Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment on appeal of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) to the extent that it affirmed the circuit court's order of resentencing and revocation of probation, holding that the ICA gravely erred in affirming the order of resentencing and revocation of probation.Defendant pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault in the second degree. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to probation. Defendant later left Hawai'i to visit his father while in Louisiana. In Louisiana, Defendant was arrested for an outstanding warrant from a previous sexual assault in Arkansas. After Defendant failed to report to his probation officer the State filed a motion for revocation of probation. The circuit court found that Defendant inexcusably violated a substantial condition of probation by failing to report to his probation officer and resentenced Defendant. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in using Defendant's argument that he did not inexcusably violate the terms of his probation as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence in contravention of the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Stat v. Kamano, 82 P.3d 401 (2003). View "State v. Fleetwood " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the circuit court dismissing John Doe's appeal from a ruling of the Department of the Attorney General (AG), holding that the record did not support the AG's ruling.Doe, a registered sex offender in the State of Washington, requested a declaratory ruling as to whether he was required to register as a sex offender in Hawai'i before visiting Hawai'i with his family for more than ten days. The AG issued a ruling that Doe was required to register in Hawai'i. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record did not support the AG's decision. View "Doe v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) on appeal affirming the family court's termination of Father's parental rights, holding that the ICA erred in substituting a provision of the family court statutes, Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-61(b)(1)(E), for a provision of the Child Protective Act (CPA) as the basis for terminating Father's parental rights.The family court terminated Father's parental rights to his child pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 587A-33, a provision of the CPA. On appeal, the ICA held that the family court's termination of Father's parental rights was not permitted by the plain language of the CPA provision. However, the ICA affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights under the family court provision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding that where the CPA provision contained a requirement not present in the family court provision the ICA erred by invoking the family court provision to affirm the family court's termination of Father's parental rights. View "In re Interest of R Children" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the order of the family court in this case concerning the proper consideration and weight of a hānai relationship in the context of a child welfare proceeding, holding that a hānai relative who is a child's resource caregiver has an interest in that child's custody sufficient to allow intervention in such proceedings under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Hawai'i Family Court Rules.Child lived with Father and his girlfriend, KL. After Father moved out, Child remained in the same home as KL. The family court later changed Child's placement to her great aunt and uncle's home in New Hampshire. At the hearing changing Child's placement, KL sought to have to have interest in the proceeding recognized. The family court denied the request. The ICA ruled that because KL had filed a petition to adopt Child she had a sufficient interest in Child's custody to intervene. KL sought further review, arguing that her status as a hānai relative conferred a substantive interest in Child's placement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the family court erred by not allowing KL to intervene in the placement hearing based in part on her status as Child's hānai parent. View "In re AB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeal (ICA) and the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of Haw. R. Pen. P. (HRPP) 48(c)(5).On the day of his scheduled jury trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss indictment for violation of HRPP Rule 48, asserting the violation based on the passage of 181 unexcludable days, a difference of only one day from the requirement that trial commence within 180 days. The circuit court denied the motion. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of manslaughter. The ICA affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that a nearly three-month delay was not excludable because he was not "unavailable" for purposes of Rule 48. The Supreme Court set aside Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the time period a defendant continues to be held in State custody in a mainland prison after his conviction is set aside and a new trial ordered is not excludable under Rule 48(c)(5); and (2) therefore, the time Defendant spent in Arizona in State custody was not excludable under Rule 48(c)(5), and the circuit court erred in denying the Rule 48 motion. View "State v. Hernane" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court vacated the sentence set forth in the circuit court judgment and affirmed by the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and otherwise affirmed the lower courts' judgments, holding that the State violated Defendant's due process rights.Defendant was convicted of four offenses. The ICA vacated three of the convictions. On remand, the State was given the option of either retrying Defendant on the charges underlying three convictions vacated by the appellate court or dismissing two of those charges and having the trial court reinstate the conviction on the remaining charge. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the three counts, arguing that Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 (b)(3) had been violated. The circuit court denied the motion. The State failed to disclose which two of the three charges would be dismissed before Defendant exercised the right of allocution at sentencing. Defendant was subsequently resentenced. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding ((1) the ICA correctly concluded that the circuit court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 48(b)(3); but (2) Defendant's right of allocution was violated by the court’s failure to require timely disclosure of the offense for which Defendant would be sentenced. View "State v. Carlton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions of murder in the second degree, carrying or use of a firearm in the commission of a separate felony, ownership or possession prohibited of any firearm, and place to keep loaded firearms other than pistols and revolvers, holding that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence five instances of prior abuse committed by Defendant and erred by not submitting a merger instruction to the jury.Defendant was convicted of fatally shooting his longtime girlfriend. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence five instance of prior abuse that were not shown to be followed by a period of separation between Defendant and the decedent. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions, holding (1) the prior bad acts were inadmissible to rebut Defendant's extreme mental and emotional distress defense, the circuit court erred in admitting the prior incidents of misconduct and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury was improperly instructed on the use of the prior bad acts; and (2) the circuit court's failure to submit a merger instruction constituted plain error and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Lavoie" on Justia Law

he Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Defendant in this dram shop action, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the decedent's contributory negligence exceeded the negligence of Defendant.Plaintiffs asserted a dram shop claim on behalf of their son, who died while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by their son's intoxicated cousin, against Defendant, who served the decedent and his cousin alcohol. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that because the decedent was also intoxicated at the time of the accident he was not an "innocent third party" with standing to bring a dram shop claim. The ICA reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the complicity defense and whether the decedent fell within the protected class of innocent third parties entitled to bring a dram shop cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the complicity defense is inconsistent with application of the contributory negligence defense; and (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decedent engaged in conduct that was more negligent than that of Defendant's. View "Kuahiwinui v. Zelo’s Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held in this case that the governor was permitted to make an interim appointment when the term of an official who is statutorily permitted to holdover expires and the senate is not in session.Michael Champley's term as commissioner of the Hawai'i Public Utilities Commission was set to expire on June 30, 2016. The 2016 legislative session ended on May 5, 2016 without the governor submitting a nomination for a new commission to replace Champley. On June 28, 2016, Champley stated that he intended to continue to serve as "holdover" commissioner until his successor was appointed and confirmed by the senate. The next day, however, the governor announced that he intended to exercise his constitutional authority to temporarily fill the vacancy to appoint Thomas Goran to replace Champley following the expiration of Champley's term. Plaintiff filed a complaint and quo warranty petition against Gorak and the State, alleging that no vacancy existed, and therefore, the interim appointment power of the governor was not implicated. The circuit court granted Gorak's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a vacancy existed upon the expiration of Champley's term as commissioner, and therefore, the governor was entitled to appoint Goran on an interim basis. View "Morita v. Gorak" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered three modified questions certified to it by the United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i in a federal court lawsuit where a grantor asserted that an escrow company's alleged deletion of an easement from the property description attached to a deed he executed rendered the deed a forged deed that was void ab initio and the escrow company and grantee asserted that the grantor's claim sounded in fraud and was barred by a statute of limitations.The Supreme Court held (1) a deed is void ab initio for fraud such that a claim challenging the validity of the deed is not subject to a statute of limitations under certain circumstances; (2) the six-year "catch-all" statute of limitations under Haw. Rev. Stat. 647-1(4) applies to a claim that a deed was procured by fraud of the type that does not render it void ab initio, such as fraud in the inducement and constructive fraud; and (3) the statute of limitations begins to run on a grantor's claim that a deed was procured by fraud of the type that does not render it void ab initio when the grantor discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim or the person liable for the claim. View "Hancock v. Kulana Partners, LLC" on Justia Law