Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

Several borrowers executed mortgage agreements with a lender, granting the lender a lien on their respective properties in Hawai‘i. Between 2008 and 2009, the borrowers defaulted on their mortgage loans, and the lender foreclosed on the properties through nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The lender was the winning bidder at each sale and subsequently conveyed the properties to third parties. In 2019, the borrowers filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure, unfair or deceptive acts and practices (UDAP), and sought quiet title and ejectment against the current titleholders. They requested both monetary damages and the return of title and possession of the properties.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the lender and the titleholders. The court found that the borrowers could not establish compensatory damages because their outstanding mortgage debts at the time of foreclosure exceeded any damages they claimed, even when accounting for loss of use and other asserted losses. The court also determined that the borrowers’ quiet title and ejectment claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers. The borrowers appealed, and the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i accepted transfer of the case.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s summary judgment. The court held that, under its precedents, borrowers must establish compensatory damages after accounting for their mortgage debts to survive summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure and UDAP claims. Here, the borrowers’ debts exceeded their claimed damages. The court further held that claims for return of title and possession are subject to a six-year statute of limitations for wrongful foreclosure actions, which barred the borrowers’ claims. Additionally, the court concluded that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers, as the foreclosure affidavits did not provide constructive notice of any defects. View "McCullough v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

In 1922, the Territory of Hawai‘i issued a Land Patent for a 3.99-acre property to a trustee for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, with a deed restriction requiring the property to be used “for Church purposes only.” If used otherwise, the property would revert to the Territory. Over the years, the property changed hands several times, with each transaction referencing the original deed restriction. The current owners, Hilo Bay Marina, LLC and Keaukaha Ministry LLC, are not religious institutions and sought to have the restriction removed, arguing it was void under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 515-6(b), and violated both the Hawai‘i and Federal Establishment Clauses.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment for the State of Hawai‘i and its Board of Land and Natural Resources, finding that the deed restriction was a permissible form of early use-zoning, did not violate the cited laws, and was covered by the statutory exemption for religious use. The court also concluded that the restriction did not violate either the Hawai‘i or Federal Establishment Clauses, applying both the Lemon test and the more recent “historical practices and understandings” standard from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the record did not support the lower court’s conclusion that the deed restriction was an early form of use-zoning. It held that the State’s enforcement of the restriction violated the Hawai‘i Establishment Clause, as it required the State to actively police religious use and entangled the government with religious affairs. The court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment for the State, vacated its ruling on the Federal Establishment Clause, and held that summary judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs. View "Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was indicted for murder and attempted murder following a shooting incident in Kona, Hawaii. The indictment included sentencing enhancements under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-660.1, which allows for mandatory minimum sentences if a firearm is possessed, used, or its use is threatened during the commission of a felony. The indictment did not specify a state of mind (mens rea) for the sentencing enhancement, though it did for the underlying offenses. At trial, the defendant was convicted on several counts, and the jury found the firearm enhancement applied. The defendant was sentenced accordingly.After the initial conviction, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the conviction on certain counts due to evidentiary errors and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the defendant, for the first time, challenged the sufficiency of the indictment, arguing that the sentencing enhancement was an element of the offense and thus required a state of mind to be alleged. The Circuit Court agreed and struck the enhancements from the indictment, finding that the omission of a state of mind violated due process and the requirements set forth in prior case law.The State appealed, and the ICA reversed the Circuit Court’s order, holding that the sentencing enhancement under HRS § 706-660.1 is not an element of the underlying offense and does not require a state of mind to be pled in the indictment. The Hawaii Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the ICA’s decision. The Court held that sentencing enhancements under HRS § 706-660.1 are not elements of the offense and that due process is satisfied if the defendant is notified that the enhancement will be sought and the indictment contains sufficient factual allegations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including a medical practice, individual physicians, a medical society, and two patients, brought various claims against a health insurer, alleging that the insurer interfered with doctor-patient relationships, denied or delayed coverage for medical services, and caused significant harm to patients. The claims included tortious interference with contractual rights, unfair competition, RICO violations, and emotional distress, with specific factual allegations that the insurer’s actions led to worsened medical outcomes for the patients involved.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit reviewed the insurer’s motion to compel arbitration based on arbitration clauses in provider agreements and member handbooks. Instead of determining whether the claims were subject to arbitration, the circuit court focused on the alleged unconscionability of the contracts as a whole, finding them to be contracts of adhesion and unconscionable, and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court also denied summary judgment as to one patient’s claims and did not stay the medical society’s claims pending arbitration.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred by not following the required analytical framework for arbitrability. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s order in part, holding that claims arising under the Participating Physician Agreement must be referred to arbitration because the agreement delegated the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Claims under the Medicare and QUEST Agreements were also subject to arbitration, as the arbitration clauses were not shown to be substantively unconscionable. However, the Court held that the claims of one patient and the physician as a patient were not subject to mandatory arbitration, and another patient’s claims were not subject to a grievance and appeals clause. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Frederick A. Nitta, M.D., Inc. v. Hawaii Medical Service Association." on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs from Kauaʻi, Oʻahu, and Maui challenged a series of emergency proclamations issued by the Governor of Hawaiʻi, beginning in July 2023, which declared affordable housing a state emergency. These proclamations suspended various state laws and established expedited processes for approving and constructing housing projects, including the creation of a State Lead Housing Officer and a Build Beyond Barriers Working Group. The initial proclamations allowed all housing projects, not just affordable housing, to benefit from the suspended laws and expedited certification. Over time, the proclamations were revised, narrowing their scope and transferring certification authority to the Hawaiʻi Housing Finance and Development Corporation (HHFDC).The plaintiffs first filed a writ of quo warranto against the State Lead Housing Officer and the Working Group, arguing that the proclamations exceeded the governor’s statutory authority and violated constitutional provisions. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed the petition without prejudice, finding the mechanism inapplicable and the claims moot, but allowed amendment. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint for declaratory relief against the governor and HHFDC, which was also dismissed for lack of standing and procedural defects. Plaintiffs appealed, and after briefing in the Intermediate Court of Appeals, the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi held that the case was justiciable, plaintiffs had standing based on their constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, and procedural missteps did not bar their claims. The court articulated a standard for reviewing emergency proclamations: they must be rationally related to public health, safety, and welfare, and the executive actions must be reasonably necessary to address the emergency. Applying this, the court found the Sixth through Fifteenth proclamations valid, but held the first five exceeded the governor’s emergency powers. The court vacated the circuit court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment claims. View "Nakoa v. Governor of the State of Hawai'i" on Justia Law

A labor union filed two lawsuits in 2014 against two related private developers responsible for constructing the Ritz-Carlton Residences towers in Waikīkī, as well as against the City and County of Honolulu. The union challenged the adequacy of the separate final environmental assessments (FEAs) for each tower under Hawaiʻi’s environmental laws, alleging that the developers improperly segmented the environmental review process. The City was included as a defendant because its Department of Planning and Permitting accepted the FEAs and issued findings of no significant impact for both towers. The lawsuits were consolidated.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the developers and the City, finding the FEAs sufficient and no improper segmentation. The developers also argued that the case was moot because the projects had been completed and sold. The union appealed, and the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi accepted transfer of the appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi held that the cases were not moot, as effective relief could still be granted, and that the public interest exception to mootness applied. The court found that there had been improper segmentation of the environmental review under the double independent utility test. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether the FEAs were sufficient as a combined review and, if not, whether a new environmental assessment or impact statement was required. In the present opinion, the Supreme Court awarded the union $112,721.10 in attorneys’ fees and costs against the private developers only, under the private attorney general doctrine, but denied fees against the City. The court found the union was a prevailing party and that the litigation vindicated important public policy. View "Unite Here! Local 5 v. Pacrep 2 LLC" on Justia Law

A trustee of a revocable living trust petitioned for instructions regarding whether it could distribute principal, not just income, from a subtrust to the settlor’s only surviving son, David. The trust’s contingent remainder beneficiaries, the Cooks, who are the settlor’s nieces and nephews, contested the petition, arguing that the trust did not permit principal distributions and that the trustee’s proposed modification was improper. The Cooks also sought attorneys’ fees from the trust. The trustee and David supported allowing principal distributions, while the Cooks opposed them.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit (probate court) initially granted the trustee’s petition, allowing principal distributions and ordering attorneys’ fees for all parties to be paid from the trust. The Cooks appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed most of the probate court’s decision but reversed the award of attorneys’ fees to the Cooks. On further review, the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i vacated the probate court’s order due to the lack of required findings and failure to enter an order under Hawai‘i Probate Rules (HPR) Rule 20(a), remanding for further proceedings. On remand, the probate court again denied the Cooks’ request for attorneys’ fees, finding their interest too contingent and their participation not beneficial to all beneficiaries. The ICA affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees but again remanded the merits for lack of an HPR Rule 20(a) order.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that a probate court may award attorneys’ fees to trust litigants if their participation assists the court in resolving the dispute, but a decision on the merits is necessary before determining if such an award is proper. Because the ICA vacated the decision on the merits, affirming the denial of attorneys’ fees was premature. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment as to attorneys’ fees and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Elaine Emma Short Revocable Living Trust Agreement" on Justia Law

A company had been diverting large amounts of water from streams in East Maui for over twenty years under a series of annually renewed, so-called “temporary” permits issued by the state’s Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). Each year, the company applied to renew these permits, which allowed it to use state land and divert millions of gallons of water daily. In 2020, before BLNR voted to renew the permits for 2021, an environmental group timely requested a contested case hearing, arguing that new evidence and changed circumstances warranted further scrutiny. BLNR denied this request and proceeded to renew the permits, adding some new conditions.The environmental group appealed to the Environmental Court of the First Circuit, challenging both the denial of a contested case hearing and the permit renewals. The Environmental Court found that the group had a constitutionally protected right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by state law, and that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed. The court vacated the permits but stayed its order to avoid disruption, temporarily modifying the permits to reduce the allowable water diversion. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the group.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that the group’s protected interest was defined by some, but not all, relevant environmental laws, and that due process did not require a contested case hearing in this instance. The ICA further found that the Environmental Court lacked jurisdiction over the permit renewals and erred in modifying the permits and awarding attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed the ICA in relevant part. It held that the group’s constitutional right was defined by all cited environmental laws, including those governing coastal zone management. The court concluded that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed, and that the Environmental Court had jurisdiction to review both the denial of the hearing and the permit renewals. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Environmental Court’s authority to temporarily modify the permits and to award attorney fees and costs to the environmental group. View "Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two companies, one a contractor and the other a developer, over a construction project in Maui. The disagreement was submitted to binding arbitration, resulting in an award in favor of the developer. The developer sought to confirm the award in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, but the contractor challenged the award, alleging the arbitrator was evidently partial due to undisclosed relationships. The circuit court initially confirmed the award, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the partiality claim. After the hearing, the circuit court found evident partiality, denied confirmation, vacated the award, and ordered a rehearing before a new arbitrator.Following this, the contractor moved for taxation of costs incurred on appeal, which the circuit court granted. The developer sought to appeal the costs order, but the circuit court denied an interlocutory appeal. A new arbitration was held, again resulting in an award for the developer, which was confirmed in a new special proceeding with a final judgment entered. The developer then appealed the earlier costs order from the first special proceeding.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal as untimely, reasoning that the circuit court’s order vacating the first arbitration award and ordering a rehearing was an appealable final order under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 658A-28(a)(3), making the subsequent costs order also immediately appealable.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is not an appealable order under HRS § 658A-28(a). The court clarified that such orders lack finality, regardless of whether the rehearing is full or partial, and reaffirmed the majority rule previously adopted in State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers (SHOPO) v. County of Kauai. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s dismissal and remanded the case for entry of a final judgment, so the merits of the appeal could be addressed. View "Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. v. LPIHGC, LLC" on Justia Law