Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involves a personal injury claim and the question of whether an adult child can claim loss of parental consortium when the parent has not died but has entered a persistent vegetative state and will not recover. The plaintiffs, including the adult child of the individual now in a persistent vegetative state, argued that a previous case, Masaki v. General Motors Co., allowed for a parent to recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child, and that this should extend to an adult child's claim for loss of parental consortium. The defendants, a group of healthcare providers, argued that a previous case, Halberg v. Young, held that no action exists in favor of a child for injuries sustained by the parent not resulting in the parent’s death.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the reasoning of Masaki would apply to the loss of parental consortium presented in this case. The court also found that the Halberg case was distinguishable factually from the current case, as it involved a parent who would recover from their injuries, unlike the parent in the current case who was in a persistent vegetative state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the lower court's decision, overruling Halberg to the extent that it held that a child cannot claim loss of parental consortium where a parent is severely injured but not killed. The court held that a child, whether a minor or an adult, may bring a loss of parental consortium claim for severe injury to a parent. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "HELG Administration Services, LLC v. Department of Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court refusing to set aside a default judgment it ordered in favor of Husband against Wife as a discovery sanction under Hawai'i Family Court Rule (HFCR) 37(b)(2), holding that the court erred in declining to set aside the default judgment under HFCR 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect and entering default as a discovery sanction.On appeal to the Supreme Court, Wife argued that the intermediate court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's denial of her timely-filed HFCR Rule 60(b)(1) motion because her neglect was excusable. The Supreme Court vacated the family court's judgment, holding (1) the family court inadequately warned Wife about the risk and consequences of neglect and that Wife did not engage in deliberate, willful conduct under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the family court erred by declining to set aside the default judgment for excusable neglect and by entering default as a discovery sanction. View "JK v. DK" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the family court's parental termination order in this case and remanding the action for a new trial, holding that Parents received a fundamentally fair trial and that due process was satisfied.During the underlying termination proceedings, the family court appointed attorneys for Parents, but Parents failed to appear at a court hearing and so the court discharged counsel. When Parents reappeared, the court reappointed counsel, and eventually, after a trial, the family court terminated Parents' parental rights. The ICA vacated the termination order and remanded for a new trial, finding structural error in the discharge of Parents' counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding (1) a family court's discharge of counsel does not necessarily make a trial fundamentally unfair in Child Protection Act proceedings; and (2) Parents received a fair procedure in this case. View "In re JH" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, in petitions for adoption and permanent placement, a family court is free to consider any admissible evidence that addresses the best interests of the individual, including evidence supporting some best interests factors listed in Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-46(b).In 2018, the Department of Human Services (DHS) assumed temporary foster custody of two children under the Child Protective Act (CPA) and placement them with resource caregivers (RCGs). In 2020, Father stipulated to the termination of his parental rights. The children's aunt and uncle (Relatives) intervened in the CPA's permanent placement and adoption proceedings. DHS filed a petition on behalf of RCGs to adopt the children. Relatives responded by filing their own petition to adopt the children. The family court consolidated the dual adoption cases and found that adoption by the RCGs was in each child's best interest. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a family court does not necessarily err when it relies on HRS 571-46(b)'s mandatory custody and visitation factors to guide a best interest determination in adoption and placement proceedings. View "In re ASK" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that marital agreements that consider fault or misconduct when dividing the marital property are not enforceable.The parties in this case entered in a postnuptial agreement that if Husband engaged in extramarital affairs or physically harmed his wife Wife would receive most of the parties' joint assets. Husband later filed a complaint for divorce. The family court held that the marital agreement at issue was unenforceable as violating statutory policy and principles of no-fault divorce and equitable distribution. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the family court's decision, holding that the marital agreement was valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the marital agreement violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable. View "Crofford v. Adachi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's order denying Father's motion to set aside default and his motion to intervene, holding that the family court should have analyzed Father's motion to intervene under Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR) 24.In this proceeding brought under the Hawai'i Child Protective Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 587A, both Father's default and default judgment were entered while the identity of the child's natural father was unknown. On certiorari, Father argued that he was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before filing his motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24. The Supreme Court agreed on that issue and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Father was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before proceeding with his motion to intervene; and (2) Father's remaining arguments were without merit. View "In re AA" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal arising from the rulings of the family court on remand from a published opinion of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) in a divorce case, holding that the family court abused its discretion in part.The ICA affirmed in part and vacated in part the divorce decree in this case and remanded several issues, including the issue of spousal support, to the family court. After the case was remanded and judgment was made, the ICA held that the family court erred by engaging in a new just and equitable determination on remand, as it was not part of the remand order. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the ICA erred by setting aside the amended spousal support order on the basis that the family court was prohibited to do so on remand because Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47(a) provided the court with continuing jurisdiction to address issues of spousal support; (2) the family court erred on remand by awarding more spousal support than it determined was required to satisfy Wife's needs; and (3) the family court erred by not holding a hearing on remand to determine whether the spousal support amount should have been amended. View "Jacoby v. Jacoby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) concluding that the family court erred in dismissing count two of this complaint charging Defendant with certain offenses on the grounds that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that count, holding that the ICA did not err.Count one of the operative complaint charged Defendant with abuse of a family or household member, and count two charged him with third degree assault against a complaining witness. The family court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss count two, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The ICA reversed, concluding that the family court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the charge based on Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-14(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the family court erred in dismissing count two for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because section 571-14(b) provided the family court with concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over count two; and (2) the family court continued to have subject matter jurisdiction over count two despite the dismissal of count one with prejudice. View "State v. Milne" on Justia Law

In this custody dispute, the Supreme Court vacated a settlement agreement reached by the parties during trial, holding that the family court's actions in reaching the settlement were improper, and thus the family court plainly erred.Father sought joint legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The parties settled during trial. On appeal, Father argued that the family court acted improperly in facilitating the settlement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court spoke to Father alone without obtaining consent from counsel on the record, initiated settlement discussions, and strongly recommended specific terms on a hotly-contested issue after trial had commenced, the family court committed plain error. View "WW v. DS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's order granting the Department of Human Services (DHS) foster custody and the subsequent order terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the ICA erred when it failed to vacate the family court's order.On appeal, Mother argued that the family court erred in failing to appoint counsel for her prior to granting foster custody. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Mother should have been appointed counsel at the time DHS filed its petition for family supervision; and (2) the failure to appoint Mother counsel at the time DHS filed its petition for foster custody was structural error that cannot be deemed harmless. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re L.I." on Justia Law