Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, the circuit court found Timothy Walsh guilty of assault in the second decree. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, finding that the prosecutor's statements during his closing argument implied that Walsh tailored his testimony because he exercised his right to be present during jury voir dire and other witnesses' testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the criminal trial of a defendant, the prosecution's statements that a testifying defendant is less credible because he had been present during the trial, heard the testimony of other witnesses, and heard voir dire, constitute prohibited generic tailoring arguments; (2) prohibited generic tailoring arguments are reviewable as plain error; (3) standard jury instructions regarding witness testimony and counsel's arguments do not cure such improper arguments; (4) accordingly, whenever a defendant testifies, the jury must be instructed that the defendant has a right to be present during trial; and (5) in this case, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded. View "State v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Alyssa Ray received treatment from Dr. Kara Yamamoto, an employee of Kapiolani Medical Specialists (KMS). Alyssa's parents brought an action in circuit court against KMS for negligent treatment and failure to obtain informed consent. The jury found that (1) Dr. Yamamoto's treatment of Alyssa was negligent but it was not a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries; and (2) Dr. Yamamoto failed to properly inform the Rays, and her failure was a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim and entered judgment in favor of the Rays. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the circuit court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim, and a new trial was required because the negligent treatment and informed consent verdicts were irreconcilable; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying KMS' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of informed consent; and (3) the circuit court erred by admitting certain testimony and failing adequately to cure the error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists" on Justia Law

Walter and Sylvia Chang and the Walter Chang Trust instituted an action related to the foreclosure of property on which the Changs held a purchase money mortgage. The Chang named as defendants several parties, including Eadean Buffington, the Changs' attorney, and Investors Funding, a mortgagee of the property. After the circuit court action was removed to the bankruptcy court, Integrity Escrow and Title was added as a third party defendant. The bankruptcy court granted the Changs' petition for a determination that their settlement with Investors Funding was made in good faith. Buffington and Integrity appealed the order. The bankruptcy court subsequently remanded the action to the circuit court. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed Buffington and Integrity's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's dismissal order, holding the ICA erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because one of the parties was in bankruptcy; (2) it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the good faith settlement order was not in the record on appeal; and (3) the good faith settlement order entered by the bankruptcy court prior to remand was not properly appealable in the state court system. Remanded. View "Chang v. Buffington" on Justia Law

After the family court granted Geraldine Civtznovich-Dubie and George Dubie a divorce, George was killed. Geraldine then filed a motion to vacate the divorce decree or to set aside the corresponding property division, arguing that her marriage to George was void ab initio because George's previous marriage had not ended in a valid divorce. The family court denied Geraldine's motion, and Geraldine appealed. The intermediate court of appeals denied the motion, holding that Geraldine was estopped from challenging the validity of George's prior divorce and thereby was estopped from challenging the family court's subject matter jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree between Geraldine and George. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the appellate court did not err in affirming the family court's order but that its reasoning was erroneous in part. The Court concluded that jurisdiction cannot be created by estoppel, and therefore a party cannot be estopped from challenging the family court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the divorce decree was not void under Hawaii Family Court Rule 60(b)(4). View "Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie" on Justia Law

Respondent Cedric Kikuta was convicted by a jury for assault in the third degree after a physical altercation with his stepson. Respondent appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the parental discipline defense and on whether the assault in the third degree occurred during the course of a scuffle, or affray, entered into by mutual consent. The court of appeals (1) held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the parental discipline defense and (2) chose not to address Respondent's argument regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court regarding the parental discipline defense but vacated the judgment as to the lack of disposition regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Court held that (1) an instruction on the parental discipline defense is not per se precluded by the fact that substantial bodily injury occurred; (2) an instruction on the parental discipline defense must be given if there is some evidence to support each element of the defense; and (3) a mutual affray instruction must be given where there is some evidence the injury was inflicted during a fight entered into by mutual consent. View "State v. Kikuta" on Justia Law

Eshell Mitchell sued the Yuen family in circuit court for multiple injuries she received when the Yuens' dog bit her. Ms. Mitchell temporarily resided with the Yuens. Petitioner Jennifer Naipo is the half-sister of Naena Yuen. Ms. Mitchell's negligence claim was partly based on a disputed fact that the Yuens' dog had bitten Ms. Naipo several months earlier. The Yuens denied that the dog bit Ms. Naipo. Ms. Mitchell deposed Ms. Naipo, who appeared without counsel. She testified she had never been bitten, and that an injury to her forehead was not from a dog bite but from a fall. The differing testimonies lead to Ms. Mitchell issuing a subpoena duces tecum for Ms. Naipo's medical records. Ms. Naipo retained counsel and sought to quash the subpoena, claiming that the records were protected from disclosure. The trial court ordered the records be produced. Ms. Naipo petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to prevent disclosure of her medical records. The Court held that Ms. Naipo's right to privacy and her physician-patient privilege were not waived. The Court directed the lower court to quash the subpoena for Ms. Naipo's medical records.

In 2007, Petitioner Cornelius Durham was indicted on two counts of sexual assault. He entered a "no contest" plea and was sentenced to five years' probation on each count to run concurrently with special terms and conditions of probation. One of the conditions was that he participate in sex offender treatment. Later that year, Petitioner began to receive treatment from Catholic Charities. In 2008, Petitioner was involuntarily terminated from care with Catholic Charities. The "Termination of Treatment" report cited four reasons. Of note, Petitioner demonstrated "resistance to treatment." Six days following the termination, Petitioner began treatment with a private licensed psychologist. Petitioner's probation officer reported that Petitioner had violated the terms of his probation because of Catholic Charities' involuntary termination. Petitioner's probation was revoked, and he was resentenced to one year in prison and an additional five years' probation. Petitioner appealed his new sentence. The Supreme Court found that Petitioner was not given notice of his probation officer's report. Without that notice, Petitioner's due process rights were violated. The Court vacated the second sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings pertaining to his probation.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Corboy and a number of real property owners and taxpayers brought claims against various state and county Defendants-Appellants to get an exemption from property taxes equal to an exemption granted to Hawaiian homestead lessees under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA). Plaintiffs are not native Hawaiians, but argued that the tax exemptions for homestead lessees involve race-based discrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Federal civil rights laws because only native Hawaiians are eligible to become homestead lessees under the HHCA. Accordingly, they sought a refund of real property taxes paid in excess of what they would have been assessed had each of them been granted an exemption. The State filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the disputed exemptions did not violate the equal protection clause because the exemptions were not based upon whether a taxpayer was a native Hawaiian, but instead they were based on whether the taxpayer was a homestead lessee of HHCA land. The tax appeal court granted the Stateâs motion, and on appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the courtâs awarding of the summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to the constitutionality of the tax exemption and the HHCA. The record reflected that the Plaintiffs were not interested in participating in the homestead lease program and therefore they could not establish an injury sufficient to give them standing to challenge the exemption. The Court vacated the tax appeal courtâs judgment, and ordered the lower court to dismiss Plaintiffsâ cases for lack of jurisdiction.

Richard Blaisdell is a Hawaiâi state inmate incarcerated in Arizona. He was convicted in 1994 on counts of sexual assault and terroristic threatening. In 2008, Blaisdell filed an emergency request for a restraining order against Arizona prison officials. He sought to enjoin the prison from destroying thirteen audio tapes he claimed contained evidence of prosecutorial misconduct that would exonerate him in his criminal case. The emergency motion was denied. Blaisdell appealed the decision to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), but the ICA affirmed the circuit courtâs decision. Blaisdell tried again two more times in 2009 to move the district court to hear his plea. Hearing nothing, Blaisdell filed a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to rule on one of his pending motions. The Supreme Court granted the writ, and the circuit court responded by dismissing Blaisdellâs motions. Blaisdell appealed again to the ICA, and again the ICA affirmed the circuit courtâs decision. Blaisdell appealed seeking Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court agreed with Blaisdellâs arguments to the extent that his claims for relief should not have been dismissed with prejudice in the lower courts. The Court held that the ICA erred in summarily affirming the circuit courtâs dismissal of Blaisdellâs complaint. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for proceedings before a different judge.

Petitioner-Appellant Lopeti Lui Tuua was charged with assaulting a bouncer with a beer bottle. At trial, Tuua's half brother testified that he, rather than Tuua, assaulted the bouncer. During closing argument, the deputy prosecuting attorney commented that if the jury believed Tuua's half brother, no one would be convicted of assault. Tuua was found guilty and convicted of second degree assault, and sentenced to 90 days in prison and 5 years probation. Tuua appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), alleging in part, that the deputy prosecutor's comments at trial and in his closing statement were improper by commenting on the consequences of the jury's verdict and matters not in evidence. The ICA held the comments were not improper; Tuua brought this appeal. On review of the record, the Supreme Court vacated Tuua's judgment and conviction, and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.