Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the gravity of a crime, by itself, does not establish an exigency empowering law enforcement officers to bypass the warrant requirement and that the State must articulate objective facts showing an immediate law enforcement need for the entry to support a warrantless home intrusion under the exigency exception.The State invoked the exigent circumstances exception to justify a warrantless home entry into Defendant's residence. Defendant was subsequently indicted for attempted murder in the second degree. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of his residence, arguing that the police lacked exigent circumstances to enter his residence without a warrant. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police entered Defendant's home without exigent circumstances, permission, or a warrant, and therefore, the circuit court properly suppressed the evidence. View "State v. Willis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the Leeward Planning Commission (LPC) for proceedings consistent with this opinion, holding that the LPC and the Planning Director of the County of Hawai'i wrongfully denied The Community Associations of Haualali (Hualalai) a hearing and decision on its petition to intervene as a party to contest a special permit application.The special permit application at issue requested approval to use an agricultural parcel of land as an equipment base yard and security dwelling and for stockpiling and crushing natural materials for commercial use. Hualalai, a group of Hawaii County community associations, filed a "Petition for Standing in a Contested Case Hearing," or petition to intervene. The petition was denied. Hualalai appealed, challenging the LPC's failure to issue a decision on Hualalai's petition and objecting to the decision to treat the proceeding as a closed matter. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the actions in this case were made upon unlawful procedure and constituted abuses of discretion. View "Community Ass'ns of Hualalai, Inc. v. Leeward Planning Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that courts cannot impose imprisonment exceeding the statutory threshold for a probationary sentence and also conditions of probation, and therefore, Defendant's sentence in this case was unlawful.Defendant pled no contest to violating a temporary restraining order. The family court sentenced Defendant to 181 days in prison and ordered him to complete a domestic violence intervention program (DVI). On appeal, Defendant argued that the family court erred in sentencing him to both serve 181 days and complete DVI because imposing DVI without probation violates Haw. Rev. Stat. Stat. 706-624(2)(a). The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the family court's sentence, holding that because a misdemeanor defendant sentenced to imprisonment exceeding 180 days cannot also receive a probationary sentence, and because DVI cannot be imposed except as a condition of probation, the family court imposed an unlawful sentence in this case. View "State v. Agdinaoay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the circuit court and granting Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees on appeal, holding that the ICA should have limited its appellate attorney's fees.Plaintiffs alleged that their neighbor, Defendant, was in breach of a restrictive covenant contained in the parties' subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions stating that trees and shrubs on every lot shall be maintained at a reasonable height. After a trial, the circuit court ordered Defendant not to maintain any plants on her property at a height not to exceed the roofline of her residence. The court awarded Plaintiffs $40,000 in damages plus attorney's fees. The ICA affirmed and granted Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment in part, holding (1) the ICA should have limited its appellate attorney's fees to twenty-five percent of the damages award Plaintiffs received; and (2) the ICA did not otherwise err. View "Gailliard v. Rawsthorne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the final judgment of the circuit court granting the State's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint seeking a declaratory order that a recently enacted bill was adopted through an unconstitutional process, holding that the bill violated Haw. Const. Art. III, 15.Plaintiffs argued in their complaint that the adoption of a law requiring hurricane shelter space in new public schools violated article III, section 15 because the bill did not receive three readings in each house of the Hawai'i State Legislature before it was passed and signed into law. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the process for enacting the law complied with the Legislature's adopted rules of procedure. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) article III, section 15 requires that the three readings begin anew after a non-germane amendment changes the purpose of a bill so that it is no longer related to the original bill as introduced; and (2) the bill at issue violated this requirement. View "League of Women Voters of Honolulu v. State" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal arising from the rulings of the family court on remand from a published opinion of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) in a divorce case, holding that the family court abused its discretion in part.The ICA affirmed in part and vacated in part the divorce decree in this case and remanded several issues, including the issue of spousal support, to the family court. After the case was remanded and judgment was made, the ICA held that the family court erred by engaging in a new just and equitable determination on remand, as it was not part of the remand order. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the ICA erred by setting aside the amended spousal support order on the basis that the family court was prohibited to do so on remand because Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47(a) provided the court with continuing jurisdiction to address issues of spousal support; (2) the family court erred on remand by awarding more spousal support than it determined was required to satisfy Wife's needs; and (3) the family court erred by not holding a hearing on remand to determine whether the spousal support amount should have been amended. View "Jacoby v. Jacoby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that wrongful foreclosures in violation of the power of sale are voidable, rather than void, and to the extent Silva v. Lopez, 5 Haw. 262 (1884), is to the contrary, it is overruled.Plaintiffs' property was foreclosed by nonjudicial foreclosure. Several years later, Plaintiffs sued for wrongful foreclosure and quiet title against various defendants. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion for dismissal of all claims. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed as to one defendant and otherwise reversed. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an application for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment as to the one defendant, holding (1) the "tender rule" was inapplicable on the facts, and as to the defendant who sought to assert the tender rule was not Plaintiffs' mortgagee, Plaintiffs did not need to plead tender to establish superior title as to that defendant; and (2) wrongful foreclosures in violation of the power of sale are voidable, not void. View "Delapinia v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's Haw. R. Pen. P. 35(b) motion to reduce his sentence for negligent homicide in the first degree and two drug-related charges, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's Rule 35(b) motion.The circuit court imposed two concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment to run consecutively with a ten-year term of imprisonment. In his Rule 35(b) motion, Appellant requested that his five-year sentences run concurrently, rather than consecutively, with his ten-year sentence. The circuit court denied the motion, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that courts deciding Rule 35(b) motions are not required to consider the Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-606 sentencing factors. View "State v. Cattaneo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate appellate court (ICA) and the circuit court's order denying Appellant's eighth Haw. R. Pen. P. Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief, holding that Appellant raised colorable claims in his petition.Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his eighth Rule 40 petition, Appellant argued that the trial court erred by ordering restitution without first determining whether Appellant could afford it and that it was error that he be denied parole for nonpayment of restitution. The circuit court denied the petition without holding a hearing. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the orders below, holding (1) Appellant stated a colorable claim that the Hawai'i Paroling Authority denied parole due to nonpayment of restitution; and (2) State v. Johnson, 711 P.2d 1295 (Haw. 1985), did not create a "new rule," and the ICA erred in concluding that the Johnson rule did not retroactively apply to Defendant's sentence. View "Rapozo v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence and remanding the case to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding that the appellate court erred in part.Defendant was convicted of computer fraud in the third degree and fraudulent use of a credit card and sentenced to five years in prison. The ICA vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded the case. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment in part, holding (1) the ICA properly held that aggregation of multiple transactions under computer fraud in the third degree is permissible; and (2) the indictment was defective with respect to the count alleging computer fraud, and therefore, the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was error. View "State v. Shaw" on Justia Law