Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) manifestly abused its discretion in setting the amount of a supersedeas bond as a condition of staying the enforcement of a judgment and writ of possession pending appeal.The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its complaint for ejectment against Defendants. While Defendants' appeal was pending, Defendants moved for a stay of proceedings to enforce the judgment. The circuit court granted the request and required Defendants to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $578,000. Defendants then filed a motion for a stay in the ICA. The ICA granted a stay on the condition that it would be effective upon the ICA's approval of a supersedeas bond in the amount of $250,000 (the stay order). Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus from the ICA's stay order, arguing that the amount of the supersedeas bond should not exceed $8,000. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) the ICA not apply relevant factors in setting the bond amount, and (2) the stay order lacked a reasonable timeframe in which Defendants would be required to post the bond. View "Kelepolo v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held prospectively that once the court receives notice pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 407.5(1) that a defendant's penal responsibility is an issue in the case, the circuit court must advise a defendant of the penal-responsibility defense and obtain a knowing waiver of the defense.During the criminal proceedings in this case, two of the three examiners concluded that Defendant lacked penal responsibility. Defendant insisted that he was not mentally ill and that he did not want to assert a defense based on lack of penal responsibility. The circuit court eventually found Defendant was fit to stand trial, and Defendant was found guilty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court should have either sua sponte instructed the jury about the defense of criminal responsibility or conduct a colloquy to ensure that he knowingly and voluntarily decided not to raise the defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) going forward, courts have a duty to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of a penal-responsibility defense; and (2) the trial court followed the rules in place at the time of Defendant's conviction and had no duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on lack of penal responsibility. View "State v. Glenn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's injury-by-disease was compensable under Hawai'i's workers' compensation law because the employer failed to overcome the presumption in favor of compensability.Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for injury-by-disease. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) rejected the claim, concluding that the employer's Independent Medical Examinations (IME) reports provided sufficient substantial evidence to overcome the statutory presumption in favor of compensability. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and the LIRAB's decision, holding that the employer's IME reports failed to provide substantial evidence to meet its burden to produce evidence that, if true, would overcome the statutory presumption that the injury was work-related. The Court remanded the case to the LIRAB with the instruction that Plaintiff's injury-by-disease was compensable under Hawai'i's workers' compensation law. View "Cadiz v. QSI, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence for theft in the second degree by shoplifting, holding that, pursuant to State v. Auld, 361 P.3d 471 (Haw. 2015), Defendant's sentence violated his right to a jury determination as to whether he qualified to be sentenced as a repeat offender pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-606.5.The circuit court sentenced Defendant as a repeat offender to a mandatory minimum of five years' incarceration without the possibility of parole. The circuit court, however, did not require a jury to find that Defendant qualified as a repeat offender beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Auld. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to the protections of Auld; and (2) the State was required to, but did not, prove Defendant's predicate prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt prior to imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence as a repeat offender. View "State v. Means" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII), holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to compel.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as to Defendant's speedy trial challenges, Haw. R. Penal P. 48 requires a "meaningful" commencement of trial, a trial is "meaningfully" commenced when a trial court reasonably commits its resources to the trial, and this holding applies prospectively to events occurring after publication of this decision; (2) the prosecutor in this case was not required to personally review files of the testifying police officers; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to compel production of a video recording showing Defendant at the police station after her arrest because the video recording was material to Defendant's defense and her request was reasonable. View "State v. Alkire" on Justia Law

In this case arising from settlement negotiations between Plaintiff and Defendants relating to a dispute about water and mold damage to Plaintiff's condominium the Supreme Court remanded this case with instruction that the circuit court hold an evidentiary hearing to address issues of fact as to the terms and existence of a purported settlement agreement between the parties.At the close of a settlement conference, the circuit court and the parties acknowledged that the parties had reached a settlement. Plaintiff, however, refused to sign the settlement documents and proceeded to represent herself pro se. Defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the parties had entered into a binding settlement agreement but that the proposed written settlement agreement contained terms beyond those agreed to at the settlement conference. Therefore, the court struck those terms and created a revised settlement agreement. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the parties reached a valid settlement agreement and as to which terms the parties agreed to at the settlement conference, the circuit court should have granted Plaintiff's motion for an evidentiary hearing to resolve those issues. View "McKenna v. Association of Apartment Owners of Elima Lani" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that Defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was infringed when the circuit court permitted the jury to view a video of Defendant invoking that privilege.Defendant was charged with attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree as a result of an altercation with another person during which Defendant allegedly punched and kicked that person multiple times. During trial, the State played for the jury a video of a detective interviewing Defendant that concluded with Defendant declining the detective's request that Defendant reenact the altercation. The jury convicted Defendant of attempted murder in the second degree. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Defendant invoked his right to remain silent when he declined to participate in a reenactment of the encounter and that his right to do so was infringed when the prosecution played the police interview video before the jury at trial. View "State v. Beaudet-Close" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII), holding that admissibility of evidence under Haw. R. Evid. 608(b) involves a two-step inquiry and that the ICA erred to the extent that it suggested a trial court can consider excluded evidence in reaching judgment.At trial, defense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of one of the State's witnesses under Rule 608(b). Counsel argued that specific instances of conduct evincing the witness's untruthfulness were contained in transcripts from three other proceedings in which he was a witness for the State. The district court refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the witness concerning these proceedings. The ICA upheld the evidentiary rulings, noting that the district court was able to review the materials concerning the three proceedings. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court, holding (1) the district court erred in precluding defense counsel from cross-examining that witness as to two of the proceedings; and (2) to the extent the ICA suggested that the district court reached its judgment by taking into account evidence it had excluded, such suggestion is wrong. View "State v. Su" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacating the circuit court's order granting Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the execution of a search warrant, holding that the amount of time afforded to Defendant to respond to police officers' demand for entry was not reasonable.Police officers broke down Defendant's front door at approximately 6:15 a.m. after they knocked, announced their presence, and demanded entry four times within a twenty-five-second period. The officers had no reason to believe that Defendant was fleeing or that any evidence was being destroyed. Defendant, who was charged with drug offenses, filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the execution of the warrant violated Haw. Rev. Stat. 803-37 and Haw. Const. art. I, 7. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress. The ICA vacated their circuit court's order, concluding that Defendant was afforded a reasonable amount of time to respond to the police's demand for entry to serve the search warrant. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) giving an occupant only twenty-five seconds to respond at such an early morning hour was unreasonable; and (2) there were no exigent circumstances that would have justified breaching the door earlier than would have otherwise been reasonable. View "State v. Naeole" on Justia Law

In this ejectment action, the Supreme Court granted Appellant's motion for in forma pauperis (IFP) status on appeal, vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) order dismissing appeal, and remanded this case to the ICA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, holding that the ICA abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to file IFP motions in the district court, in denying Appellant's second IFP motion based on Haw. Rev. Stat. 607-3 and Haw. R. App. P. 24, and then in dismissing her appeal.Appellant, a self-represented defendant in a residential ejectment case, appealed a judgment and writ of possession filed by the district court. Appellant filed two motions to proceed IFP. The ICA denied both motions and ordered Appellant either to file an IFP motion in the district court within ten days or pay the filing fees in full. When Appellant did neither, the ICA dismissed Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when courts have discretion in applying court rules or statutes, they must consider the access to justice principle of reducing barriers to the civil justice system for self-represented litigants. View "Estate Administrative Services LLC v. Mohulamu" on Justia Law