Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit organization sought access to confidential court records from child protective and adoption proceedings involving a young girl who died after being placed in foster care and later adopted. The girl was reported missing in 2021, and her death was confirmed in 2023. The records also contained information about her siblings. The siblings, through their counsel, did not object to disclosure as long as their identities were protected through redactions. The Department of Human Services and the adoptive father opposed disclosure, arguing that the records were confidential and that redactions would not sufficiently protect privacy.The Family Court of the First Circuit denied the request, reasoning that releasing redacted records would be misleading and would not serve the public interest in understanding the response of agencies and the court to child abuse and neglect. The court concluded that the records should remain sealed, citing concerns about the completeness and potential for misunderstanding of the redacted information.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that, under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes §§ 587A-40 and 578-15, public access to confidential child protective and adoption records is permitted when a foster child is missing, has suffered a near fatality, been critically injured, or has died, provided that information about living siblings is redacted to protect their privacy. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it limited disclosure to only those purposes that further the best interests of the child, clarifying that a “legitimate purpose” for disclosure can exist independently. The court ordered the release of the redacted records and provided guidance for future requests, affirming the family court’s authority to require agencies to prepare redacted versions for public access. View "Public First Law Center v. Viola" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of retirement benefits following the divorce of William S. Perreira and Gertrude B. Perreira (now Gertrude B. Haia). In 1990, the Family Court of the Third Circuit awarded Gertrude a percentage of William’s State of Hawai‘i Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) benefits, with payments to begin when William became eligible to retire. William qualified for retirement in 1999, but Gertrude did not receive payments. In 2008, she moved to enforce the division order. The family court granted her motion in 2012, awarding her 31% of William’s pension as valued at his retirement eligibility date. Gertrude later sought further relief in 2017, alleging William failed to disclose information and make payments, resulting in a 2019 order awarding her interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.William appealed the 2019 orders to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that Gertrude’s 2008 motion was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-5. While the appeal was pending, Gertrude moved for entry of a Hawai‘i Domestic Relations Order (HiDRO) under HRS § 88-93.5, which the family court granted in 2021, directing ERS to pay her William’s entire monthly pension until her award was satisfied. William appealed the HiDRO order, contending that the statute could not be applied retroactively.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that Gertrude’s 2008 motion to enforce was not time-barred, as her right to enforce the judgment accrued when William became eligible to retire in 1999. The court further held that the application of HRS § 88-93.5 to effectuate the HiDRO was not an ex post facto violation, as the statute is civil and merely enforces existing rights. The ICA’s judgment was affirmed. View "Perreira v. Perreira" on Justia Law

Two children, born in Utah in 2016 and 2018 to parents who met as teenagers and struggled with substance abuse, moved with their mother and maternal grandparents to Maui in December 2019. The father relocated to Maui a few months later. Both parents had periods of sobriety and relapse, and the children were exposed to instability, including domestic violence involving the mother’s boyfriend. In 2021, the mother sought sole custody, alleging the father sexually abused the children. The father denied the allegations and sought sole custody and permission to relocate the children to Utah.The Family Court of the Second Circuit held a bench trial, during which the mother attempted to introduce testimony from fact and expert witnesses regarding the credibility of the children’s disclosures of abuse, as well as hearsay evidence about those disclosures. The court excluded this testimony, relying on State v. Batangan, which prohibits expert or lay testimony on the credibility of child sexual abuse victims. The court also excluded certain hearsay evidence, finding the mother failed to meet the requirements for exceptions under the Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence. After considering the statutory best interest factors, the court awarded the father sole legal and physical custody, allowed him to relocate the children to Utah, and granted the mother supervised visitation. The court found no confirmed sexual abuse by the father and determined the mother had misused the protection from abuse process.The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s decision. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi also affirmed, holding that the family court properly excluded testimony regarding the children’s credibility, correctly applied evidentiary rules, and did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody and approving relocation. The court found the family court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence and that the best interests of the children were served by the custody and relocation order. View "KP v. EM." on Justia Law

Angelica Joy Daoang lived in a house co-owned by her aunt, Carolina Balanza, and Balanza’s ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Perry. In September 2022, Perry and Balanza obtained restraining orders against each other due to domestic violence, and Perry did not return to the house. On February 16, 2024, Daoang obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Perry following an incident on February 14, 2024, where Perry entered the house through a window, leading to a confrontation with Daoang.The District Court of the Second Circuit dissolved the TRO after a hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found a lack of clear and convincing evidence of harassment as defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 604-10.5. The court determined that there was no evidence of physical harm or threats thereof, and no "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The court also questioned Daoang’s legal right to prevent Perry, a co-owner, from entering the house, ultimately concluding that Daoang was a guest rather than a tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dissolving the TRO, as there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under either definition provided by HRS § 604-10.5. The court noted that a single incident does not constitute a "course of conduct" required for harassment. The Supreme Court also provided guidance for handling cases related to domestic violence, emphasizing the importance of considering safety and suggesting alternative legal avenues for resolving conflicts. View "Daoang v. Perry" on Justia Law

This case involves a personal injury claim and the question of whether an adult child can claim loss of parental consortium when the parent has not died but has entered a persistent vegetative state and will not recover. The plaintiffs, including the adult child of the individual now in a persistent vegetative state, argued that a previous case, Masaki v. General Motors Co., allowed for a parent to recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child, and that this should extend to an adult child's claim for loss of parental consortium. The defendants, a group of healthcare providers, argued that a previous case, Halberg v. Young, held that no action exists in favor of a child for injuries sustained by the parent not resulting in the parent’s death.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the reasoning of Masaki would apply to the loss of parental consortium presented in this case. The court also found that the Halberg case was distinguishable factually from the current case, as it involved a parent who would recover from their injuries, unlike the parent in the current case who was in a persistent vegetative state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the lower court's decision, overruling Halberg to the extent that it held that a child cannot claim loss of parental consortium where a parent is severely injured but not killed. The court held that a child, whether a minor or an adult, may bring a loss of parental consortium claim for severe injury to a parent. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "HELG Administration Services, LLC v. Department of Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court refusing to set aside a default judgment it ordered in favor of Husband against Wife as a discovery sanction under Hawai'i Family Court Rule (HFCR) 37(b)(2), holding that the court erred in declining to set aside the default judgment under HFCR 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect and entering default as a discovery sanction.On appeal to the Supreme Court, Wife argued that the intermediate court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's denial of her timely-filed HFCR Rule 60(b)(1) motion because her neglect was excusable. The Supreme Court vacated the family court's judgment, holding (1) the family court inadequately warned Wife about the risk and consequences of neglect and that Wife did not engage in deliberate, willful conduct under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the family court erred by declining to set aside the default judgment for excusable neglect and by entering default as a discovery sanction. View "JK v. DK" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the family court's parental termination order in this case and remanding the action for a new trial, holding that Parents received a fundamentally fair trial and that due process was satisfied.During the underlying termination proceedings, the family court appointed attorneys for Parents, but Parents failed to appear at a court hearing and so the court discharged counsel. When Parents reappeared, the court reappointed counsel, and eventually, after a trial, the family court terminated Parents' parental rights. The ICA vacated the termination order and remanded for a new trial, finding structural error in the discharge of Parents' counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding (1) a family court's discharge of counsel does not necessarily make a trial fundamentally unfair in Child Protection Act proceedings; and (2) Parents received a fair procedure in this case. View "In re JH" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, in petitions for adoption and permanent placement, a family court is free to consider any admissible evidence that addresses the best interests of the individual, including evidence supporting some best interests factors listed in Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-46(b).In 2018, the Department of Human Services (DHS) assumed temporary foster custody of two children under the Child Protective Act (CPA) and placement them with resource caregivers (RCGs). In 2020, Father stipulated to the termination of his parental rights. The children's aunt and uncle (Relatives) intervened in the CPA's permanent placement and adoption proceedings. DHS filed a petition on behalf of RCGs to adopt the children. Relatives responded by filing their own petition to adopt the children. The family court consolidated the dual adoption cases and found that adoption by the RCGs was in each child's best interest. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a family court does not necessarily err when it relies on HRS 571-46(b)'s mandatory custody and visitation factors to guide a best interest determination in adoption and placement proceedings. View "In re ASK" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that marital agreements that consider fault or misconduct when dividing the marital property are not enforceable.The parties in this case entered in a postnuptial agreement that if Husband engaged in extramarital affairs or physically harmed his wife Wife would receive most of the parties' joint assets. Husband later filed a complaint for divorce. The family court held that the marital agreement at issue was unenforceable as violating statutory policy and principles of no-fault divorce and equitable distribution. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the family court's decision, holding that the marital agreement was valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the marital agreement violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable. View "Crofford v. Adachi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's order denying Father's motion to set aside default and his motion to intervene, holding that the family court should have analyzed Father's motion to intervene under Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR) 24.In this proceeding brought under the Hawai'i Child Protective Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 587A, both Father's default and default judgment were entered while the identity of the child's natural father was unknown. On certiorari, Father argued that he was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before filing his motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24. The Supreme Court agreed on that issue and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Father was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before proceeding with his motion to intervene; and (2) Father's remaining arguments were without merit. View "In re AA" on Justia Law