Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Keep the North Shore Country's (KNSC) appeal from the decision of the Board of Land and Natural Resources approving Applicant's habitat conservation plan and authorizing Applicant to take fewer than two and a half Hawaiian hoary bats per year, holding that there was no error.To operate a proposed wind farm, Applicant was required to obtain an incidental take license as part of a habitat conservation plan approved by the Board. KNSC opposed the application citing the wind farm's potential impact on the ope'ape'a, the Hawaiian hoary bat. The Board approved the plan and authorized Applicant to take up to fifty-one ope'ape'a over the course twenty-one years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly applied the clear error standard in reviewing KNSC's challenges based on mixed questions of law and fact; (2) substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusions; and (3) there was no other error in the Board's proceedings. View "Keep the North Shore Country v. Board of Land & Natural Resources" on Justia Law

In this case concerning two restrictive clauses within a non-compete agreement the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the entry of summary judgment in favor of Lorna Gagnon, a former employee of Prudential Locations, LLC (Locations), holding that summary judgment was improper as to one agent as to a non-solicitation clause.The non-compete agreement in this case restricted Gagnon from establishing her own brokerage firm in the state within one year after terminating her employment with Locations and from soliciting persons "employed by" or "affiliated with" Locations. The two restrictive clauses at issue were a non-compete clause and a non-solicitation clause. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Gagnon as to the non-compete clause because the clause was not ancillary to a legitimate purpose; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to one agent with respect to the non-solicitation clause. View "Prudential Locations, LLC v. Gagnon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) to the extent it affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion for a deferred acceptance of no contest (DANC) plea, holding that the circuit court's consideration of sexual penetration was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances.Defendant was indicted for the sexual assault of a twelve-year-old and accepted a plea agreement allowing her to plead no contest to an amended charged of sexual assault in the fourth degree. Defendant moved for DANC plea, which the circuit court denied. The ICA affirmed the denial of Defendant's DANC motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that Defendant's no contest plea to sexual assault in the fourth degree excluded any allegation of sexual penetration. View "State v. Satoafaiga" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) in this dispute regarding payment of uninsured motorist (UM) and underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits to Plaintiff, holding that the circuit court properly excluded evidence related to an unleaded claim but erred in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend complaint solely on the basis of undue delay.Plaintiff, individually and as personal representative of the estate of her son, who died as a passenger in an automobile accident, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment, arguing that Defendant improperly failed to recognize that UM and UIM coverages totaling $1.2 million were available to her. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred in granting Defendant's motion to present evidence or in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend complaint. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendant's motion to preclude evidence; but (2) erred in concluding that Plaintiff could not amend her complaint due to undue delay. View "Carvalho v. AIG Hawaii Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the proper timing of Alvarado calculations, which determines the reimbursement due the insurer from a third-party settlement, and the reimbursement process for an insurer when the amount of workers' compensation (WC) benefits the insurer has already dispensed to the employee is less than the amount it owes the employee for its share of attorney's costs and fees for the third-party action.Petitioner received WC benefits from Respondent. Petitioner brought suit against the owner of the building in which she was injured and reached a settlement. Respondent then sought reimbursement of the WC benefits it had paid to Petitioner under Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-8 and Alvarado v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 993 P.2d 549 (Haw. 2000). At issue was whether certain WC benefits that Respondent owed Petitioner were properly classified as "paid compensation" and whether the process of Respondent's reimbursement of WC benefits exceeded the amount it had previously contributed to Petitioner as "paid compensation." The Supreme Court held (1) Alvarado calculations shall be performed based on the date on which the employee receives the third-party recovery; and (2) an insurer's "share" of the attorney's fees and costs the employee incurs while pursuing third-party recovery is based on the insurer's total WC liability. View "Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct, holding that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of disorderly conduct.Defendant was arrested by lying in front of trucks scheduled to transport telescope components for the Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope along with other protestors and then convicted of disorderly conduct. The ICA affirmed the conviction, concluding that the State's evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's disorderly conduct conviction was unsupported by substantial evidence. View "State v. Kaeo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the failure of the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) and the prosecutor in this case to comply with the twenty-day and forty-five-day statutory deadlines contained in Haw. Rev. Stat. 712A-7 and 712A-9 applicable to the seizure of Petitioner's property required its return to Petitioner.In 2012, HPD seized twenty-seven Product Direct Sweepstakes (PDS) machines from six Winner'z Zone locations for violating Hawaii's gambling statutes. For two years, while the machines remained in police custody, HPD did not initiate foreclosure proceedings, give notice of the seizure of forfeiture to all parties, or provide the prosecutors a written request for forfeiture. In 2014, HPD "re-seized" the PDS machines, and the prosecutor initiated forfeiture proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the agency was required to return the seized property because the agency failed to commence forfeiture proceedings according to the specific timing requirements set forth in sections 712A-7 and 712A-9. View "Kaneshiro v. Eleven Products Direct Sweepstakes Machines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's order denying Father's motion to set aside default and his motion to intervene, holding that the family court should have analyzed Father's motion to intervene under Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR) 24.In this proceeding brought under the Hawai'i Child Protective Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 587A, both Father's default and default judgment were entered while the identity of the child's natural father was unknown. On certiorari, Father argued that he was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before filing his motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24. The Supreme Court agreed on that issue and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Father was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before proceeding with his motion to intervene; and (2) Father's remaining arguments were without merit. View "In re AA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the district court's order on motion for summary judgment and judgment, holding that the ICA erred when it affirmed the district court regarding Plaintiff-buyers' claims alleging unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAP) remaining after summary judgment.Following the execution of two purchase agreements, Buyers took possession of the vehicle in dispute in this case, which, unbeknownst to Buyers at the time, had a defective clutch assembly. Seller refused to repair the vehicle at no cost to Buyers or to return Buyers' deposit. Buyers brought this action alleging that Seller had engaged in UDAP. The district court granted summary judgment for Seller and then entered judgment against Buyers on all remaining claims. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments in part, holding that the district court erred in interpreting Haw. Rev. Stat. 481J-2 to conclude that the warranty for used motor vehicles does not cover a clutch assembly. View "Leong v. Honolulu Ford, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) determining that the criminal complaint against Defendant did not comply with Haw. Rev. Stat. 805-1 but that a non-compliant complaint could still be used to initiate and maintain a prosecution by penal summons, holding that the family court erred in issuing a penal summons.The State charged Defendant by complaint with abuse of a household or family member, but the complaint was neither signed by a complainant nor supported by a declaration. The family court issued a penal summons compelling Defendant to appear. After appearing, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint was deficient, and therefore, the family court lacked probable cause to issue the penal summons. The family court granted the motion to dismiss. The ICA vacated the family court, concluding that the district court did not err in issuing the penal summons. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 805-1 does not distinguish between complaints for penal summons and complaints for arrest warrants; and (2) therefore, the ICA erred in holding that the State need not comply with its statutory obligations simply because it sought a penal summons. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law