Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner's ex-wife, Respondent, brought a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586 petition alleging domestic abuse of the couple's daughter. The family court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) determined, inter alia, that the family court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and order of the family court, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to discipline children inhering in their liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, under the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution; (2) a parent may raise the right of parental discipline in a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586-5 show cause hearing in opposition to the continuation of a TRO issued under chapter 586 on allegations of domestic abuse; (3) in such circumstances trial courts shall consider whether the discipline is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor in determine whether the parent's conduct constituted abuse or proper discipline; and (4) generally a non-custodial parent retains the right to discipline a child when the child is under his or her supervision. View "Hamilton v. Lethem" on Justia Law

Governor Linda Lingle filed an executive order unilaterally imposing three-day-per-month furloughs for all state employees and reducing the Department of Education's and University of Hawaii's spending accordingly. The Hawaii State Teachers Association and United Public Workers (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this action, asserting several causes of action and moving for a temporary restraining order. The circuit court granted in part Plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction and held for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the dispute in this case ultimately related to a prohibited practice pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 89; and (2) the circuit court erred by deciding statutory issues over which the Hawaii Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction. View "State Teachers Ass'n v. Abercrombie" on Justia Law

In these related original proceedings, Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for (1) judgment invalidating the 2011 Final Reapportionment Plan (Plan) for the state legislature adopted by the State Reapportionment Commission, (2) a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to prepare and file a new reapportionment plan for the state legislature, and (3) a writ of mandamus directing the Chief Election Officer to rescind the publication of the Plan. The Supreme Court issued orders granting the petitions and (1) invalidated the Plan, determining it was constitutionally invalid where (i) the Hawaii Constitution expressly mandates that only permanent residents be counted in the population base for the purpose of reapportionment, and (ii) the Plan disregarded this constitutional mandate by including nonpermanent residents in the population base that the Commission used to allocate legislative seats among the islands; (2) directed the Commission to prepare and file a new reapportionment plan that (i) allocates the members of the state legislature among the basic island units by using a permanent resident population base and then (ii) apportions the members among the districts therein; and (3) directed the Chief Election Officer to rescind the publication of the Plan for the state legislature. View "Solomon v. Abercrombie" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing on the Commission on Water Resource Management's amendment of interim flow standards for certain Maui streams. The Commission denied Petitioner's petition in a decision that was reflected in the minutes of the Commission's meeting. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the meeting minutes were not a final order because the document was not signed by any member of the Commission pursuant to Haw. Admin. R. 13-167-7(c). The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's decision, holding that the Commission's decision, as reflected in the meeting minutes, was a final decision of the Commission for which judicial review could be sought because the Acting Deputy Director to the Chairperson of the Board of Land and Natural Resources authenticated the Commission's decision in accordance with section 13-167-7(c). Remanded. View "In re Petition to Amend Interim Instream Flow Standards for Maui Streams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Brandon Valeros was charged with assault in the second degree. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence of Defendant, holding that the failure of the prosecution to disclose an alibi-rebuttal witness was a violation of Haw. R. Pen. P. 12.1 even though the witness had been previously listed as the alibi witness of Defendant, as the witness apparently unbeknownst to Defendant became the prosecution's witness. Hence, in the absence of a good cause for granting an exception to the requirements of Rule 12.1, it was error for the circuit court to allow that witness to testify in order to rebut Defendant's alibi defense. Remanded. View "State v. Valeros" on Justia Law

Hatem Eid was charged with excessive speeding. The charge stemmed from an incident in which an officer paced Eid's car with his own vehicle and concluded Eid was speeding. Prior to that incident, the officer had speed checks conducted on his patrol car, which were intended to establish that the speedometer was accurate. Prior to trial, Eid filed a motion in limine to exclude any speed check or speedometer reading evidence. The district court denied Eid's motion, admitted the evidence, and found Eid guilty of excessive speeding. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that the district court erred in admitting the speed check and speedometer reading evidence after determining that the State did not meet the foundational requirements set forth by State v. Fitzwater. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded, holding that the State established a sufficient foundation to admit the speed check evidence, and consequently, the speedometer reading in this case. View "State v. Eid" on Justia Law

Alohacare, a health maintenance organization (HMO), submitted a proposal to the Department of Human Services to bid for a Quest Expanded Access contract to provide healthcare services for participants in the state's Medicaid program. The Department of Human Services awarded Quest contracts to United HealthCare Insurance (United) and WellCare Health Insurance (Ohana) but not to Alohacare. Alohacare petitioned the Insurance Commissioner of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs for declaratory relief that the Quest contracts required the accident and health insurers to carry an HMO license. The Commissioner concluded that the license was not required to offer the Quest managed care product because the services required under the contracts were not services that could be provided only by an HMO. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) AlohaCare had standing to appeal the Commissioner's decision; (2) both accident and health insurers and HMOs were authorized to offer the model of care required by the Quest contracts; and (3) this holding did not nullify the Health Maintenance Organization Act. View "Alohacare v. Ito" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arose from an insurance contract between Plaintiff, who had cancer, and Defendants, two insurance companies. In May 2007, Plaintiff applied for long-term care benefits under her policy. Defendants found her eligible for benefits and paid her caregiver for services beginning in October 2007. Defendants provided coverage for Plaintiff for almost a year, then terminated her benefits on August 25, 2008. Nearly five months later, on January 23, 2009, Defendants reinstated her benefits retroactively. After Defendants terminated Plaintiff's benefits, she attempted suicide. On July 9, 2009, Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging, inter alia, insurer bad faith and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court subsequently accepted a question certified to it by the district court and answered it by holding that if a first-party insurer commits bad faith, an insured need not prove the insured suffered economic or physical loss caused by the bad faith in order to recover emotional distress damages caused by the bad faith. View "Miller v. Hartford Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Michele Steigman brought a tort action to recover damages after suffering a slip-and-fall accident while she was a guest of Outrigger Enterprises' hotel. The case went to trial, and a jury found Outrigger was not negligent. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. At issue on certiorari was whether Hawaii's comparative negligence statute nullifies the common law tort defense barring recovery for plaintiffs injured by known or obvious dangers. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and circuit court, holding that where the comparative negligence statute eliminates contributory negligence, the known or obvious danger defense is no longer viable as a complete bar to an injured plaintiff's claim in the context of premises liability. View "Steigman v. Outrigger Enterprises, Inc. " on Justia Law

Daniel Taylor was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to traffic in Native American cultural items that were obtained in violation of the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act. The items were native Hawaiian artifacts that Taylor and an accomplice took from a cave. A year later the State grand jury indicted Taylor for theft in the first degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-830(1) and 708-830.5(1)(a) with regard to the same events. Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, and the circuit court denied Taylor's motion. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to the grand jury to find probable cause that the property taken was "property of another" under section 708-830(1); and (2) Taylor's prosecution in state court was not barred by Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-112 because the theft charge required proof of a fact not required for Taylor's federal conspiracy offense, and the purposes behind the state and federal statutes differed. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law