Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved the disposition of property during divorce proceedings between Husband and Wife. In the divorce decree, the court provided that the property would be sold and the proceeds divided as proposed by the parties. Both parties subsequently filed post-decree motions. The family court later modified the decree as to the apportioned liability for capital gains taxes between Husband and Wife. The Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the court's order modifying the decree. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment affirming the order on post-decree relief and vacated the family court's order on post-decree relief, holding that the family court was foreclosed from modifying the divorce decree because the circumstances here did not permit such modification under the Hawaii Family Court Rules. Remanded.View "Thomas-Yukimura v. Yukimura" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for temporary foster custody over Mother’s son, T.M. At a combined permanency hearing and termination of parental rights hearing several months later, Mother was not yet represented by counsel. Counsel was subsequently appointed for Mother. The family court later vacated Mother’s parental rights. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that the family court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint counsel to represent Mother earlier in the proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and the family court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to counsel in parental termination proceedings, and henceforth, courts must appoint counsel for indigent parents once DHS files a petition to assert foster custody over a child; and (2) the family court in this case abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel for Mother until almost nineteen months after DHS filed a petition for temporary foster custody over T.M. Remanded for a new hearing. View "In re TM" on Justia Law

Aaron and Bonnie Kakinami were divorced pursuant to a a divorce decree that reserved property division. Pursuant to a supplemental divorce decree, the family court classified a gift and several inheritances that Bonnie received during the marriage as marital separate property and awarded Bonnie one hundred percent of that property. After Aaron filed a notice of appeal, the family court issued an order compelling Aaron to pay Bonnie her net share of the marital residence. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ICA erred in stating that the family court had the authority to award marital separate property to a non-owning spouse, as marital separate property remains non-divisible under the framework set forth in Hussey v. Hussey; (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion when it adhered to the partnership model of property division in dividing the parties' marital partnership property, because the existence of an inheritance, without more, does not mandate deviation; and (3) the family court had jurisdiction when it issued its post-decree order because the order enforced a preexisting obligation. View "Kakinami v. Kakinami" on Justia Law

After his divorce from Respondent, Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree, which granted the parties a divorce and awarded child custody. The family court denied the motion. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA in part, insofar as it held the court properly awarded Respondent the copyrights and vacated the portion of the divorce decree that awarded Respondent all ownership interest in copyrights held in Petitioner's name, holding (1) the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion, as Petitioner had notice that his failure to appear at a scheduled settlement conference would result in default, and the court acknowledged that Petitioner's motion was for Hawaii Fam. Ct. R. 60(b) relief, although Petitioner had failed to cite rule 60(b) in support of the motion; and (2) the court abused its discretion in declining to set aside that part of the divorce decree that transferred Petitioner's entire ownership interest in the copyrights to Respondent in violation of federal law. The Court affirmed the divorce decree in all other respects. Remanded for a determination of the economic interest in the copyrights to which Respondent was entitled. View "Berry v. Berry" on Justia Law

This case involved a divorce action between Sami and Jacqueline Tamman. After the family court entered its order granting custody and support, Sami timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the family court denied in substantial part. Sami subsequently filed a notice of appeal and attached the court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. Approximately a month later Sami filed his civil appeal docketing statement, to which he attached the order granting custody and other documents. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the family court's order regarding motion for reconsideration and declined to address Sami's other points of error. Sami appealed, arguing that the ICA erred by limiting its review to only the order regarding motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding that, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the ICA erred when it limited its review to only the order regarding motion for reconsideration. Remanded to the ICA to address Sami's remaining points of error. View "Tamman v. Tamman " on Justia Law

Orlando Pecpec was charged in the family court with twenty-five counts of violation of an order for protection in relation to twenty-five voicemails and text messages he allegedly sent to his former spouse. The jury found PecPec guilty on nineteen counts. Pecpec challenged his convictions on eight counts, arguing they were obtained in violation of his right to an unanimous verdict because the jury was not specifically instructed that it was required to unanimously agree to the specific act that supported each count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under State v. Mundon, the family court was required to give a specific unanimity instruction in the circumstances of the instant case; but (2) the family court's error in this case was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that Pecpec was convicted on less than a unanimous verdict. View "State v. Pecpec" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a stipulated divorce decree on August 8, 2005, which reserved jurisdiction over division of the parties' assets and debts. The family court subsequently filed orders to effectuate the sale of certain property. On October 5, 2006, Husband filed a motion to stay the sale of the property and to dismiss, arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction to order the sale because it failed to issue a ruling dividing the property within one year of entering its divorce decree, as required under Boulton v. Boulton. The court denied the motion and later filed an order authorizing escrow to release a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the property to Wife. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) held that the family court had jurisdiction to order the sale and that the ICA lacked jurisdiction to consider Husband's contention regarding the order releasing funds from escrow. The Supreme Court affirmed after overruling Boulton, holding (1) the family court was not divested of jurisdiction over the property division in the instant case; and (2) the ICA did not have jurisdiction to address the family court's escrow order because Husband failed to appeal that order. View "Riethbrock v. Lange" on Justia Law

Petitioner's ex-wife, Respondent, brought a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586 petition alleging domestic abuse of the couple's daughter. The family court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) determined, inter alia, that the family court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and order of the family court, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to discipline children inhering in their liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, under the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution; (2) a parent may raise the right of parental discipline in a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586-5 show cause hearing in opposition to the continuation of a TRO issued under chapter 586 on allegations of domestic abuse; (3) in such circumstances trial courts shall consider whether the discipline is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor in determine whether the parent's conduct constituted abuse or proper discipline; and (4) generally a non-custodial parent retains the right to discipline a child when the child is under his or her supervision. View "Hamilton v. Lethem" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a divorce decree that ordered Father to pay child support for each child as long as they continued post-high school education, until graduation, or until the child attained the age of twenty-three. The family court later granted Mother's post-decree motion seeking an order reestablishing educational support for the parties' twenty-five year-old daughter, who was legally blind and pursuing a college education. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded. At issue on appeal was whether Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47(a) authorized a family court to order educational support for a disabled but competent child age twenty-three or older when the family court's 2004 Child Support Guidelines provided that such support may be continued only until the child reaches age twenty-three. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA and affirmed the family court, holding (1) to the extent that the 2004 Guidelines purport to set an age limitation on the family child's authority to continue educational support for an adult child, they are invalid as they exceed the statutory mandate of section 580-47(a); and (2) section 580-47(a) does not impose an age limit for educational support of a child age twenty-three or older. View "Jaylo v. Jaylo" on Justia Law

After Bonnie Kakinami filed a complaint for divorce from Aaron Kakinami, the family court granted Aaron's motion to continue the trial. Eighteen months after she filed for divorce, Bonnie filed a motion to bifurcate. The family court granted her request. During the hearing on the motion, the family court found Bonnie was entitled to divorce and entered a divorce decree that dissolved the marriage and made certain orders regarding division of property and debts. The court reserved the division of property and debts not decided by the divorce decree until the trial. Later, the family court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that the court had good cause to bifurcate the divorce. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the family court did not abuse its discretion by bifurcating the proceedings and entering the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the family court was correct to apply the good cause standard for bifurcating the divorce proceedings, and (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion by finding that good cause existed to bifurcate the proceedings in this case. View "Kakinami v. Kakinami" on Justia Law