA erred in concluding the hotels’ disclosures satisfied Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 481B-14. The court determined that merely reciting statutory language or stating that “a portion” of the service charge goes to employees is ambiguous and does not clearly inform consumers. The court held that when only part of a service charge is distributed as tips, the employer must disclose the amount or percentage paid to employees. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Mauna Kea Resort LLC." on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a Hawai‘i corporation and one of its directors after the director questioned the validity of a conflict-of-interest clause in the corporation’s articles. The corporation filed a declaratory judgment action against the director, seeking a ruling that the clause was valid. The director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing there was no actual controversy. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, retaining jurisdiction to hear a motion for attorneys’ fees. The director then sought indemnification from the corporation for his legal expenses, relying on both the corporation’s articles and Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 414-243, which mandates indemnification for directors who are “wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise,” in defending proceedings brought against them due to their role as directors.The corporation partially indemnified the director for his defense costs but disputed his entitlement to further fees, particularly those incurred in seeking indemnification itself (“fees on fees”). The Circuit Court denied the director’s motion for additional fees, finding he was not “wholly successful” under the statute because the dismissal was without prejudice. The director appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision. The ICA concluded that fees on fees were only available when indemnification was court-ordered, which was not the case here, and declined to address whether the director was “wholly successful” under HRS § 414-243.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and reversed both lower courts. It held that a director whose case is dismissed without prejudice and who incurs no liability is “wholly successful” under HRS § 414-243 and thus entitled to mandatory indemnification. The court further held that this statutory indemnification includes reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining indemnification, such as fees on fees. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court to determine the reasonable amount of such expenses. View "Loyalty Development Company, LTD. v. Ching" on Justia Law

Several residential property owners in the Pauoa Beach Subdivision, part of the Mauna Lani Resort in Hawaiʻi, challenged the use of a residential lot (Lot B) owned by Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC (PBL1). PBL1’s parent company operates a luxury destination club, allowing its members to stay at properties like Lot B in exchange for annual dues. The plaintiffs argued that this arrangement constituted a prohibited “commercial use” under the subdivision’s governing documents, which restrict commercial activity but allow short-term rentals.The dispute began in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the court granted summary judgment in favor of PBL1, finding no violation of the residential use restrictions. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated that decision, holding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether PBL1’s use amounted to a “gainful occupation, profession or trade,” and remanded for further factual findings. On remand, the circuit court reinterpreted the project documents and initially found PBL1 to be a commercial owner, but ultimately determined, based on evidence of actual use, that PBL1’s activities did not rise to the level of commercial use. The court denied the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, and both sides appealed again.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case. It affirmed the ICA’s conclusion that PBL1’s use of Lot B did not violate the project documents, agreeing that the law of the case doctrine precluded reinterpreting the documents’ meaning. The court also held that the ICA did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to PBL1. However, it reversed the ICA’s award of attorney fees to PBL1, holding that the relevant contract only allowed prevailing plaintiffs, not defendants, to recover such fees. The ICA’s judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after a domestic dispute, shot and killed his partner in the presence of others, including children. He was initially convicted by a jury of murder and several firearms offenses, and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, with additional consecutive sentences for the firearms charges. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i found errors in the trial, including the improper admission of prior bad acts and a failure to give a merger instruction, and remanded for a new trial. Instead of a retrial, the defendant entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to manslaughter, use of a firearm in a separate felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. The parties agreed to use the original presentence report, which included mental health evaluations.Before sentencing, the defendant requested over $8,700 in court funds to hire an expert to assess his dangerousness for sentencing and future parole purposes. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit denied most of the request, authorizing only $1,000, finding the request excessive and unnecessary since the expert had already evaluated the defendant. The court sentenced the defendant to forty years’ imprisonment: twenty years each for manslaughter and use of a firearm (to run consecutively), and ten years for felon in possession (to run concurrently). The defendant appealed, arguing the denial of expert fees and challenging the severity and rationale of his sentence.The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence and declined to address the expert fees issue, finding it unpreserved due to procedural technicalities. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the defendant had preserved the expert fees issue and addressed it on the merits. The court held that expert fees for indigent defendants are generally not required for regular sentencing, unless extended term sentencing is sought or unique circumstances exist. The court also held that the new forty-year sentence was not “more severe” than the original life sentence with the possibility of parole, adopting an aggregate approach to compare sentences. The court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and sentence. View "State v. Lavoie" on Justia Law

In 2006, Brenda Merle White executed a $250,000 promissory note secured by a mortgage with Countrywide Home Loans, which was later assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM). White stopped making payments in 2008, and BNYM initiated, then rescinded, a non-judicial foreclosure. In 2012, the Association of Apartment Owners of Kumelewai Court foreclosed on the property for unpaid fees, and Gabi Collins acquired an interest in the property in 2015 via quitclaim deed. Collins was not a party to the original mortgage. In 2017, BNYM sent White a notice of default and filed a foreclosure action in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. White did not respond, but Collins contested the action, arguing, among other things, that the statute of limitations had expired.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment to BNYM, finding the foreclosure action timely. Collins appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations for a foreclosure action is twenty years under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-31.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed whether the ICA erred in applying a twenty-year statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions. The court held that such actions are more analogous to real property actions than to debt recovery actions, and thus the twenty-year limitations period under HRS § 657-31 applies. The court rejected Collins’ arguments that recent precedent required a different result and found that neither DW Aina Lea Development, LLC v. State Land Use Commission nor Adair v. Kona Corporation conflicted with this approach. The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi affirmed the ICA’s judgment, holding that the statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure actions is twenty years. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. White" on Justia Law

A defendant, Jerome Rogan, was convicted of sexual assault, but his conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of Hawai'i due to prosecutorial misconduct, preventing retrial. Alan Ahn, a former police officer, had his charges dismissed after a deferred acceptance of a no contest plea. Both Rogan and Ahn received expungement orders from the Department of the Attorney General and requested the court to seal their records.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially handled Ahn's case, where a grand jury indicted him on drug-related charges. After procedural complexities, including a motion to unseal records by Nick Grube, Ahn's charges were eventually dismissed. Rogan's case was straightforward, with his conviction being reversed by the Supreme Court of Hawai'i.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the consolidated cases of Rogan and Ahn. The court held that under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 831-3.2(f), judicial records must be removed from the judiciary’s publicly accessible electronic databases (eCourt Kōkua) but remain accessible for in-person review at the courthouse. The court emphasized that the public has a constitutional right to access court records under article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution, which cannot be overridden by automatic sealing. The court also noted that the judiciary has exclusive control over its records under article VI, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution. The court denied the motions to seal the records but granted the removal of the records from eCourt Kōkua. View "State v. Rogan." on Justia Law