Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted by the district court of committing assault in the third degree in the course of a mutual affray. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed Petitioner's conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court vacated Petitioner's conviction, holding (1) Petitioner's argument that he was immune from the district court's jurisdiction because of the legitimacy of the Kingdom government was without merit; but (2) the district court violated Petitioner's right to a jury trial because Petitioner demanded a jury trial, and his departure from the courtroom during his trial did not operate as an implied waiver of this right. In addition, the Court held that there was sufficient evidence to negate Petitioner's claim of self-defense. View "State v. Kaulia" on Justia Law

Respondents initiated an action against Petitioner and others based on an investigation conducted by the Office of Consumer Protection. Petitioner subsequently filed the present action against Respondents, alleging that Respondents were liable for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, negligent failure to train and/or supervise, and punitive damages arising from the initiation and maintenance of the earlier action. The court found in favor of Respondents. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the trial court's amended final judgment, holding (1) a plaintiff may bring an action in tort for the maintenance of a malicious prosecution as well as for the initiation of a malicious prosecution; (2) the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Respondents on Plaintiff's claims of maintenance of a malicious prosecution and initiation of a malicious prosecution; but (3) the court erred in failing to state its rationale for granting in part Petitioner's motion for review and/or to set aside taxation of costs. Remanded. View "Arquette v. State" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of attempted sexual assault in the first degree, kidnapping-no voluntary release, attempted assault in the third degree, and assault in the third degree. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Petitioner's convictions for assault in the third degree; (2) vacated Petitioner's convictions for attempted sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping; and (3) vacated the court's sentence on Petitioner's convictions for assault in the third degree, holding that the circuit court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence of acts allegedly committed by Petitioner for which a jury had acquitted him in the prior trial because the evidence violated the principle of collateral estoppel embodied in the double jeopardy clause of the Hawai'i Constitution. View "State v. Mundon" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with excessive speeding in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291C-105(a). After the charge was read, Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that it failed to state the requisite state of mind under Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-204. The court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that when a statute does not expressly set forth the culpable state of mind, but rather imports the mens rea element from Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-212 that obviated the need of the State to articulate a state of mind. The district court subsequently convicted Defendant of the charge. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the charge without prejudice, holding (1) the offense of driving at an excessive speed is not a strict liability offense and requires proof that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, an thus, the requisite states of mind must be alleged in a charge of this offense; (2) the section 291C-105(a) charge against Defendant failed to allege the requisite states of mind; and (3) the State also failed to lay an adequate foundation to admit a laser instrument reading of Defendant's vehicle's speed into evidence. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

While traveling to California to meet his obligations in a pending matter in that state's courts, Petitioner, who was on release in an unrelated criminal proceeding in the circuit court, was arrested at the Honolulu International Airport. Petitioner's arrest led to the drug charge in the instant court proceedings. Petitioner posted bail and was released from custody. Petitioner proceeded to California, where he was held in custody. Petitioner was not present for his arraignment because he was in custody in California. The circuit filed a a bail forfeiture judgment. The circuit court later denied Petitioner's motion to set aside bail forfeiture and for return of bail. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals and held the that circuit court erred in denying Petitioner's motion because, under the circumstances, Petitioner's incarceration in California established good cause for his failure to appear at his arraignment, and thus for why the bail forfeiture judgment should not be executed. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress seeking to preclude the State from introducing methamphetamine obtained during a warrantless search of Petitioner's pockets. The circuit court suppressed the evidence. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the suppression order and remanded to the court for entry of its findings and conclusions regarding whether the State met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the methamphetamine would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means pursuant to State v. Lopez. On remand, the court again ordered the evidence suppressed. The ICA ordered the second suppression order vacated and the case remanded for trial, concluding that the circuit court did not make factual findings regarding the events relevant to the issue of inevitable discovery. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court was not wrong in holding that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the methamphetamine would have inevitably been discovered. View "State v. Rodrigues" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Levell, Jr. was charged with harassment for allegedly shoving the complainant and subjecting her to offensive physical contact. The altercation at issue here arose from whether the complainant stole Petitioner's credit cards and used them after he was arrested. Petitioner contended that the use of the cards was relevant to prove his motive to accuse Petitioner of offensive contact an harassment and to falsely testify against him at trial. Petitioner sought to cross-examine the complainant, but the court found the issue not relevant, and that cross-examination might have caused the complainant to violate her right against self-incrimination as the unauthorized use of the cards was then being investigated. Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision with respect to the cross-examination. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by disallowing Petitioner the ability to cross-examine the complainant. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Hawai'i v. Levell" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court held that mere proximity and power to exercise control over contraband are insufficient to sustain a conviction for possession absent evidence of intent. Petitioner-Defendant-Appellee Raymond L. Foster was found guilty by a jury of, inter alia, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Following the jury verdict, the circuit court granted Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on those two counts, concluding that the evidence adduced at trial did not establish he had the requisite intent to exercise dominion and control over the firearm and ammunition. The State appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") concluded that there was sufficient evidence of intent, vacated the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, and remanded for resentencing based on the jury's guilty verdicts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the ICA erred in vacating the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for acquittal of both the firearm and ammunition charges. The Court reinstated the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal of the firearm and ammunition charges. View "Hawai'i v. Foster" on Justia Law

Defendant Steve Cabagbag allegedly stole a truck from a storage facility as well as several tools from a construction site. A jury found Defendant guilty of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle and theft in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two concurrent five-year terms of probation. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court committed plain error for failing to provide a jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification because the jury's attention was not adequately drawn to the identification issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in criminal cases, the circuit courts must give the jury a specific eyewitness identification instruction whenever identification evidence is a central issue in the case, and it is requested by the defendant; (2) a circuit court may, in the exercise of its discretion, give the instruction if it believes the instruction is otherwise warranted in a particular case; (3) this new rule should be given prospective effect; and (4) Defendant's conviction is affirmed under the rule then in effect when he was tried. View "State v. Cabagbag" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner Glenn Keohokapu was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to an extended term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the process by which the jury was selected for Petitioner's trial did not result in substantial prejudice to Petitioner notwithstanding the pretrial publicity to which some jurors were exposed. The Court, however, vacated Petitioner's extended term sentence, holding that, as to the extended sentencing proceedings, (1) where the jury must determined whether an extended term of imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public, it is error to instruct the jury that the extended term sentence includes the possibility of parole; (2) in this case it was error to admit the statement of one of the witnesses during the sentencing phase as past recollection recorded; and (3) these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Keohokapu" on Justia Law