Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case concerning the admissibility and evidentiary weight of documents and declarations in a foreclosure proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment and order of the circuit court granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and for interlocutory decree of foreclosure, holding that promissory notes are not hearsay.Plaintiff, U.S. Bank, brought this foreclosure action. The circuit court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, but the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded the case. At issue on remand was whether U.S. Bank possessed the promissory note when it filed its complaint. The circuit court concluded that U.S. Bank possessed the promissory note at the time it brought suit. The ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment, concluding that U.S. Bank lacked standing because it had not established it possessed the promissory note at the time it filed the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) promissory notes are not hearsay; (2) copies of promissory notes are not self-authenticating under Haw. R. Evid. 902(9); (3) under the incorporated records doctrine, business records may be admissible even absent testimony concerning the business practices or records of their creator; and (4) U.S. Bank was entitled to summary judgment. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Verhagen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the circuit court's judgment affirming the decisions of the Maui Planning Commission approving an application for a special management area (SMA) use permit to build affordable housing and denying a petition to intervene in the SMA use permit application proceedings, holding that further proceedings were necessary.The SMA use permit was sought by Stanford Carr Development, LLC's (Carr), which sought to build affordable housing within the County of Maui's SMA. The Protect and Preserve Kahoma Ahupua'a Association (PPKAA) filed a petition to intervene in the proceedings. The Commission denied PPKAA's petition on the grounds that PPKAA failed to demonstrate that its interests were different from those of the general public and then approved the SMA use permit application. The ICA vacated the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) PPKAA had standing to intervene as a matter of right and was denied procedural due process to protect its constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment; and (2) the Commission was required to make findings on the project's consistency with the general and community plans pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 205A-26(2)(C). View "Protect & Preserve Kahoma Ahupua'a Ass'n v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

In this case involving the binding effect of a stipulation, the Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the circuit court's judgment with respect to the circuit court's order denying sanctions, but otherwise affirmed, holding that the lower courts erred by failing to treat the stipulation at issue as a binding agreement.Plaintiff brought a complaint for foreclosure against Defendants. After summary judgment was granted to Plaintiff but before any foreclosure sale, the parties entered into a stipulation filed with the court providing that the foreclosure sale would be continued while Defendants pursued a private sale. One defendant later filed a motion to compel and for sanctions, asserting that other defendants had blocked the transaction in contravention of the stipulation. The court denied the motion, and the property was subsequently sold at auction. The ICA affirmed, concluding that the circuit court's finding that there was no agreement for a private sale was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that a stipulation made during the course of litigation that is reduced to writing, agreed to by all parties, and filed with the court generally operates like a contract and generally binds the parties to its terms. View "Provident Funding Associates, L.P. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence for four counts of sexual assault in the second degree, holding that Defendant presented a "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal of his pleas of no contest to the counts.Before sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his no contest pleas, asserting that he was innocent and wanted a trial. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant entered his pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court disregarded the principle that pre-sentence defendants are entitled to withdraw their pleas for any fair and just reason and that there was a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of Defendant's pleas. View "State v. Pedro" on Justia Law

In this appeal stemming from three separate criminal cases related to repeated violations of an injunction against harassment the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's orders of resentencing and revocation of probation in two cases and vacated the circuit court's order sentencing Defendant in another case, holding that the circuit court erred.Defendant pled no contest in two cases to eleven counts of violating an injunction against harassment and was sentenced to probation. Two years later, Defendant was convicted of one count each of violating an injunction against harassment and of second-degree assault. At sentencing, the circuit court revoked Defendant's probation in the prior two cases based on Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. The court then sentenced Defendant to a total of seventeen years imprisonment. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence, holding that the record did not reflect that Defendant understood the consequences of stipulating to the State's motions to revoke probation and that the circuit court did not sufficiently justify the imposition of consecutive sentences for each count. View "State v. Sandoval " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. on its complaint seeking judicial foreclosure of the residence of Marianne Fong, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.In order to prove that Fong had defaulted, Wells Fargo submitted a ledger without providing an explanation as to how to read the ledger. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in the absence of any explanation, the ledger was subject to interpretation and therefore presented a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Fong actually owed the amounts that forced her into her alleged default. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Fong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence of an aggregate of seventeen years of imprisonment following the revocation of his probation, holding that before accepting a defendant's stipulation to a probation violation the trial court must ensure that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enters into the stipulation.Defendant was involved in three separate criminal cases related to repeated violations of an injunction against harassment. Defendant was sentenced to probation after pleading no contest in two cases. Two years later, he was convicted of violating an injunction against harassment and second-degree assault. Based on Defendant's stipulation that he had violated the terms of his probation the circuit court revoked Defendant's probation in the two prior cases. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that where the record did not reflect that Defendant understood the consequences of stipulating to the State's motions to revoke probation, the stipulation should be vacated. View "State v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated two orders of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) denying a competitive bidding waiver to Hawai'i Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) and denying Hu Honua's request for reconsideration of the first order, holding that both orders were the result of a misreading of the holding in Matter of Hawai'i Electric Light Co., 445 P.3d 673 (Haw. 2019) (HELCO I).In 2017, the PUC granted HELCO a waiver from competitive bidding for a proposed power purchase agreement HELCO wanted to enter into with Hu Honua (the amended PPA). The 2017 waiver was issued alongside the PUC's approval of the amended PPA. The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the PUC issued Order No. 37205 denying HELCO's request for a waiver under the belief that HELCO I nullified the 2017 waiver. In order No. 37306, the PUC denied Hu Honua's request for reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that HELCO I did not vacate the 2017 waiver and, by extension, did not require the PUC to revisit the threshold waiver issue. View "In re Hawai'i Electric Light Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's request for attorney's fees in this appeal arising from a grievance arbitration, holding that the State "incurred" attorney's fees for the purposes of Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A-25.In the arbitration, the State was represented by an attorney employed by the State's Department of Attorney General. The union requested attorney's fees and costs, which the circuit court denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Thereafter, the State filed a request for appellate attorney's fees and costs, citing section 658A-25 and Haw. R. App. P. 39(a). The ICA granted the State's request for costs but denied its request for attorney's fees on the grounds that the State "failed to demonstrate that it incurred, as an expense, liability, or legal obligation to pay, appellate attorney's fees[.]" The Supreme Court reversed and granted the State's request for attorney's fees, holding that the fees were erroneously denied on the grounds that they were not "incurred." View "In re Arbitration between United Public Workers and State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal entered by the intermediate court of appeals affirming the circuit court's final judgment in this compensation dispute based on an oral agreement, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' motion filed under Haw. R. Civ. P. (HRCP) 55(c) to set aside entry of default.In this dispute between an independent contractor dentist, Dr. Grace Chen, and the dentist who retained Chen's services, Dr. Jonathan Mah and his corporation (collectively, Defendants), default and subsequent default judgment as to certain claims were entered against Defendants, and a bench trial was held regarding damages on some claims. Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to set aside entry of default and their motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Defendants' HRCP Rule 55(c) on the grounds that they failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of the test governing HRCP Rule 60(b) motions to set aside default judgments; and (2) the circuit court did not err in its remaining rulings. View "Chen v. Mah" on Justia Law