Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute between Plaintiff, Ka’upulehu Land LLC, and Defendants, heirs and assigns of Pahukula, et al., stemming from Plaintiff’s complaint to quiet title to certain property. Plaintiff, which obtained the property through paper title derived from a common grantor, claimed that neither it nor Defendants received valid title to the property because the common grantor had sold the property prior to his death. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to the entire property by adverse possession. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court’s judgment, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of a cotenancy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the common grantor was not vested with title to the property when he died, and therefore, title to the property descended in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the common grantor’s death to his heirs; and (2) Defendants and Plaintiff were cotenants because they both received their interests in the property through a series of conveyances stemming from the common grantor. View "Ka'upulehu Land LLC v. Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula " on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a coastal height setback requirement that limits development next to Waikiki’s shoreline. In 2010, Kyo-ya Hotels & Resorts LP submitted a land use permit to redevelop an existing hotel building with a twenty-six-story hotel and residential tower. The Director of the Department of Planning and Permitting granted partial approval of Kyo-ya’s variance application to allow the Project to encroach approximately seventy-four percent into the coastal height setback. Several entities (Petitioners) challenged the Director’s conclusion that Kyo-ya’s request for a variance from the coastal height Sstback met the requirements for issuance of a variance as set forth by the city charter. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) denied Petitioners’ appeal of the Director’s decision. The circuit court affirmed the ZBA order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kyo-ya met none of the three requirements for issuance of a variance. View "Surfrider Found. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over a flag lot parcel of land in Puko’o, located on the Island of Moloka’i, County of Maui, State of Hawaii. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an order deciding a motion that was purportedly filed pursuant to Haw. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is appealable where the underlying ruling from which the party sought Rule 60(b) relief was not appealable. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order regarding the Rule 60(b) motion was not appealable because the circuit court had not entered a valid final judgment on the underlying claims at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that relief under Rule 60(b) requires an underlying judgment that comports with the principles of finality set forth in Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, and therefore, the ICA did not err in including that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the order regarding the Rule 60(b) motion. View "Bailey v. Duvauchelle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individual condominium owners, entered into purchase agreements with the developer of a Maui condominium project. Homeowners received the condominium declaration, which contained an arbitration clause, and other documents governing the project along with their purchase agreements. When the condominium development began experiencing financial problems, Homeowners filed suit against Respondents, the development and management companies for the project. Respondents filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the circuit court summarily denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that a valid arbitration agreement existed, this dispute fell within the scope of that agreement, the arbitration terms were procedurally conscionable, and the arbitration clause was not an unenforceable contract of adhesion. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) because Plaintiffs did not unambiguously assent to arbitration, the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable; (2) the ICA erred by placing dispositive weight on procedural unconscionability without addressing the alleged substantive unconscionability of the arbitration terms; and (3) the ICA erred by concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate procedural unconscionability. View "Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Since 1993, Defendant claimed lawful ownership of a property that was fraudulently transferred to him as part of a conspiracy to prevent Plaintiffs from collecting on a judgment. After two remands, a third jury found that the transfer of certain property was fraudulent and awarded $253,000 in special damages and $1,642,857 in punitive damages. Defendant appealed, arguing that the punitive damages award was grossly excessive and in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the punitive damages awarded by the third jury was justified and did not violate Defendant’s federal due process rights. View "Kekona v. Bornemann" on Justia Law

The Planning Director of the County of Hawaii approved the application of Michael Pruglo to consolidate and resubdivide the pre-existing lots on his forty-nine-acre parcel of land. Mark Kellberg, who owned land adjacent to the subject property, objected to the approval. Kellberg brought suit against the Planning Director and the County of Hawaii seeking to have the subdivision declared void. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) ruled that the Planning Director’s approval of Pruglo’s subdivision was invalid because it increased the number of lots. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA, holding that the ICA erred in ruling on the merits of Kellberg’s claims without addressing whether the owners of the lots within the subject property were required to be joined as parties under Haw. R. Civ. P. 19. Because the lot owners were necessary parties under Rule 19(a), the Court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to order the joinder of the lot owners under Rule 19. View "Kellberg v. Yuen" on Justia Law

After Defendants fell behind on their mortgage payments, their lender (“the Bank”) commenced a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the property, acquired the property at auction, and filed an ejectment action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Bank, judgment for possession, and a writ of possession (“the April 12th orders”). Defendants filed a motion to reconsider. Defendant later filed an amended Haw. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The circuit court denied Defendants’ motion to reconsider but did not dispose of the amended Rule 60(b) motion. Defendants appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) determined that the appeal from the April 12th orders and motion to reconsider was untimely and ruled that the appeal was premature with respect to the amended Rule 60(b) motion. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the portion of the ICA dismissal order concluding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of the April 12th orders and the motion to reconsider, holding that the ICA had appellate jurisdiction over this portion of the appeal; and (2) affirmed the portion of the ICA dismissal order dismissing any appeal of the amended Rule 60(b) motion, holding that the ICA lacked jurisdiction over this portion of the appeal. View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Amasol" on Justia Law

In 1989, land in Waikoloa on Hawai’i Island was reclassified from agricultural to urban to allow for the development of a residential community. The reclassification was made subject certain conditions. The land changed hands several time over the years. In 2009, the landowner, Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC (Bridge), informed the Land Use Commission (LUC) that it intended to assign its interest in the land to DW Aina Le’a Development, LLC (DW). DW subsequently invested approximately $20 million in developing the site. Nevertheless, the LUC voted to revert the land to its former agricultural land use classification on the basis that Bridge and its predecessors in interest had failed to perform according to the conditions imposed. Bridge and DW each sought judicial review of the LUC’s decision and order. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that the LUC erred in reverting the property without complying with the requirements of Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-4; and (2) erred in concluding that Bridge’s and DW’s procedural and substantive due process rights and equal protection rights were violated. View "DW Aina Le'a Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC" on Justia Law

Ralph Mitchell, a condominium owner in the Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay (“AOAO”), submitted a petition to the AOAO to conduct a special meeting of the AOAO to remove one or more of the AOAO Board members. The AOAO filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the petition did not contain at least twenty-five percent of the owners’ signatures, and therefore, there was no basis for conducting a special meeting. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the AOAO. The AOAO subsequently sought fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-157(a) and (b). The circuit court granted the motion. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the AOAO’s refusal to mediate the dispute precluded it from an entitlement of any fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-161(a). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded for a determination of whether section 514B-161(a) applies in this case and, if so, directed the circuit court to take into consideration such refusal in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a property title dispute between Defendant, who purchased the property in 2007, and Plaintiff, which later acquired a quitclaim deed to the property following a judicial foreclosure. After Defendant refused to vacate the property, Plaintiff filed the underlying action, requesting a judgment for immediate and exclusive possession of the property and a writ of possession. The circuit court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and issued a writ of possession. Defendant filed post-judgment motions and then filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-judgment motions. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the summary judgment and remanded based on Defendant’s post-judgment declaration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded, holding that the ICA erred in relying upon Defendant’s post-judgment motion as a basis to find disputed facts with regard to the motion for summary judgment. View "Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi" on Justia Law