Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves the environmental review of commercial aquarium fishing permits in Hawai‘i. In 2017, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the permitting process for commercial aquarium collection must undergo environmental review under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). Following this ruling, the Environmental Court voided all existing permits and enjoined the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) from issuing new permits without completing HEPA review. The Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) then prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to continue commercial aquarium fishing in the West Hawai‘i Reef Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA).The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) initially rejected the EIS, citing fourteen reasons. PIJAC revised the EIS and, after a public comment period, submitted it again. BLNR's vote on the revised EIS resulted in a 3-3 tie, leading to the EIS being "deemed accepted" by operation of law. Plaintiffs sued BLNR in the Environmental Court for the First Circuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the EIS adequately disclosed facts for the agency to make an informed decision. Plaintiffs appealed, and the State cross-appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss.The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that the State is a proper defendant in the case and should defend the EIS. The court also determined that the "rule of reason" should be used in conjunction with HEPA’s content requirements to evaluate an EIS. The court found that the EIS was legally sufficient as it met HEPA’s content requirements and provided enough information for BLNR to make an informed decision. Consequently, the court affirmed the Environmental Court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and its grant of summary judgment for PIJAC. View "Kaupiko v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The case involves a motor vehicle collision near the entrance to Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, where Charles Yuen allegedly rear-ended another car. Military police (MPs) arrived at the scene, identified Yuen as the driver, and conducted field sobriety tests and a preliminary alcohol screening. They then detained Yuen until Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers arrived, who conducted their own tests and arrested Yuen for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII).The District Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawai'i adjudicated Yuen guilty of OVUII based on the testimony of HPD officers. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction, finding that there was substantial evidence to support it. However, the ICA did not find sufficient evidence in the record to establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence based on a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that Yuen's trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the MPs, which could have been considered a violation of the PCA. The court found that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as it potentially impaired a meritorious defense. The court also agreed with the ICA that there was substantial evidence to support Yuen's conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Yuen's OVUII conviction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Yuen" on Justia Law

A nonpartisan candidate filed a complaint challenging the primary election ballot in Hawaii, arguing that the requirement for voters to select a political preference violated the Hawaii Constitution and various state statutes. The plaintiff sought an order to redesign the ballot and declare the current ballot invalid.The State of Hawaii, Office of Elections, and the Chief Election Officer moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the case and found that the plaintiff's claims under HRS §§ 11-173.5, 11-174.5, and 91-14 were not valid because no election results had been posted, which is a prerequisite for these statutes. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge all statewide ballots under HRS § 11-172, as he was only a candidate in the Mayor's race in Honolulu. The court also determined that the plaintiff's complaint did not state a claim under HRS § 11-172 because the alleged ballot defects would not impact his nonpartisan race.The Supreme Court of Hawaii dismissed the election contest claims for failure to state a claim. The court also construed the complaint as a petition for a writ of mandamus but denied the petition, finding that the plaintiff did not establish a clear and indisputable right to the relief requested or a lack of other means to address the alleged wrong. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Dicks v. State " on Justia Law

This case involves John Sing, who was charged with Robbery in the Second Degree and convicted of Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree. Sing and Abraham Sionesini approached Wesley Mau in a park. Sionesini demanded Mau's watch and tugged on it, but Mau pulled his arm away. Sing then lightly punched Mau and both men left the scene. Sing was later indicted for Robbery in the Second Degree under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-841(1)(a) (2014). At trial, the jury did not convict Sing of Robbery in the Second Degree, but convicted him of Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree.Sing appealed his conviction to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury on Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The ICA affirmed his conviction, concluding that there was a rational basis for the Attempted Robbery instruction and sufficient evidence to support his conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree is a crime in Hawai‘i, but not under the facts presented in this case. The court found that the circuit court erred by instructing the jury on Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment, the circuit court’s judgment, conviction, and sentence on Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree, and remanded to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the charges against Sing with prejudice. View "State v. Sing" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Honoipu Hideaway, LLC's (Honoipu) appeal of the Land Use Commission’s (LUC) order denying its petition for a declaratory order to change the boundary location between the conservation and agricultural districts on a district boundary map. The appeal was initially filed with the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit. However, following a decision in another case, In re Kanahele, it was determined that appeals of LUC declaratory orders should have been filed with the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i in the first instance. This led to a question of whether the circuit court had the authority to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit had initially accepted the appeal. However, following the decision in In re Kanahele, it was determined that the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i was the correct court for such appeals. This led to a dispute between Honoipu and the LUC, with Honoipu arguing for the transfer of the case to the Supreme Court, and the LUC arguing for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit had both inherent and statutory authority to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court. The court reasoned that the power to "do such other acts and take such other steps as may be necessary to carry into full effect the powers which are or shall be given to them by law or for the promotion of justice" gave the circuit court the power to correct a jurisdictional mistake that was no party’s or court’s fault. The court also noted that transferring the case would further the judiciary’s policy of permitting litigants to appeal and hear the case on its merits. View "Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Ronnie and Sharon Llanes and Michael and Lauren Codie (collectively, Borrowers) who purchased homes with mortgages from Bank of America, N.A. (Lender). After the Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the properties were foreclosed upon and sold in nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The Borrowers then sued the Lender for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the Lender's foreclosures did not comply with Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 667-5 (2008) (since repealed).The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the Lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Borrowers did not prove damages. The circuit court denied the motion due to factual disputes and lack of clarity in existing law. However, after the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i issued its decision in Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., the Lender renewed its summary judgment motion, arguing that under Lima, the Borrowers’ claims failed as a matter of law because they did not provide evidence of damages that accounted for their pre-foreclosure mortgage debts. The circuit court granted the Lender's renewed motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Borrowers had not proven their damages after accounting for their debts under Lima.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, the Borrowers argued that the circuit court erred by concluding that they bore the burden of proving their damages and did not meet that burden. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that outstanding debt may not be counted as damages in wrongful foreclosure cases. The court concluded that the Borrowers did not prove the damages element of their wrongful foreclosure claims, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Lender. View "Llanes v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over water use permits and instream flow standards in the Nā Wai ‘Ehā region of Maui, Hawaii. The region includes the Waihe‘e River, Waiehu Stream, Wailuku River, and Waikapū Stream. Various parties, including MMK Maui, LP, Hui o Nā Wai ‘Ehā, the Maui Tomorrow Foundation, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Mahi Pono, LLC, and Wailuku Water Company, LLC, appealed from the Commission on Water Resource Management's decision regarding water use permits and instream flow standards.The Commission had designated Nā Wai ‘Ehā as a Surface Water Management Area, requiring existing and new water users to file surface water use permit applications. Over 140 applicants filed applications, including MMK, which operates two golf courses in the area, and Mahi Pono, which engages in agricultural operations on former sugar plantation lands.In 2016, the last remaining sugar plantation on Maui announced its closure. In response, the Hui/MTF filed a petition with the Commission to amend Nā Wai ‘Ehā’s Interim Instream Flow Standards. The Commission consolidated the permit and flow standards proceedings. In 2021, the Commission issued a decision amending the flow standards and granting various applicants surface water use permits.The parties appealed the Commission's decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s decision and order with respect to the instream flow standards and the delegation of the Commission’s public trust duties, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the decision and order in all other respects. View "In re Surface Water Use Permit Applications" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Melissa Fay, who was prosecuted for driving under the influence and other related charges. She entered a plea agreement, which did not include imprisonment or probation, but agreed to pay a freestanding order of restitution. The District Court of the Second Circuit followed the plea deal and ordered indefinite compliance hearings to monitor Fay's restitution payments. Fay protested, arguing that Hawai'i's restitution enforcement statute, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-644, limits the court's authority.Fay's appeal was unsuccessful in the Intermediate Court of Appeals, which agreed with the district court's decision. The Intermediate Court of Appeals held that an independent order of restitution empowers a criminal court to retain jurisdiction over a person who owes restitution. The court ruled that setting recurrent proof of compliance hearings fell within a court's general power to enforce its orders.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, however, concluded that the district court exceeded its statutory authority. The Supreme Court held that HRS § 706-644, the specific law relating to restitution enforcement, controls over the court's general powers to enforce judgments. The court ruled that a compliance hearing regarding restitution payments can only be ordered if a defendant is on probation or the defendant "defaults" on payment per HRS § 706-644(1). The Supreme Court vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals' judgment on appeal. View "State v. Fay" on Justia Law

Augustina Dean, a former elementary school teacher, filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) in Hawaii, asserting she had suffered a work-related injury. The Director of the DLIR, however, found that Dean did not suffer a work-related injury. Dean appealed this decision to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board (LIRAB). The LIRAB reversed the Director's decision and ordered a new hearing. Following the new hearing, the Director awarded Dean $2,424.24 for "1% permanent partial disability of the whole person," and "medical care, services and supplies as the nature of the injury may require." Dean appealed this decision to the LIRAB, but the LIRAB refused to hear the case, arguing that Dean had missed the appeal deadline by one day.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) sided with the LIRAB, affirming its decision to dismiss Dean's appeal as untimely. The ICA relied on the precedent set in Kissell v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Appeals Bd., which declared that the time for filing a written notice of appeal is mandatory. Dean, still self-represented, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii vacated the ICA's summary disposition order. The court held that the LIRAB, the agency rejecting an appeal as untimely based on the Department’s “sent” date, must have direct evidence that the decision was sent on that date. In this case, the LIRAB did not have sufficient evidence. The court concluded that the Department did not offer adequate evidence that it mailed its decision on the date it claimed. Therefore, Dean may appeal to the LIRAB. The court remanded the case to the LIRAB to address the merits of Dean's appeal. View "Dean v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Zeth Browder, who was charged with first-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree burglary, kidnapping, and evidence tampering. The charges stemmed from an incident where Browder allegedly sexually assaulted an elderly woman while she was camping in a county park. The jury found Browder guilty of all charges.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reviewed the case and vacated Browder's conviction, ordering a new trial based on inappropriate comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. However, the ICA was divided on whether the prosecutor's comment that the witness' testimony was "consistent with someone who's been traumatized" constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The majority held that the statement was not misconduct, while Judge Leonard disagreed, arguing that the remark mirrored one that the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i found improper in a previous case, State v. Hirata.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i disagreed with the ICA's majority, holding that the prosecutor's comment was indeed prosecutorial misconduct. The court found that the prosecutor expressed a personal belief about the witness' credibility and introduced new evidence during closing arguments, thereby undermining Browder's right to a fair trial. The court noted that the prosecutor's comment suggested that the witness had been traumatized, a conclusion that was not supported by any expert testimony. The court vacated the part of the ICA's opinion that allowed the prosecutor's comment and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit. View "State v. Browder" on Justia Law