Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After his divorce from Respondent, Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree, which granted the parties a divorce and awarded child custody. The family court denied the motion. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA in part, insofar as it held the court properly awarded Respondent the copyrights and vacated the portion of the divorce decree that awarded Respondent all ownership interest in copyrights held in Petitioner's name, holding (1) the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion, as Petitioner had notice that his failure to appear at a scheduled settlement conference would result in default, and the court acknowledged that Petitioner's motion was for Hawaii Fam. Ct. R. 60(b) relief, although Petitioner had failed to cite rule 60(b) in support of the motion; and (2) the court abused its discretion in declining to set aside that part of the divorce decree that transferred Petitioner's entire ownership interest in the copyrights to Respondent in violation of federal law. The Court affirmed the divorce decree in all other respects. Remanded for a determination of the economic interest in the copyrights to which Respondent was entitled. View "Berry v. Berry" on Justia Law

This case involved a divorce action between Sami and Jacqueline Tamman. After the family court entered its order granting custody and support, Sami timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the family court denied in substantial part. Sami subsequently filed a notice of appeal and attached the court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. Approximately a month later Sami filed his civil appeal docketing statement, to which he attached the order granting custody and other documents. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the family court's order regarding motion for reconsideration and declined to address Sami's other points of error. Sami appealed, arguing that the ICA erred by limiting its review to only the order regarding motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding that, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the ICA erred when it limited its review to only the order regarding motion for reconsideration. Remanded to the ICA to address Sami's remaining points of error. View "Tamman v. Tamman " on Justia Law

Orlando Pecpec was charged in the family court with twenty-five counts of violation of an order for protection in relation to twenty-five voicemails and text messages he allegedly sent to his former spouse. The jury found PecPec guilty on nineteen counts. Pecpec challenged his convictions on eight counts, arguing they were obtained in violation of his right to an unanimous verdict because the jury was not specifically instructed that it was required to unanimously agree to the specific act that supported each count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under State v. Mundon, the family court was required to give a specific unanimity instruction in the circumstances of the instant case; but (2) the family court's error in this case was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that Pecpec was convicted on less than a unanimous verdict. View "State v. Pecpec" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a stipulated divorce decree on August 8, 2005, which reserved jurisdiction over division of the parties' assets and debts. The family court subsequently filed orders to effectuate the sale of certain property. On October 5, 2006, Husband filed a motion to stay the sale of the property and to dismiss, arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction to order the sale because it failed to issue a ruling dividing the property within one year of entering its divorce decree, as required under Boulton v. Boulton. The court denied the motion and later filed an order authorizing escrow to release a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the property to Wife. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) held that the family court had jurisdiction to order the sale and that the ICA lacked jurisdiction to consider Husband's contention regarding the order releasing funds from escrow. The Supreme Court affirmed after overruling Boulton, holding (1) the family court was not divested of jurisdiction over the property division in the instant case; and (2) the ICA did not have jurisdiction to address the family court's escrow order because Husband failed to appeal that order. View "Riethbrock v. Lange" on Justia Law

Petitioner's ex-wife, Respondent, brought a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586 petition alleging domestic abuse of the couple's daughter. The family court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) determined, inter alia, that the family court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and order of the family court, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to discipline children inhering in their liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, under the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution; (2) a parent may raise the right of parental discipline in a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586-5 show cause hearing in opposition to the continuation of a TRO issued under chapter 586 on allegations of domestic abuse; (3) in such circumstances trial courts shall consider whether the discipline is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor in determine whether the parent's conduct constituted abuse or proper discipline; and (4) generally a non-custodial parent retains the right to discipline a child when the child is under his or her supervision. View "Hamilton v. Lethem" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a divorce decree that ordered Father to pay child support for each child as long as they continued post-high school education, until graduation, or until the child attained the age of twenty-three. The family court later granted Mother's post-decree motion seeking an order reestablishing educational support for the parties' twenty-five year-old daughter, who was legally blind and pursuing a college education. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded. At issue on appeal was whether Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47(a) authorized a family court to order educational support for a disabled but competent child age twenty-three or older when the family court's 2004 Child Support Guidelines provided that such support may be continued only until the child reaches age twenty-three. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA and affirmed the family court, holding (1) to the extent that the 2004 Guidelines purport to set an age limitation on the family child's authority to continue educational support for an adult child, they are invalid as they exceed the statutory mandate of section 580-47(a); and (2) section 580-47(a) does not impose an age limit for educational support of a child age twenty-three or older. View "Jaylo v. Jaylo" on Justia Law

After Bonnie Kakinami filed a complaint for divorce from Aaron Kakinami, the family court granted Aaron's motion to continue the trial. Eighteen months after she filed for divorce, Bonnie filed a motion to bifurcate. The family court granted her request. During the hearing on the motion, the family court found Bonnie was entitled to divorce and entered a divorce decree that dissolved the marriage and made certain orders regarding division of property and debts. The court reserved the division of property and debts not decided by the divorce decree until the trial. Later, the family court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that the court had good cause to bifurcate the divorce. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the family court did not abuse its discretion by bifurcating the proceedings and entering the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the family court was correct to apply the good cause standard for bifurcating the divorce proceedings, and (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion by finding that good cause existed to bifurcate the proceedings in this case. View "Kakinami v. Kakinami" on Justia Law

After the family court granted Geraldine Civtznovich-Dubie and George Dubie a divorce, George was killed. Geraldine then filed a motion to vacate the divorce decree or to set aside the corresponding property division, arguing that her marriage to George was void ab initio because George's previous marriage had not ended in a valid divorce. The family court denied Geraldine's motion, and Geraldine appealed. The intermediate court of appeals denied the motion, holding that Geraldine was estopped from challenging the validity of George's prior divorce and thereby was estopped from challenging the family court's subject matter jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree between Geraldine and George. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the appellate court did not err in affirming the family court's order but that its reasoning was erroneous in part. The Court concluded that jurisdiction cannot be created by estoppel, and therefore a party cannot be estopped from challenging the family court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the divorce decree was not void under Hawaii Family Court Rule 60(b)(4). View "Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie" on Justia Law

Respondent Cedric Kikuta was convicted by a jury for assault in the third degree after a physical altercation with his stepson. Respondent appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the parental discipline defense and on whether the assault in the third degree occurred during the course of a scuffle, or affray, entered into by mutual consent. The court of appeals (1) held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the parental discipline defense and (2) chose not to address Respondent's argument regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court regarding the parental discipline defense but vacated the judgment as to the lack of disposition regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Court held that (1) an instruction on the parental discipline defense is not per se precluded by the fact that substantial bodily injury occurred; (2) an instruction on the parental discipline defense must be given if there is some evidence to support each element of the defense; and (3) a mutual affray instruction must be given where there is some evidence the injury was inflicted during a fight entered into by mutual consent. View "State v. Kikuta" on Justia Law