Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A defendant was indicted for two counts involving sexual acts with a minor under fourteen. Before trial, the prosecution filed a bill of particulars specifying the acts alleged to support the charges, including statutory definitions of “sexual contact” and “sexual penetration.” At trial, the minor testified to multiple incidents of sexual contact and penetration over several years, as well as a specific incident in July 2019. The trial court, after acquitting the defendant of the most serious charge, submitted lesser included offenses to the jury and provided jury instructions that used modified statutory definitions, omitting terms not relevant to the evidence. The jury convicted the defendant of Attempted Sexual Assault in the First Degree and Continuous Sexual Assault of a Minor Under Fourteen.The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous because they allowed conviction for conduct outside the specific acts listed in the bill of particulars. The appellate court agreed, finding that the omission of the bill’s specific acts from the instructions, combined with the broader statutory definitions, may have contributed to the convictions. The appellate court vacated the convictions and remanded for a new trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. It held that while a bill of particulars limits the evidence the prosecution may present at trial, it does not similarly restrict the content of jury instructions. The court found that the omission of the specific acts from the jury instructions was not erroneous and that there was no reasonable possibility any instructional error contributed to the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. Masuda-Mercado" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with second-degree murder after his elderly, wheelchair-bound landlord was found dead with multiple stab wounds. The prosecution presented extensive physical and circumstantial evidence, including DNA linking the defendant to the crime scene and the victim, as well as testimony about the defendant’s motive related to an eviction order. The defendant testified in his own defense, offering alternative explanations for the physical evidence.During jury selection in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit, a prospective juror made comments in the courthouse hallway expressing a desire to be excused, stating she “already had [her] opinion” and making remarks about the defendant’s appearance and discomfort with the case. The court questioned the prospective juror and three others who overheard the comments. The prospective juror was excused, and the court issued curative instructions to the remaining jury pool. The three other prospective jurors were not empaneled or selected as alternates. The defense moved for a mistrial, arguing the comments tainted the jury, but the motion was denied.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, finding the trial court’s inquiry into the comments insufficient and the curative instructions inadequate. The State sought review.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the trial court’s investigation into the comments was adequate, its curative instructions were sufficient to cure any potential prejudice, and any prejudice was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial motion, reversed the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ judgment, and affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "State v. Grewer" on Justia Law

Police in Hawai‘i County obtained a search warrant to search an individual suspected of narcotics dealing. The suspect was stopped while driving his pickup truck, and officers executed the warrant, finding nothing on his person. After the search, an officer asked for consent to search the truck. Instead of giving a direct answer, the suspect made an incriminating statement indicating contraband was in the vehicle. He was not told he was free to leave or given Miranda warnings before this exchange. The truck was later searched under a separate warrant, and over an ounce of methamphetamine was found. The suspect was charged and, after a jury trial, convicted of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the First Degree.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit denied the defendant’s motions to suppress evidence and found his statements voluntary, admitting them at trial. The court also admitted expert testimony regarding the identity and weight of the drugs, over defense objections about the expert’s qualifications. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the conviction, holding that the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation for the expert’s qualifications because it did not show the expert was trained according to the manufacturers’ requirements for the testing devices. The ICA affirmed the circuit court on other issues.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. It held that the ICA erred in requiring the State to show the expert was trained in accordance with device manufacturers’ requirements. The proper standard is that the State must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the expert’s qualifications, use of valid techniques, and that the instruments were in proper working order. The court also held that the brief continued detention after the search was justified by reasonable suspicion, and that the initial incriminating statement was admissible. Any Miranda violation in subsequent questioning was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Spies" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of retirement benefits following the divorce of William S. Perreira and Gertrude B. Perreira (now Gertrude B. Haia). In 1990, the Family Court of the Third Circuit awarded Gertrude a percentage of William’s State of Hawai‘i Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) benefits, with payments to begin when William became eligible to retire. William qualified for retirement in 1999, but Gertrude did not receive payments. In 2008, she moved to enforce the division order. The family court granted her motion in 2012, awarding her 31% of William’s pension as valued at his retirement eligibility date. Gertrude later sought further relief in 2017, alleging William failed to disclose information and make payments, resulting in a 2019 order awarding her interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.William appealed the 2019 orders to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that Gertrude’s 2008 motion was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-5. While the appeal was pending, Gertrude moved for entry of a Hawai‘i Domestic Relations Order (HiDRO) under HRS § 88-93.5, which the family court granted in 2021, directing ERS to pay her William’s entire monthly pension until her award was satisfied. William appealed the HiDRO order, contending that the statute could not be applied retroactively.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that Gertrude’s 2008 motion to enforce was not time-barred, as her right to enforce the judgment accrued when William became eligible to retire in 1999. The court further held that the application of HRS § 88-93.5 to effectuate the HiDRO was not an ex post facto violation, as the statute is civil and merely enforces existing rights. The ICA’s judgment was affirmed. View "Perreira v. Perreira" on Justia Law

An airport restaurant and bar manager sustained bilateral knee injuries in 2007 while lifting a beer keg at work. Her right knee required surgery, and she experienced ongoing pain, swelling, and functional limitations in both knees, which affected her ability to return to her previous job and participate in daily activities and hobbies. After vocational rehabilitation, she found sedentary work as a medical coder and biller. Multiple medical evaluations rated her right knee at 5% impairment and her left knee at 0% impairment, based on the AMA Guides.The Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Disability Compensation Division awarded her 7% permanent partial disability (PPD) for the right knee and 0% for the left knee. She appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB), seeking higher PPD percentages. LIRAB increased the awards to 8% for the right knee and 3% for the left knee, but its chair dissented, advocating for 20% and 5% respectively. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed LIRAB’s majority decision, finding that LIRAB had sufficiently explained its reasoning and properly considered her inability to return to her prior job.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and found that LIRAB’s findings and conclusions were insufficiently clear to allow meaningful appellate review. The court held that LIRAB’s decision was clearly erroneous and adopted the reasoning of the LIRAB chair’s dissent, awarding 20% PPD for the right knee and 5% for the left knee. The court also held that LIRAB improperly considered vocational rehabilitation and temporary total disability benefits in determining the PPD award. The ICA’s judgment and LIRAB’s decision were vacated in part, and the case was remanded to LIRAB to determine the compensation amount consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Noborikawa v. Host International" on Justia Law

Two children, born in Utah in 2016 and 2018 to parents who met as teenagers and struggled with substance abuse, moved with their mother and maternal grandparents to Maui in December 2019. The father relocated to Maui a few months later. Both parents had periods of sobriety and relapse, and the children were exposed to instability, including domestic violence involving the mother’s boyfriend. In 2021, the mother sought sole custody, alleging the father sexually abused the children. The father denied the allegations and sought sole custody and permission to relocate the children to Utah.The Family Court of the Second Circuit held a bench trial, during which the mother attempted to introduce testimony from fact and expert witnesses regarding the credibility of the children’s disclosures of abuse, as well as hearsay evidence about those disclosures. The court excluded this testimony, relying on State v. Batangan, which prohibits expert or lay testimony on the credibility of child sexual abuse victims. The court also excluded certain hearsay evidence, finding the mother failed to meet the requirements for exceptions under the Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence. After considering the statutory best interest factors, the court awarded the father sole legal and physical custody, allowed him to relocate the children to Utah, and granted the mother supervised visitation. The court found no confirmed sexual abuse by the father and determined the mother had misused the protection from abuse process.The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s decision. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi also affirmed, holding that the family court properly excluded testimony regarding the children’s credibility, correctly applied evidentiary rules, and did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody and approving relocation. The court found the family court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence and that the best interests of the children were served by the custody and relocation order. View "KP v. EM." on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

Several borrowers executed mortgage agreements with a lender, granting the lender a lien on their respective properties in Hawai‘i. Between 2008 and 2009, the borrowers defaulted on their mortgage loans, and the lender foreclosed on the properties through nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The lender was the winning bidder at each sale and subsequently conveyed the properties to third parties. In 2019, the borrowers filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure, unfair or deceptive acts and practices (UDAP), and sought quiet title and ejectment against the current titleholders. They requested both monetary damages and the return of title and possession of the properties.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the lender and the titleholders. The court found that the borrowers could not establish compensatory damages because their outstanding mortgage debts at the time of foreclosure exceeded any damages they claimed, even when accounting for loss of use and other asserted losses. The court also determined that the borrowers’ quiet title and ejectment claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers. The borrowers appealed, and the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i accepted transfer of the case.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s summary judgment. The court held that, under its precedents, borrowers must establish compensatory damages after accounting for their mortgage debts to survive summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure and UDAP claims. Here, the borrowers’ debts exceeded their claimed damages. The court further held that claims for return of title and possession are subject to a six-year statute of limitations for wrongful foreclosure actions, which barred the borrowers’ claims. Additionally, the court concluded that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers, as the foreclosure affidavits did not provide constructive notice of any defects. View "McCullough v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

In 1922, the Territory of Hawai‘i issued a Land Patent for a 3.99-acre property to a trustee for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, with a deed restriction requiring the property to be used “for Church purposes only.” If used otherwise, the property would revert to the Territory. Over the years, the property changed hands several times, with each transaction referencing the original deed restriction. The current owners, Hilo Bay Marina, LLC and Keaukaha Ministry LLC, are not religious institutions and sought to have the restriction removed, arguing it was void under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 515-6(b), and violated both the Hawai‘i and Federal Establishment Clauses.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment for the State of Hawai‘i and its Board of Land and Natural Resources, finding that the deed restriction was a permissible form of early use-zoning, did not violate the cited laws, and was covered by the statutory exemption for religious use. The court also concluded that the restriction did not violate either the Hawai‘i or Federal Establishment Clauses, applying both the Lemon test and the more recent “historical practices and understandings” standard from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the record did not support the lower court’s conclusion that the deed restriction was an early form of use-zoning. It held that the State’s enforcement of the restriction violated the Hawai‘i Establishment Clause, as it required the State to actively police religious use and entangled the government with religious affairs. The court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment for the State, vacated its ruling on the Federal Establishment Clause, and held that summary judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs. View "Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was indicted for murder and attempted murder following a shooting incident in Kona, Hawaii. The indictment included sentencing enhancements under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-660.1, which allows for mandatory minimum sentences if a firearm is possessed, used, or its use is threatened during the commission of a felony. The indictment did not specify a state of mind (mens rea) for the sentencing enhancement, though it did for the underlying offenses. At trial, the defendant was convicted on several counts, and the jury found the firearm enhancement applied. The defendant was sentenced accordingly.After the initial conviction, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the conviction on certain counts due to evidentiary errors and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the defendant, for the first time, challenged the sufficiency of the indictment, arguing that the sentencing enhancement was an element of the offense and thus required a state of mind to be alleged. The Circuit Court agreed and struck the enhancements from the indictment, finding that the omission of a state of mind violated due process and the requirements set forth in prior case law.The State appealed, and the ICA reversed the Circuit Court’s order, holding that the sentencing enhancement under HRS § 706-660.1 is not an element of the underlying offense and does not require a state of mind to be pled in the indictment. The Hawaii Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the ICA’s decision. The Court held that sentencing enhancements under HRS § 706-660.1 are not elements of the offense and that due process is satisfied if the defendant is notified that the enhancement will be sought and the indictment contains sufficient factual allegations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law