Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kevin Nesmith and Chris Yamamoto were each charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). The trial court found Nesmith and Yamamoto guilty as charged. Nesmith and Yamamoto appealed, alleging that the complaints were legally deficient for having failed to allege mens rea. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that mens rea need not be alleged in a complaint charging crimes under sections 291E-6a(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and held (1) pursuant to State v. Wheeler, a charge of OVUII under section 291E-61(a)(1) must allege the requisite mens rea; (2) an OVUII charge under section 291E-61(a)(3) is an absolute liability offense for which mens rea need not be alleged or proven; (3) the ICA erred by relying on general intent cases to hold that mens rea may be inferred from the allegations in a section 291E-61(a)(1) OVUII charge; and (4) the State v. Nesmith majority erred by extending Haw. Rev. Stat. 806-28 to the district courts. View "State v. Nesmith" on Justia Law

The circuit court found Samuel Walker guilty of three offenses, including Count I, habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (HOVUII). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded Walker's case with instructions to dismiss Count I without prejudice, holding that Count I of the felony information failed to allege an essential element, an attendant circumstance, of the charge of HOVUII. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appellate court's remand for entry of judgment of conviction and resentencing for a lesser-included offense must be based on a jurisdictionally valid lesser-included charge; and (2) under this holding, Walker's HOVUII charge did not adequately allege the lesser-included offense of OVUII as a first offender because his charge failed to allege an essential element, specifically, the attendant circumstance that he operated a vehicle on a public road, way, street, or highway. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

Jason Kiese was found guilty by the family court of one count of harassment. After the trial, the family court denied Kiese's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the judgment of conviction and concluded that the family court's denial of Kiese's stay was erroneous but moot. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and, because Kiese had already served his probationary sentence, affirmed the ICA's judgment on appeal, holding (1) the ICA correctly held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Kiese's harassment conviction; (2) the ICA erred in not addressing the family court's failure to stay Keise's sentence pending appeal based on the mootness doctrine because the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied; and (3) the family court erred by denying Kiese a stay of his petty misdemeanor sentence pending appeal because Kiese, as a petty misdemeanant on bail, was entitled to a continuance of bail as a matter of right pending appellate review, and the family court was without jurisdiction to execute Kiese's sentence. View "State v. Kiese" on Justia Law

This case involved a divorce action between Sami and Jacqueline Tamman. After the family court entered its order granting custody and support, Sami timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the family court denied in substantial part. Sami subsequently filed a notice of appeal and attached the court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. Approximately a month later Sami filed his civil appeal docketing statement, to which he attached the order granting custody and other documents. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the family court's order regarding motion for reconsideration and declined to address Sami's other points of error. Sami appealed, arguing that the ICA erred by limiting its review to only the order regarding motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding that, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the ICA erred when it limited its review to only the order regarding motion for reconsideration. Remanded to the ICA to address Sami's remaining points of error. View "Tamman v. Tamman " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner Blue Lealao was convicted of assault in the second degree. A year and a half after the incident and before trial, Petitioner had said, "I'm so sorry. I made a big mistake" to a relative. Petitioner filed a motion in limine to exclude the statement under Haw. R. Evid. 409.5, which provides that evidence expressing condolences is not admissible to prove liability. The circuit court concluded that the phrase "I'm so sorry" was an expression of sympathy but that "I made a big mistake" was not and was therefore admissible. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) Rule 409.5 applies in civil but not in criminal cases, and accordingly, the circuit court and ICA erred in applying the rule in this criminal case to Petitioner's pretrial statements; (2) however, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Petitioner's testimony; and (3) moreover, the statement was relevant and admissible as a party admission under Haw. R. Evid. 803(a)(1). View "State v. Lealao" on Justia Law

Charles and Lisa Hart filed a complaint against TICOR Title Insurance Company for breach of contract after TICOR refused to defend the Harts under their title insurance policy against an escheat claim asserted by the State. The district court entered judgment in favor of TICOR and awarded TICOR attorneys' fees and costs. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of TICOR and vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to TICOR, holding that TICOR owed a duty to defend the Harts under the policy against the State's claim and prayer for affirmative relief. Remanded to the district court with instructions (1) to enter judgment in favor of the Harts, and (2) to determine an award of attorneys fees and costs to the Harts. View "Hart v. TICOR Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Orlando Pecpec was charged in the family court with twenty-five counts of violation of an order for protection in relation to twenty-five voicemails and text messages he allegedly sent to his former spouse. The jury found PecPec guilty on nineteen counts. Pecpec challenged his convictions on eight counts, arguing they were obtained in violation of his right to an unanimous verdict because the jury was not specifically instructed that it was required to unanimously agree to the specific act that supported each count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under State v. Mundon, the family court was required to give a specific unanimity instruction in the circumstances of the instant case; but (2) the family court's error in this case was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that Pecpec was convicted on less than a unanimous verdict. View "State v. Pecpec" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a stipulated divorce decree on August 8, 2005, which reserved jurisdiction over division of the parties' assets and debts. The family court subsequently filed orders to effectuate the sale of certain property. On October 5, 2006, Husband filed a motion to stay the sale of the property and to dismiss, arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction to order the sale because it failed to issue a ruling dividing the property within one year of entering its divorce decree, as required under Boulton v. Boulton. The court denied the motion and later filed an order authorizing escrow to release a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the property to Wife. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) held that the family court had jurisdiction to order the sale and that the ICA lacked jurisdiction to consider Husband's contention regarding the order releasing funds from escrow. The Supreme Court affirmed after overruling Boulton, holding (1) the family court was not divested of jurisdiction over the property division in the instant case; and (2) the ICA did not have jurisdiction to address the family court's escrow order because Husband failed to appeal that order. View "Riethbrock v. Lange" on Justia Law

Employee was allegedly involved in a work-related accident on property owned by Corporation. Insurer was Employer's insurance carrier. While paying Employee's workers' compensation benefits, Insurer filed suit against Corporation, asserting its right of subrogation. After the statute of limitations period had elapsed, Employee sought to intervene in Insurer's suit, and the circuit court granted Employee's request. Corporation subsequently moved for summary judgment on the ground that Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-8, which governs the right of an employee to intervene in an employer's third party liability lawsuit under workers' compensation law, did not allow an employee to intervene after the statute of limitations had expired. The circuit court granted Corporation's motion and entered judgment against Employee. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded, holding that Employee could intervene in Insurer's action against Corporation because section 386-8 did not limit Employee's right to intervene in Insurer's timely filed lawsuit. View "First Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd. v. A&B Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Peter Bailey was convicted in the circuit court on four counts of attempted sexual assault. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and sentence, holding (1) the court abused its discretion in denying Bailey's motion for a mistrial because a juror statements regarding Bailey's prior murder charge and/or conviction were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the jury was properly instructed on the offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support each of Bailey's convictions. Remanded for a new trial on the four counts of attempted sexual assault in the first degree. View "State v. Bailey" on Justia Law