Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence of an aggregate of seventeen years of imprisonment following the revocation of his probation, holding that before accepting a defendant's stipulation to a probation violation the trial court must ensure that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enters into the stipulation.Defendant was involved in three separate criminal cases related to repeated violations of an injunction against harassment. Defendant was sentenced to probation after pleading no contest in two cases. Two years later, he was convicted of violating an injunction against harassment and second-degree assault. Based on Defendant's stipulation that he had violated the terms of his probation the circuit court revoked Defendant's probation in the two prior cases. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that where the record did not reflect that Defendant understood the consequences of stipulating to the State's motions to revoke probation, the stipulation should be vacated. View "State v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated two orders of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) denying a competitive bidding waiver to Hawai'i Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) and denying Hu Honua's request for reconsideration of the first order, holding that both orders were the result of a misreading of the holding in Matter of Hawai'i Electric Light Co., 445 P.3d 673 (Haw. 2019) (HELCO I).In 2017, the PUC granted HELCO a waiver from competitive bidding for a proposed power purchase agreement HELCO wanted to enter into with Hu Honua (the amended PPA). The 2017 waiver was issued alongside the PUC's approval of the amended PPA. The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the PUC issued Order No. 37205 denying HELCO's request for a waiver under the belief that HELCO I nullified the 2017 waiver. In order No. 37306, the PUC denied Hu Honua's request for reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that HELCO I did not vacate the 2017 waiver and, by extension, did not require the PUC to revisit the threshold waiver issue. View "In re Hawai'i Electric Light Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's request for attorney's fees in this appeal arising from a grievance arbitration, holding that the State "incurred" attorney's fees for the purposes of Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A-25.In the arbitration, the State was represented by an attorney employed by the State's Department of Attorney General. The union requested attorney's fees and costs, which the circuit court denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Thereafter, the State filed a request for appellate attorney's fees and costs, citing section 658A-25 and Haw. R. App. P. 39(a). The ICA granted the State's request for costs but denied its request for attorney's fees on the grounds that the State "failed to demonstrate that it incurred, as an expense, liability, or legal obligation to pay, appellate attorney's fees[.]" The Supreme Court reversed and granted the State's request for attorney's fees, holding that the fees were erroneously denied on the grounds that they were not "incurred." View "In re Arbitration between United Public Workers and State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal entered by the intermediate court of appeals affirming the circuit court's final judgment in this compensation dispute based on an oral agreement, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' motion filed under Haw. R. Civ. P. (HRCP) 55(c) to set aside entry of default.In this dispute between an independent contractor dentist, Dr. Grace Chen, and the dentist who retained Chen's services, Dr. Jonathan Mah and his corporation (collectively, Defendants), default and subsequent default judgment as to certain claims were entered against Defendants, and a bench trial was held regarding damages on some claims. Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to set aside entry of default and their motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Defendants' HRCP Rule 55(c) on the grounds that they failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of the test governing HRCP Rule 60(b) motions to set aside default judgments; and (2) the circuit court did not err in its remaining rulings. View "Chen v. Mah" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) holding that Defendant was not deprived of due process when the circuit court refused to hold a hearing during trial as to whether Defendant was incompetent pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 704-404, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion.Defendant was charged with one count of sexual assault in the first degree. During trial, Defendant's counsel informed the circuit court of his belief that Defendant was not fit to proceed. The circuit court denied the motion, and Defendant was found guilty. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that he was incompetent during his trial. The motion was denied. The ICA remanded the case to have the circuit court determine whether Defendant was competent at the time of his trial. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding that there was ample evidence subsequent to trial supporting Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Fleming " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's motions in limine to offer hearsay evidence, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the motions without entering findings of fact on the record.On certiorari, Appellant argued that the ICA erred by concluding that the circuit court may deny a motion in limine without providing findings of fact on the record in violation of Haw. R. Pen. P. 12(e). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 12(e) does not govern motions in limine; and (2) Haw. R. Evid. 103(b), the specific standard governing the admissibility of evidence and motions in limine, provides discretion to trial courts resolving evidentiary issues regarding whether to make findings of fact. View "State v. Marroquin" on Justia Law

In this custody dispute, the Supreme Court vacated a settlement agreement reached by the parties during trial, holding that the family court's actions in reaching the settlement were improper, and thus the family court plainly erred.Father sought joint legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The parties settled during trial. On appeal, Father argued that the family court acted improperly in facilitating the settlement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court spoke to Father alone without obtaining consent from counsel on the record, initiated settlement discussions, and strongly recommended specific terms on a hotly-contested issue after trial had commenced, the family court committed plain error. View "WW v. DS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's order granting the Department of Human Services (DHS) foster custody and the subsequent order terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the ICA erred when it failed to vacate the family court's order.On appeal, Mother argued that the family court erred in failing to appoint counsel for her prior to granting foster custody. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Mother should have been appointed counsel at the time DHS filed its petition for family supervision; and (2) the failure to appoint Mother counsel at the time DHS filed its petition for foster custody was structural error that cannot be deemed harmless. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re L.I." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII), Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1), holding that any error not taking judicial notice that thirty mph was equivalent to forty-four feet per second was harmless.During trial, Defendant's attorney asked the district court to take judicial notice that sixty miles per hour was equivalent to eighty-eight feet per second as a matter that is generally known. The court appeared to conclude that it could not take judicial notice of the conversion and that Defendant would have to present expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial courts are required to take judicial notice of equivalent measurements unless provided with the mathematical equation for conversion, but the error in this case was harmless. View "State v. Kwong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) judgment on appeal with respect to defendant Nicole Jadan's counterclaim and vacated the district court's judgment, holding that the district court erred by failing to determine whether Jadan's participation in the court proceedings would be meaningful absent language assistance when it resolved her repeated requests for an interpreter.Cambridge Management filed a complaint for writ of possession against Jadan. Jadan counterclaimed for damages. The district court held nine hearings on the complaint and counterclaim. At eight of those court dates, Jadan either requested the assistance of a Polish interpreter or indicated to the court that she struggled with understanding and communicating in English. One judge agreed to appoint an interpreter midway through the district court proceedings, but subsequent court dates proceeded without the service of an interpreter. The court ruled in favor of Cambridge. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the district court's failure adequately to inquire into Jadan's language access needs was not harmless. View "Cambridge Management Inc. v. Jadan" on Justia Law