Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the political question doctrine barred Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) beneficiaries from using the Hawaiian Constitution's "sufficient sums" provision to demand more legislative funding of the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) when that provision provided no guidance as to how quickly homesteads must be developed. The Supreme Court held (1) judicial determination of "sufficient sums" as to the purpose of DHHL's administrative and operating expenses is not barred as a nonjusticiable political question, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) did not err in so holding; but (2) the political question bars judicial determination of what would constitute "sufficient sums" for the purposes of (a) development of home, agriculture, farm and ranch lots, (b) home, agriculture, aquaculture, farm and ranch loans, and (c) rehabilitation projects, and the ICA erred in concluding otherwise. View "Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case arose from the 2008 application of the Honolulu Department of Environmental Services (DES) for a special use permit (SUP) to expand an existing sanitary landfill. The Land Use Commission (LUC) approved the SUP subject to, inter alia, a condition prohibiting the landfill from accepting municipal solid waste after July 31, 2012. The validity of this condition was the sole issue raised by DES on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment affirming the LUC's approval of the SUP, holding (1) the condition was inconsistent with the evidence shown in the record and was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) because the LUC's approval of the SUP was expressly given subject to the LUC's imposition of the condition, the court's judgment must be vacated. Remanded. View "Dep't of Envtl. Servs. v. Land Use Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing on the Commission on Water Resource Management's amendment of interim flow standards for certain Maui streams. The Commission denied Petitioner's petition in a decision that was reflected in the minutes of the Commission's meeting. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the meeting minutes were not a final order because the document was not signed by any member of the Commission pursuant to Haw. Admin. R. 13-167-7(c). The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's decision, holding that the Commission's decision, as reflected in the meeting minutes, was a final decision of the Commission for which judicial review could be sought because the Acting Deputy Director to the Chairperson of the Board of Land and Natural Resources authenticated the Commission's decision in accordance with section 13-167-7(c). Remanded. View "In re Petition to Amend Interim Instream Flow Standards for Maui Streams" on Justia Law

Alohacare, a health maintenance organization (HMO), submitted a proposal to the Department of Human Services to bid for a Quest Expanded Access contract to provide healthcare services for participants in the state's Medicaid program. The Department of Human Services awarded Quest contracts to United HealthCare Insurance (United) and WellCare Health Insurance (Ohana) but not to Alohacare. Alohacare petitioned the Insurance Commissioner of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs for declaratory relief that the Quest contracts required the accident and health insurers to carry an HMO license. The Commissioner concluded that the license was not required to offer the Quest managed care product because the services required under the contracts were not services that could be provided only by an HMO. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) AlohaCare had standing to appeal the Commissioner's decision; (2) both accident and health insurers and HMOs were authorized to offer the model of care required by the Quest contracts; and (3) this holding did not nullify the Health Maintenance Organization Act. View "Alohacare v. Ito" on Justia Law

In the case underlying this appeal, the circuit court appointed Appellant David Bettencourt to represent a client in a criminal case. After the client was acquitted on all counts, Appellant filed two requests for his own fees as appointed counsel, the second if which was the subject of this appeal. The trial judge certified the total amount of fees requested in the second request, but an administrative judge reduced the amount of fees requested as necessary to provide fair compensation. At issue on appeal was the scope of the administrative judge's authority under Haw. Rev. Stat. 802-5(b). The Supreme Court vacated the administrative judge's order, holding (1) under section 802-5(b), both the trial judge and the administrative judge independently review excess fee requests to determine whether a fee award is fair compensation, and both the trial judge's and administrative judge's orders awarding fees are judicial acts subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard; and (2) because the administrative judge in this case summarily reduced Appellant's fees with no reasons given, the Court could not determine whether the administrative judge abused his discretion in ordering reduced fees. Remanded. View "In re Attorney's Fees of Bettencourt" on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company denied personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to Chung Ahn and Kee Kim (collectively, Insureds) for treatments after motor vehicle accidents. Insureds each sought administrative reviews with the Insurance Division of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs (DCCA). The DCCA granted summary judgment to Liberty Mutual based on the holding in Wilson v. AIG Hawaii Insurance Company, which stated that unless an insurer's non-payment of PIP benefits jeopardizes an insured's ability to reach the minimum amount of medical expenses required to file a tort lawsuit, insureds are not real parties in interest allowed to pursue lawsuits seeking payment of PIP benefits to providers. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Act 198 of 2006 had legislatively overruled Wilson. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) upheld the circuit court. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) overruled Wilson, holding that insureds are real parties in interest in actions against insurers regarding PIP benefits; and (2) vacated the ICA and circuit court judgments because at the time of judgment, Act 198 of 2006 was not retrospective, and the real party in interest holding of Wilson was still in effect. Remanded. View "Ahn v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant John Corboy and a number of real property owners and taxpayers brought claims against various state and county Defendants-Appellants to get an exemption from property taxes equal to an exemption granted to Hawaiian homestead lessees under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA). Plaintiffs are not native Hawaiians, but argued that the tax exemptions for homestead lessees involve race-based discrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Federal civil rights laws because only native Hawaiians are eligible to become homestead lessees under the HHCA. Accordingly, they sought a refund of real property taxes paid in excess of what they would have been assessed had each of them been granted an exemption. The State filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the disputed exemptions did not violate the equal protection clause because the exemptions were not based upon whether a taxpayer was a native Hawaiian, but instead they were based on whether the taxpayer was a homestead lessee of HHCA land. The tax appeal court granted the Stateâs motion, and on appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the courtâs awarding of the summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to the constitutionality of the tax exemption and the HHCA. The record reflected that the Plaintiffs were not interested in participating in the homestead lease program and therefore they could not establish an injury sufficient to give them standing to challenge the exemption. The Court vacated the tax appeal courtâs judgment, and ordered the lower court to dismiss Plaintiffsâ cases for lack of jurisdiction.