Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over water use permits and instream flow standards in the Nā Wai ‘Ehā region of Maui, Hawaii. The region includes the Waihe‘e River, Waiehu Stream, Wailuku River, and Waikapū Stream. Various parties, including MMK Maui, LP, Hui o Nā Wai ‘Ehā, the Maui Tomorrow Foundation, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Mahi Pono, LLC, and Wailuku Water Company, LLC, appealed from the Commission on Water Resource Management's decision regarding water use permits and instream flow standards.The Commission had designated Nā Wai ‘Ehā as a Surface Water Management Area, requiring existing and new water users to file surface water use permit applications. Over 140 applicants filed applications, including MMK, which operates two golf courses in the area, and Mahi Pono, which engages in agricultural operations on former sugar plantation lands.In 2016, the last remaining sugar plantation on Maui announced its closure. In response, the Hui/MTF filed a petition with the Commission to amend Nā Wai ‘Ehā’s Interim Instream Flow Standards. The Commission consolidated the permit and flow standards proceedings. In 2021, the Commission issued a decision amending the flow standards and granting various applicants surface water use permits.The parties appealed the Commission's decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s decision and order with respect to the instream flow standards and the delegation of the Commission’s public trust duties, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the decision and order in all other respects. View "In re Surface Water Use Permit Applications" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Melissa Fay, who was prosecuted for driving under the influence and other related charges. She entered a plea agreement, which did not include imprisonment or probation, but agreed to pay a freestanding order of restitution. The District Court of the Second Circuit followed the plea deal and ordered indefinite compliance hearings to monitor Fay's restitution payments. Fay protested, arguing that Hawai'i's restitution enforcement statute, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-644, limits the court's authority.Fay's appeal was unsuccessful in the Intermediate Court of Appeals, which agreed with the district court's decision. The Intermediate Court of Appeals held that an independent order of restitution empowers a criminal court to retain jurisdiction over a person who owes restitution. The court ruled that setting recurrent proof of compliance hearings fell within a court's general power to enforce its orders.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, however, concluded that the district court exceeded its statutory authority. The Supreme Court held that HRS § 706-644, the specific law relating to restitution enforcement, controls over the court's general powers to enforce judgments. The court ruled that a compliance hearing regarding restitution payments can only be ordered if a defendant is on probation or the defendant "defaults" on payment per HRS § 706-644(1). The Supreme Court vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals' judgment on appeal. View "State v. Fay" on Justia Law

Augustina Dean, a former elementary school teacher, filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) in Hawaii, asserting she had suffered a work-related injury. The Director of the DLIR, however, found that Dean did not suffer a work-related injury. Dean appealed this decision to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board (LIRAB). The LIRAB reversed the Director's decision and ordered a new hearing. Following the new hearing, the Director awarded Dean $2,424.24 for "1% permanent partial disability of the whole person," and "medical care, services and supplies as the nature of the injury may require." Dean appealed this decision to the LIRAB, but the LIRAB refused to hear the case, arguing that Dean had missed the appeal deadline by one day.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) sided with the LIRAB, affirming its decision to dismiss Dean's appeal as untimely. The ICA relied on the precedent set in Kissell v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Appeals Bd., which declared that the time for filing a written notice of appeal is mandatory. Dean, still self-represented, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii vacated the ICA's summary disposition order. The court held that the LIRAB, the agency rejecting an appeal as untimely based on the Department’s “sent” date, must have direct evidence that the decision was sent on that date. In this case, the LIRAB did not have sufficient evidence. The court concluded that the Department did not offer adequate evidence that it mailed its decision on the date it claimed. Therefore, Dean may appeal to the LIRAB. The court remanded the case to the LIRAB to address the merits of Dean's appeal. View "Dean v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around attorney fees in a dispute involving the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR), State of Hawaii, and the Sierra Club. In 2022, the BLNR approved permits allowing Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. and East Maui Irrigation Company, LLC to divert water from East Maui streams. The Sierra Club appealed this decision, arguing that the BLNR unlawfully denied its request for a contested case hearing. The environmental court modified the permits and capped the amount of water that could be diverted. The BLNR then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, alleging that the environmental court's decision resulted in a water shortage that hindered firefighting efforts during a wildfire.The environmental court had previously sided with the Sierra Club, ruling that the BLNR should have held a contested case hearing. The court also invoked Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 604A-2(b) and HRS § 91-14(g) to modify the permits, and cited public trust doctrine principles to support the cap on water diversion. The court decided not to void the permits entirely to avoid potential chaos and threats to the reliable availability of necessary water.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii held that a state-initiated original proceeding is not protected by sovereign immunity, and thus, the state may be liable for reasonable attorney fees spent opposing a frivolous petition for extraordinary relief. The court concluded that the Sierra Club is entitled to attorney fees, as the BLNR's petition was found to be frivolous and made in bad faith. The court rejected the BLNR's invocation of sovereign immunity, stating that the state waives its sovereign immunity when it initiates an original action. View "Board of Land and Natural Resources v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the City and County of Honolulu, acting through the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation (HART), and Victoria Ward, Limited, over the amount of just compensation to be paid for two acres of easements on property previously owned by Victoria Ward. The easements were obtained by HART for the construction of a fixed rail system and a proposed Kaka‘ako Station. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i ruled that the circuit court had erred in granting summary judgment on many of the issues in the case. The supreme court ruled that the circuit court had incorrectly used summary judgment to resolve disputed factual issues including whether Victoria Ward was estopped from seeking severance damages, whether Victoria Ward's claims relating to a "lost tower" were too speculative, and whether Victoria Ward was precluded from seeking severance damages for impacts to non-taken properties. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on some issues, but vacated others and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court's pause of the accrual of "blight of summons" interest during the pendency of the appeal. View "HART v. Ward " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals upholding the conviction of Michael Pickell for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. The case centered around the legality of a traffic stop initiated by a Maui County police officer who observed Pickell executing a U-turn at a highway intersection with left turn only markings and signage but no signage explicitly prohibiting U-turns. Pickell argued that in the absence of an express sign prohibiting U-turns, as required by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-82(c), the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. The court held that the Maui County ordinance, which requires drivers to follow the directional movements exhibited on markings and signage at intersections, was neither preempted by HRS § 291C-82(c) nor in conflict with it. Therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on a violation of the Maui County ordinance, and the motion to suppress evidence from the stop was properly denied. View "State v. Pickell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this action brought by Academic Labor United (ALU) requesting declaratory judgments that graduate assistants were foreclosed from exercising the collective bargaining rights provided to public employees under Haw. Const. art. XIII, 2 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 89, holding that there was no error.ALU, which represented graduate student employees of the University of Hawaii who wish to engage in collective bargaining, brought this suit arguing that a pair of 1972 decisions of the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board determined that graduate assistants were not "employees" under chapter 89 and were thus foreclosed from exercising collective bargaining rights. The circuit court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because ALU had not invoked Hawaii Administrative Rules 12-42-9 to clarify whether its members are employees under chapter 89 and had not exhausted its administrative remedies, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over ALU's action. View "Academic Labor United v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Haw." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Office of the Auditor lacked the authority to pierce the attorney-client privilege and obtain an audit's confidential communications and rejected the Office of the Auditor's jurisdiction and non-justiciability bars to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' (OHA) suit in this declaratory action.The OHA sued the Office of the Auditor after it was audited, seeking a declaratory judgment that neither Haw. Rev. Stat. 23-5 nor the Hawai'i State Constitution required OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment for OHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-5 did not require OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure pursuant to Haw. R. Evid. 503 and common-law principles. View "Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Kondo" on Justia Law

In this case challenging the constitutionality of administrative rules governing access to Mauna Kea's summit under Haw. Const. art XII, 7, the Supreme Court answered questions reserved by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit by holding (1) in a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative rules based on a violation of Haw. Const. art. XII, 7, the burden of proof does not shift to the government agency defendant and instead remains with the challenging party; and (2) the framework set forth in Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068 (Haw. 2000), applies to challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative rule based on an alleged violation of article XII, section 7, in addition to contested case hearings. View "Flores-Case 'Ohana v. University of Haw." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Land Use Commission (LUC) denying Petitioners' petition for a declaratory order challenging the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT), holding that Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-2(e) does not authorize the Commission to exclude or enforce certain land uses within conservation districts.Petitioners in this case sought to use the LUC's districting authority in a manner that would compel the removal of all astronomy facilities located within the Astronomy Precinct. The LUC denied the petition, and Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction to directly review Petitioners' appeal; (2) the LUC correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested declaratory orders; and (3) Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their remaining claims of error. View "In re Petition of Ku'ulei Higashi Kanahele" on Justia Law