Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Husband and Wife were divorced. Pursuant to the decree, the parties were awarded joint legal custody and shared physical custody of their two children. This case stemmed from a dispute involving the correct interpretation of the divorce decree and an amendment to that decree that governed Husband’s child support obligations. In 2011, Husband filed a motion asking the family court to retroactively terminate his child support obligation for Daughter to 2010 when daughter began college and to require Wife to reimburse him for amounts he allegedly overpaid in child support for Son and Daughter. The family court denied Husband relief. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the decision of the family court and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part the ICA judgment and affirmed to the extent that it vacated the decision of the family court, holding (1) the ICA erred in concluding that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Husband was precluded from seeking reimbursement for his overpayment of child support for Son; and (2) the ICA erred by failing to address certain issues regarding Daughter’s child support. Remanded. View "Herrmann v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

Susan Gordon filed a complaint for divorce against Ira Gordon. The family court entered a divorce decree diving the parties’ property and awarding Susan alimony. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the decree as it pertained to the property division and otherwise affirmed, holding that the family court was able to identify and value marital assets without a property division chart but erred by distributing a property to Ira that was no longer in the parties’ possession at the time of the divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment to the extent that it vacated the family court’s decree and otherwise vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the family court’s divorce decree, holding that the family court (1) erred in failing to support its property division with sufficient documentation so that the parties and reviewing court could ensure the division was equitable and free from miscalculations or other errors; (2) erred in deviating from a fifty-fifty division of the martial estate in addition to a deduction for marital waste; and (3) erred in its award of alimony to Susan. View "Gordon v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who were never married, were the biological parents of two minor children. Father sought custody of the children and sought to exclude Mother from visitation. The family court decided to consider the parties’ competing custody petitions in a trial for which it set a three hour limit. During the trial, which lasted approximately three hours, Father was able to present his evidence, but Mother’s evidence was cut short despite her motion for additional time. The family court awarded sole legal and physical custody to Father. The Supreme Court vacated the family court’s order, holding that the family court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for additional trial time, as the family court’s strict enforcement of the time limit unduly curtailed Mother’s ability to present evidence relevant to the proper determination of the children’s best interests. Remanded. View "AC v. AC" on Justia Law

During their marriage, Ray and Sandra signed three documents establishing the division and distribution of their martial partnership property upon divorce. The documents included a handwritten document, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) and a quitclaim deed. Sandra subsequently filed a complaint for divorce. Nothwithstanding the documents, the family court awarded Ray and Sandra each one-half interest in the property, concluding that the quitclaim deed was unenforceable because they were unconscionable and that all three documents were unenforceable because Ray acted under duress and coercion when he signed them. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated in part the family court’s divorce decree, concluding that the quitclaim deed was not unconscionable and that Ray executed both the quitclaim deed and the MOU voluntarily. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and vacated the family court’s divorce decree, holding (1) the quitclaim deed did not affect the disposition of the parties’ marital partnership property upon divorce, and therefore, the ICA erred in concluding that the quitclaim deed was an enforceable separation agreement; and (2) the MOU was enforceable because it was not unconscionable and was entered into voluntarily. Remanded. View "Balogh v. Balogh" on Justia Law

In 2000, Colleen Collins and John Wassell were joined as a married couple in a ceremony. After the marriage ceremony, the couple did not submit the completed license and certificate of marriage to the State Department of Health due to concerns about the marriage’s financial implications. Afterwards, Collins and Wassell went on a honeymoon, began living together, and shared a joint bank account. In 2005, the couple legally married. In 2007, Collins filed for divorce against Wassell. Collins argued that she was entitled to an equalization payment for her contributions during the period of premarital cohabitation. The family court determined that Collins and Wassell did not form a premarital economic partnership within the meaning of Helbush v. Helbush. The Supreme Court vacated the divorce decree and the property division and equalization provisions in the decree, holding that the family court (1) applied incorrect legal principles when considering the nature and degree to which the parties applied their financial resources, energies, and efforts for each other’s benefit; and (2) clearly erred in concluding that the parties did not form a premarital economic partnership. View "Collins v. Wassell" on Justia Law

AS, a minor child, was taken into foster custody after her birth. The Department of Human Services (DHS) recommended that AS be placed permanently with her maternal aunt. The family court, however, awarded custody of AS to AS’s non-relative foster parents. DHS appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed after reviewing DHS’s permanent placement recommendation under a best interests of the child standard, rather than an abuse of discretion standard. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment and clarified the ICA’s opinion to hold, inter alia, that (1) the party challenging DHS’s permanent placement recommendation bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the permanent placement is not in the child’s best interests; (2) there is no relative placement preference in the Child Protective Act (CPA) with regard to permanent placement of foster children, and therefore, to the extent that DHS’s police directives mandate such a preferences, those policies impermissibly alter the CPA and its legislative history; and (3) In re Doe does not stand for the proposition that the family court must relieve DHS of its permanent custodianship if the family court disagrees with DHS’s permanent placement decision. View "In re AS" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) recorded a statutory lien on Petitioner’s real and personal property for delinquent child support. More than a decade later, a law firm agreed to Appellant in an unrelated civil action in exchange for one-third of any recovery obtained. The action resulted in an arbitration award in Petitioner’s favor. The State and the law firm disputed whether the CSEA lien had priority over the attorneys’ lien. The circuit court concluded that the CSEA’s statutory lien had priority over Petitioner’s attorneys’ lien. On appeal, Petitioner argued (1) his attorneys’ lien constituted a property interest that was independent from his interest in the judgment, and (2) therefore, equitable and public policy considerations favored giving an attorneys’ lien priority over the CSEA’s lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 507-81 does not provide a superior or independent right for an attorney’s property interest in a judgment over a prior recorded CSEA lien; and (2) accordingly, CSEA’s lien took priority over Petitioner’s attorneys’ lien. View "Lopez v. State" on Justia Law

This case involved the disposition of property during divorce proceedings between Husband and Wife. In the divorce decree, the court provided that the property would be sold and the proceeds divided as proposed by the parties. Both parties subsequently filed post-decree motions. The family court later modified the decree as to the apportioned liability for capital gains taxes between Husband and Wife. The Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the court's order modifying the decree. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment affirming the order on post-decree relief and vacated the family court's order on post-decree relief, holding that the family court was foreclosed from modifying the divorce decree because the circumstances here did not permit such modification under the Hawaii Family Court Rules. Remanded.View "Thomas-Yukimura v. Yukimura" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for temporary foster custody over Mother’s son, T.M. At a combined permanency hearing and termination of parental rights hearing several months later, Mother was not yet represented by counsel. Counsel was subsequently appointed for Mother. The family court later vacated Mother’s parental rights. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that the family court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint counsel to represent Mother earlier in the proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and the family court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to counsel in parental termination proceedings, and henceforth, courts must appoint counsel for indigent parents once DHS files a petition to assert foster custody over a child; and (2) the family court in this case abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel for Mother until almost nineteen months after DHS filed a petition for temporary foster custody over T.M. Remanded for a new hearing. View "In re TM" on Justia Law

Aaron and Bonnie Kakinami were divorced pursuant to a a divorce decree that reserved property division. Pursuant to a supplemental divorce decree, the family court classified a gift and several inheritances that Bonnie received during the marriage as marital separate property and awarded Bonnie one hundred percent of that property. After Aaron filed a notice of appeal, the family court issued an order compelling Aaron to pay Bonnie her net share of the marital residence. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ICA erred in stating that the family court had the authority to award marital separate property to a non-owning spouse, as marital separate property remains non-divisible under the framework set forth in Hussey v. Hussey; (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion when it adhered to the partnership model of property division in dividing the parties' marital partnership property, because the existence of an inheritance, without more, does not mandate deviation; and (3) the family court had jurisdiction when it issued its post-decree order because the order enforced a preexisting obligation. View "Kakinami v. Kakinami" on Justia Law