Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This labor dispute arose out of a negotiation between the State and other governmental entities (collectively, the State) and United Public Workers (UPW) regarding the renewal and modification of a collective bargaining agreement. The State and UPW failed to reach an agreement, and the case proceeded to arbitration. Because the parties were unable to select a neutral arbitrator, the Hawai’i Labor Relations Board (HLRB) ordered the American Arbitration Association to select the neutral arbitrator. Both parties challenged the actions of the HLRB. The circuit court affirmed the HLRB’s rulings. On appeal, UPW asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute regarding the selection of the arbitrator. The Intermediate Court of Appeals disagreed, determining that HLRB had exclusive original jurisdiction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 89-14. UPW appealed, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dispute regarding selection of the arbitrator under Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HLRB had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over the selection of the arbitrator under chapter 89, as the arbitration was required by statute as part of the legislatively mandated process for resolving impasses in collective bargaining; and (2) chapter 658A was not applicable to this case. View "State v. Nakaneula" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crystal methamphetamine. Petitioner was released in 2003 and began a radiological technician (radtech) degree program. In 2007, after graduating from the program, Petitioner applied for a vacant radtech position at Hawai’i Health Systems Corporation (HHSC), d/b/a Hilo Medical Center (HMC) (collectively, HHSC/HMC). HHSC/HMC rejected Petitioner’s application because of his prior drug conviction. Petitioner filed suit, alleging violations of Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-2 and Haw. Const. art. I, 5. The circuit court granted summary judgment for HHSC/HMC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment where HHSC/HMC did not establish the existence of a rational relationship between the radtech possession and Petitioner’s prior drug conviction that would entitle HHSC/HMC to summary judgment. View "Shimose v. Haw. Health Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

The Kahala Hotel and Resort collected a nineteen percent service charge on the purchase of food and beverages at Jason Kawakami’s reception. The hotel retained fifteen percent of the service charge as a “management share,” then reclassified and used that portion to pay for the banquet employees’ “wages.” Kawakami, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, sued, alleging that Kahala Hotel violated Haw. Rev. Stat. 481B-14. The circuit court agreed, holding that, pursuant to section 481B-14, customers are entitled to know that a portion of the service charge would not be paid to employes as tip income but would instead become the property of the hotel to be used as the hotel deemed appropriate. The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no disclosure was required because the hotel had reclassified its fifteen percent management share to pay its employees’ wages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding section 481B-14 requires a hotel or restaurant that applies a service charge for food or beverage services to either distribute the service charge directly as tip income to the non-management employees who provided the services or disclose to its customers its practice of retaining the service charge. View "Kawakami v. Kahala Hotel Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant was permanently incapacitated while lifting boxes during a work shift for the City and County of Honolulu. Appellant applied for service-connected disability retirement benefits with the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) under Haw. Rev. Stat. 88-79, which allows for such benefits if an ERS member was permanently incapacitated for duty as the “natural and proximate result” of an “accident” occurring while in the actual performance of a duty “at some definite time and place.” The Board denied Appellant’s application, concluding (1) Appellant’s injury was not an “accident” because Appellant had failed to show that the injury occurred at “some definite time and place”; and (2) Appellant’s permanent incapacity was not the “natural and proximate result” of the incident. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the circuit court, holding that the “definite time and place” language in section 88-79 does not preclude the recovery of benefits despite Appellant’s inability to pinpoint the precise moment of injury where there was no dispute that Appellant was injured during her work shift. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant’s permanent incapacity was not “the natural and proximate result” of the alleged incident. View "Panado v. Bd. of Trustees Employees' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO (“UPW”) filed an action on behalf of the employees it represented, alleging (1) then-Governor Lingle and members of her administration retaliated against UPW members for filing a lawsuit opposing her statewide furlough plan; and (2) the State was unlawfully privatizing positions customarily performed by civil servants under the merit system. The circuit court dismissed the complaint based on a lack of jurisdiction. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to stay the action pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine so the parties could pursue appropriate administrative remedies before the Hawaii Labor Relations Board (HLRB). The Supreme Court primarily affirmed, holding (1) the ICA did not err in concluding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was applicable to UPW’s retaliation claims because the claims required the resolution of issues that have been placed within the special competence of the HLRB, and that a stay, rather than a dismissal, was appropriate under the circumstances; and (2) the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not apply to UPW’s privatization claims, and therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing these claims, and the ICA erred in referring the claims to the HLRB. Remanded. View "United Pub. Workers, AFSCME, Local 636, AFL-CIO v. Abercrombie" on Justia Law

The Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA) filed a grievance against the University Laboratory School (ULS), alleging that the ULS refused to implement the proper salary placement for teachers as agreed to in a supplemental agreement negotiated by the HSTA and the Hawaii Board of Education. The ULS argued that the step placement chart the HSTA sought to enforce had never been agreed upon or incorporated into the agreement. The HSTA subsequently filed a grievance and a motion to compel arbitration of its grievance. The circuit court denied the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying HSTA’s motion, determining that the Hawaii Labor Relations Board had primary jurisdiction over the issues raised in the HSTA’s grievance and that the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration was premature. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that because the parties agreed to leave questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration after concluding that an arbitration agreement existed. Remanded. View "Haw. State Teachers Ass’n v. Univ. Lab. Sch." on Justia Law

Raymond Gurrobat, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, filed an action against HTH Corporation and Pacific Beach Corporation (collectively, Defendants), asserting claims of unlawful withholding of wages and unfair methods of competition (UMOC) for Defendants’ alleged failure to distribute the entirety of the service charges they received from customers to service employees and for failing to disclose to customers their practice of retaining a portion of those charges. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gurrabat on the unlawful withholding of wages claim but in favor of Defendants on the UMOC claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s order granting Gurrobat’s motion for class certification; (2) affirmed in large part the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on Gurrobat’s claims for unpaid wages but vacated the portion of the order granting Gurrobat’s motion for summary judgment as to damages that imposed joint and several liability on Defendants; and (3) vacated the circuit court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Gurrobat’s UMOC claim, as Gurrobat alleged sufficient facts to survive summary judgment on this claim. Remanded. View "Gurrobat v. HTH Corp." on Justia Law

John McLaren represented a claimant in a workers’ compensation case before the Disability Compensation Division (“Division”) of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (“Department”) that resulted in a settlement awarding the claimant benefits for disability and disfigurement. McLaren requested attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $7,105. The Director of the Department approved the request but reduced the amount to $3,729. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board dismissed McLaren’s appeal as untimely and denied McLaren’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the ICA erred in concluding that McLaren’s appeal was untimely made and that his requests to the Division for reconsideration were insufficiently supported; (2) the ICA did not err in concluding that McLaren did not have a right to a contested case hearing before the Division; but (3) the Division was required to provide its reasons for reducing McLaren’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. View "McLaren v. Paradise Inn Haw., Inc." on Justia Law

The State filed a third amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that public funds ported to certain unions under the Hawaii Public Employees Health Fund’s porting program exceeded the amounts allowed by law. The circuit court’s declaratory ruling interpreting the statutory phrase “actual monthly cost of the coverage” in Haw. Rev. Stat. 87 essentially ended the State’s case, and the court entered judgment against the State. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in interpreting “actual monthly cost of the coverage,” and (2) the State’s factual allegations did not constitute a violation of the provisions of chapter 87. View "State v. Haw. Gov’t Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer and supervisors, alleging that he suffered discriminatory conduct while employed as a car salesman. Plaintiff asserted claims for state harassment and retaliation, federal harassment and retaliation, unlawful termination as against public policy, and breach of his employment contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and one of Defendant’s supervisors on the state harassment and retaliation claims and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the federal harassment and retaliation claims and the public policy claim, and (2) otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the ICA’s judgment on the state harassment and retaliation claims with respect to Plaintiff’s supervisor, holding that individual employees are not liable as employers under Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-2(1)(A) and 378-2(2); and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co." on Justia Law