Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2016, a plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit in Hawai‘i against his uncle, alleging sexual abuse that occurred in 1975 and 1976 when the plaintiff was a minor. The plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery, among other claims. The case was subject to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-1.8, which sets specific time limitations for civil actions arising from the sexual abuse of a minor.The Circuit Court instructed the jury based on criminal statutes in effect at the time the complaint was filed, rather than those in effect when the alleged abuse occurred. The jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the instructions should have been based on the criminal statutes in effect during the time of the alleged abuse. The ICA affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, holding that the defendant failed to show that HRS § 657-1.8 violated the ex post facto clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that HRS § 657-1.8(a) establishes a statute of limitations for civil actions based on the sexual abuse of a minor and does not create an independent cause of action. The court concluded that the applicable criminal statutes are those in effect when the alleged conduct occurred. Although the Circuit Court erred in instructing the jury on the criminal statutes in effect when the complaint was filed, the Supreme Court found this error to be harmless. The record showed that the defendant admitted to conduct that would have constituted a criminal offense under the statutes in effect at the time of the alleged abuse. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment, which upheld the Circuit Court’s final judgment. View "Foresman v. Foresman" on Justia Law

A landlord operated a business renting homes and had a tenant who performed repair, maintenance, and improvement work in exchange for reduced rent and payment. The tenant fell while working on the roof of one of the rental units and filed a workers' compensation claim. The landlord denied an employment relationship and disputed the work-related injury.The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations ruled in favor of the tenant, finding an employer-employee relationship. The landlord appealed, and the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) reversed the Director's decision, concluding there was no employment relationship under the control and relative nature of work tests. The tenant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which vacated parts of LIRAB's decision, instructing LIRAB to apply the substantial evidence standard instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case. The court held that the landlord did not present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of an employment relationship under the relative nature of the work test. The tenant's work was integral to the landlord's rental business, and the tenant did not have a business of his own. Therefore, the court concluded that an employer-employee relationship existed, and the tenant's injury was covered under Hawai'i's workers' compensation laws. The court vacated LIRAB's decision and the ICA's judgment, remanding the case to LIRAB to compute compensation. The court also held that the landlord was not responsible for the tenant's attorney fees and costs. View "Borrson v. Weeks" on Justia Law

This case involves a personal injury claim and the question of whether an adult child can claim loss of parental consortium when the parent has not died but has entered a persistent vegetative state and will not recover. The plaintiffs, including the adult child of the individual now in a persistent vegetative state, argued that a previous case, Masaki v. General Motors Co., allowed for a parent to recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child, and that this should extend to an adult child's claim for loss of parental consortium. The defendants, a group of healthcare providers, argued that a previous case, Halberg v. Young, held that no action exists in favor of a child for injuries sustained by the parent not resulting in the parent’s death.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the reasoning of Masaki would apply to the loss of parental consortium presented in this case. The court also found that the Halberg case was distinguishable factually from the current case, as it involved a parent who would recover from their injuries, unlike the parent in the current case who was in a persistent vegetative state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the lower court's decision, overruling Halberg to the extent that it held that a child cannot claim loss of parental consortium where a parent is severely injured but not killed. The court held that a child, whether a minor or an adult, may bring a loss of parental consortium claim for severe injury to a parent. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "HELG Administration Services, LLC v. Department of Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reinstating the jury's verdict and judgment for Tiare Franco's family (the Francos) after granting Sabio Reinhardt's motion to set aside the jury verdict and judgment, holding that the ICA erred.The Francos brought a wrongful death lawsuit against Reinhardt for negligently crashing a truck and killing Tiare. National Interstate Insurance Company (NIIC), the truck's insurer, filed a declaratory judgment action claiming it had no duty to defend and indemnify Reinhardt under the policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment for NIIC, and the Francos successfully appealed. Before the ICA resolved the declaratory action appeal, the circuit court held a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Francos. Counsel for Reinhardt moved to set aside the jury's verdict. The trial court granted the Francos' ensuing motion to disqualify counsel and Reinhardt's motion to set aside the jury verdict and judgment. The ICA reinstated the jury's verdict and judgment, holding that Reinhardt's counsel lacked authority to act as his lawyer. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and affirmed the circuit court's orders, holding that the circuit court correctly denied the Francos' motion to disqualify counsel and did not abuse its discretion by granting Reinhardt's motion to set aside. View "Franco v. Reinhardt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the circuit court denying Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim in this action brought by the City and County of Honolulu and the Honolulu Board of Water Supply (collectively, Plaintiffs) against a number of oil and gas producers (collectively, Defendants), holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs sued Defendants alleging public nuisance, private nuisance, strict liability failure to warn, negligent failure to warn, and trespass. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants engaged in a deceptive promotion campaign and misled the public about the dangers and environmental impact of using their fossil fuel products. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Supreme Court denied the motions, holding (1) Defendants were subject to specific jurisdiction in Hawai'i; (2) the CAA displaced federal common law governing interstate pollution damages suit, and following displacement, federal common law did and does not preempt state law; and (3) the CAA did not preempt Plaintiffs' claims. View "City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction in this case in which three law firms petitioned the Court to order a judge to dismiss them from the underlying lawsuit, holding that the law firms demonstrated a "clear and indisputable right to the relief requested and a lack of other means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or to obtain he requested action."Plaintiffs sued certain cigarette manufacturers and retailers, bringing product liability, fraud, and conspiracy claims. Plaintiff also sued three law firms that counseled the tobacco companies, alleging two counts of conspiracy. The law firms each filed motions to dismiss under Haw. R. Civ. P. (HRCP) Rule 12(b)(2), claiming that Hawai'i courts lacked general and specific jurisdiction over them. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss without making minimum contacts findings or undertaking any due process analysis. The law firms subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition and, alternatively, for a writ of mandamus ordering dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction and granted the law firms' writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court clearly exercised jurisdiction beyond its authority, and there were no other means for the law firms to adequately address the alleged wrong or to obtain dismissal. View "Dickinson v. Kim" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissing Appellant's appeal in this workers' compensation case for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that the ICA erred when it dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.These consolidated cases consisted of the decision of the Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DCD) determining that Appellant sustained compensable work-related injuries but denying her claim for compensation relating to her alleged neck injury and sleep disorder. Following years of proceedings before the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) and DCD, the LIRAB issued several orders, including an order granting Employer/Insurer's two motions to compel and denying Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment. The ICA dismissed Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ICA had jurisdiction to review the LIRAB's order granting the motions to compel and denying partial summary judgment as to the order compelling Appellant to undergo an independent medical examination. View "Suzuki v. American Healthways, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the district court ruling on a Haw. Rev. Stat. 604-10.5 petition to enjoin harassment (injunction petition) after ninety days elapsed from issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO), holding that the ICA correctly held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case.Further at issue before the Supreme Court, other than the jurisdictional matter, was whether a section 604-10.5 TRO expires after ninety days despite orders by the district court continuing the TRO beyond ninety days pending completion of a hearing and decision on the injunction petition. The Supreme Court held that if a district court has commenced hearing the merits of a section 604-10.5 injunction petition but, despite reasonable efforts, is unable to conclude the hearing within ninety days of the issuance of the ex parte TRO, the court has jurisdiction to continue the TRO pending its final decision on the injunction petition. View "Meyer v. Basco" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the proper timing of Alvarado calculations, which determines the reimbursement due the insurer from a third-party settlement, and the reimbursement process for an insurer when the amount of workers' compensation (WC) benefits the insurer has already dispensed to the employee is less than the amount it owes the employee for its share of attorney's costs and fees for the third-party action.Petitioner received WC benefits from Respondent. Petitioner brought suit against the owner of the building in which she was injured and reached a settlement. Respondent then sought reimbursement of the WC benefits it had paid to Petitioner under Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-8 and Alvarado v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 993 P.2d 549 (Haw. 2000). At issue was whether certain WC benefits that Respondent owed Petitioner were properly classified as "paid compensation" and whether the process of Respondent's reimbursement of WC benefits exceeded the amount it had previously contributed to Petitioner as "paid compensation." The Supreme Court held (1) Alvarado calculations shall be performed based on the date on which the employee receives the third-party recovery; and (2) an insurer's "share" of the attorney's fees and costs the employee incurs while pursuing third-party recovery is based on the insurer's total WC liability. View "Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's motions in limine to offer hearsay evidence, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the motions without entering findings of fact on the record.On certiorari, Appellant argued that the ICA erred by concluding that the circuit court may deny a motion in limine without providing findings of fact on the record in violation of Haw. R. Pen. P. 12(e). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 12(e) does not govern motions in limine; and (2) Haw. R. Evid. 103(b), the specific standard governing the admissibility of evidence and motions in limine, provides discretion to trial courts resolving evidentiary issues regarding whether to make findings of fact. View "State v. Marroquin" on Justia Law