Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tara Thomas filed a lawsuit against her former attorney, Grant Kidani. Kidani represented Thomas in a real estate dispute wherein the jury decided the case against Thomas. Following that trial, Thomas sued Kidani, alleging legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Kidani, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the ICA applied an incorrect standard of review on appeal where it invoked the clearly erroneous standard rather than a de novo review of Kidani's motion for summary judgment; but (2) Kidani was entitled to summary judgment in this case because Thomas did not meet her burden of proving that she would have prevailed at trial. View "Thomas v. Kidani" on Justia Law

The instant action arose from an ejectment proceeding involving a dispute as to whether Respondent Wayne Peelua alleged a cognizable claim to the title of certain real property. Petitioner Deutsche Bank filed a complaint alleging that it was entitled to possession of the property. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court held for Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the district court order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA and affirmed the district court, holding that Respondent's affidavit did not meet the requirements of Dist. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12.1, and therefore, the district court had jurisdiction over Petitioner's ejectment action. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Peelua" on Justia Law

In the case underlying this appeal, the circuit court appointed Appellant David Bettencourt to represent a client in a criminal case. After the client was acquitted on all counts, Appellant filed two requests for his own fees as appointed counsel, the second if which was the subject of this appeal. The trial judge certified the total amount of fees requested in the second request, but an administrative judge reduced the amount of fees requested as necessary to provide fair compensation. At issue on appeal was the scope of the administrative judge's authority under Haw. Rev. Stat. 802-5(b). The Supreme Court vacated the administrative judge's order, holding (1) under section 802-5(b), both the trial judge and the administrative judge independently review excess fee requests to determine whether a fee award is fair compensation, and both the trial judge's and administrative judge's orders awarding fees are judicial acts subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard; and (2) because the administrative judge in this case summarily reduced Appellant's fees with no reasons given, the Court could not determine whether the administrative judge abused his discretion in ordering reduced fees. Remanded. View "In re Attorney's Fees of Bettencourt" on Justia Law

In this personal injury case, Petitioners filed a complaint against Respondent, alleging negligence and seeking damages. A jury returned with a verdict awarding special damages with no general damages. The trial court gave the jury a supplemental jury instruction, and the jury returned from its deliberations with a general damages award of one dollar. Petitioners filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the damages award, holding (1) when a jury awards special damages but returns a zero general damages award for pain and suffering in a personal injury case, it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to instruct the jury that the verdict is inconsistent and to direct the jury to continue deliberations on the amount of general damages to be awarded; (2) when, after resubmittal to the jury, the jury returns a general damages award that is the symbolic equivalent of no award, the verdict is inconsistent; (3) in the instant case, the jury's general damages award was the symbolic equivalent of no award; and (4) under the circumstances of this case, a new trial on damages must be granted. Remanded. View "Kanahele v. Han" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Jenaro Torres of murder in the second degree and found that Appellant possessed, used, or threatened the use of a revolver during the commission of a murder. Appellant had previously pled no contest in federal court to charges stemming from the same incident. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial based on its conclusion that the court erred in admitting evidence obtained by federal officers. The Supreme Court (1) held that where the State seeks to prosecute a defendant in a Hawaii state court and seeks to admit evidence obtained by federal law enforcement officers, the court must give due consideration to the Hawaii Constitution and applicable case law when assessing whether such evidence is admissible against the defendant; (2) corrected the opinion of the ICA insofar as it concluded that federal law alone was to be considered in ruling on the evidence obtained by federal officers and failed to additionally consider whether the evidence also comported with the Hawaii Constitution and applicable case law; and (3) affirmed the opinion of the ICA in all other respects. View "State v. Torres " on Justia Law

Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a divorce decree that ordered Father to pay child support for each child as long as they continued post-high school education, until graduation, or until the child attained the age of twenty-three. The family court later granted Mother's post-decree motion seeking an order reestablishing educational support for the parties' twenty-five year-old daughter, who was legally blind and pursuing a college education. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded. At issue on appeal was whether Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47(a) authorized a family court to order educational support for a disabled but competent child age twenty-three or older when the family court's 2004 Child Support Guidelines provided that such support may be continued only until the child reaches age twenty-three. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA and affirmed the family court, holding (1) to the extent that the 2004 Guidelines purport to set an age limitation on the family child's authority to continue educational support for an adult child, they are invalid as they exceed the statutory mandate of section 580-47(a); and (2) section 580-47(a) does not impose an age limit for educational support of a child age twenty-three or older. View "Jaylo v. Jaylo" on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company denied personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to Chung Ahn and Kee Kim (collectively, Insureds) for treatments after motor vehicle accidents. Insureds each sought administrative reviews with the Insurance Division of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs (DCCA). The DCCA granted summary judgment to Liberty Mutual based on the holding in Wilson v. AIG Hawaii Insurance Company, which stated that unless an insurer's non-payment of PIP benefits jeopardizes an insured's ability to reach the minimum amount of medical expenses required to file a tort lawsuit, insureds are not real parties in interest allowed to pursue lawsuits seeking payment of PIP benefits to providers. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Act 198 of 2006 had legislatively overruled Wilson. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) upheld the circuit court. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) overruled Wilson, holding that insureds are real parties in interest in actions against insurers regarding PIP benefits; and (2) vacated the ICA and circuit court judgments because at the time of judgment, Act 198 of 2006 was not retrospective, and the real party in interest holding of Wilson was still in effect. Remanded. View "Ahn v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent John Veikoso was charged with an eight-count indictment relating to the sexual assault of two complaining witnesses on two separate occasions. The jury found Respondent guilty on all eight counts. On appeal, the intermediate court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a doctor who examined the second complaining witness regarding alleged threats made by Respondent against the witness and that such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate appeallate court and reinstated and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the error in admitting such testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Veikoso" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Tominiko was near an intersection with a gathering of people who were drinking beer and soda. A police officer arrived but did not see Tominiko drinking beer. The officer asked to see Tominiko's identification, but Tominiko walked to his car and got in. When the officer asked Tominiko to exit his vehicle, Tominiko drove away. The officer chased Tominiko and, while Tominiko was stopped by traffic, the officer approached Tominiko's vehicle and noticed beer bottles in his car. Tominiko was later convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). Tominiko appealed, contending that the OVUII charge was insufficient and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals and district court, holding (1) the charge was not insufficient because, when reading the charge as a whole, it could be reasonably construed to charge a crime; and (2) Tominiko was subjected to an illegal seizure, and the evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed. View "State v. Tominiko" on Justia Law

After Bonnie Kakinami filed a complaint for divorce from Aaron Kakinami, the family court granted Aaron's motion to continue the trial. Eighteen months after she filed for divorce, Bonnie filed a motion to bifurcate. The family court granted her request. During the hearing on the motion, the family court found Bonnie was entitled to divorce and entered a divorce decree that dissolved the marriage and made certain orders regarding division of property and debts. The court reserved the division of property and debts not decided by the divorce decree until the trial. Later, the family court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that the court had good cause to bifurcate the divorce. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the family court did not abuse its discretion by bifurcating the proceedings and entering the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the family court was correct to apply the good cause standard for bifurcating the divorce proceedings, and (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion by finding that good cause existed to bifurcate the proceedings in this case. View "Kakinami v. Kakinami" on Justia Law