Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and several other charges. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court plainly erred in excluding expert testimony on cocaine use where the defense expert was prepared to testify that, to a reasonable degree of scientific probability, the victim was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the shooting. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s convictions for second-degree murder and carrying or use of a firearm while engaged in the commission of a separate felony, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error by excluding the testimony on the grounds that the testimony must be offered to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Remanded. View "State v. Deleon" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (Count I) and one count of accidents involving damage to vehicle or property (Count II). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Petitioner sought review of the judgment of the ICA, raising a challenge to the sufficient of the complaint with respect to Count II. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that Count II failed to charge a requisite state of mind. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the lower courts, holding that inasmuch as Count II of the complaint against Petitioner failed to allege the requisite state of mind, it must be dismissed. View "State v. Tongg " on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of prostitution. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The ICA sua sponte raised the issue of whether the charge was deficient for failing to allege the requisite mens rea, which was an essential fact of the offense of prostitution. The ICA, inter alia, held that Petitioner “waived any sufficiency to the charge for failure to allege a mens rea” by not objecting on this basis and by not asserting the claim on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that, inasmuch as the complaint against Petitioner failed to allege the requisite state of mind for the offense of prostitution, the complaint must be dismissed. View "State v. Shyanguya " on Justia Law

The district court adjudged Petitioner guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the trial for a fourth day because it had already determined that the trial would not be completed on the third day; but (2) the OVUII charge was deficient by failing to state the offense of OVUII where it did not allege the attendant circumstance that Defendant operated his vehicle on a public roadway. Remanded. View "State v. Akitake " on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with electronic enticement in the first degree (Count 1) and promoting child abuse in the third degree (Count 2). The charges were severed. The State then proceeded to trial on Count 1 and appealed the circuit court’s suppression order as it related to count 2. In relevant part, the court suppressed a statement made by Defendant after he was arrested and evidence seized from Defendant’s residence pursuant to a misdated search warrant. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of electronic enticement. Both parties appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction and vacated the suppression order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in affirming Defendant’s conviction for electronic enticement; (2) suppression of Defendant’s statement was proper where law enforcement officers failed to obtain a voluntary waiver of Defendant’s Miranda rights; and (3) the circuit court erred in suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. Remanded. View "State v. McKnight" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with abuse of family and household members. Prior to trial, a Korean language interpreter was sworn in to translate the proceedings for Petitioner. During the trial, Petitioner's attorney informed the court Petitioner was not going to testify on his own behalf. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed, claiming that his right to testify was violated because the court's Tachibana colloquy was deficient. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) under State v. Tachibana, a colloquy between the judge and a defendant involves a verbal exchange in which the judge ascertains the defendant's understanding of his or her rights; (2) here, the advisement by the family court did not adequately ascertain whether Petitioner understood his constitutional right to testify or not to testify; (3) further, Petitioner's need for an interpreter during the trial heightened the necessity for the court to insure Petitioner understood the rights he waived; and (4) the error in this case was not harmless. Remanded. View "State v. Han" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 712-1240.8. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a concurrent term of imprisonment of five years in both counts as a young adult defendant pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-667. The State filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that the court's decision to sentence Defendant under section 706-667 ran contrary to law. The circuit court denied the order. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing under section 712-1240.8. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the phrase "notwithstanding...any other law to the contrary" found in the sentencing provision of section 712-1240.8 overrode sentencing under section 706-667 as "contrary." The Supreme Court held that it did not, reversed the ICA's judgment, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence and order denying the State's motion to correct illegal sentence.View "State v. Casugay-Badiang" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with harassment. Before trial commenced, the district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that disjunctive wording in the complaint made it difficult to prepare a defense. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because the complaint charged two forms of non-synonymous conduct disjunctively, the charge did not provide Defendant with adequate notice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when charging a defendant under a single subsection of a statute, the charge may be worded disjunctively in the language of the statute as long as the acts charged are reasonably related so that the charge provides sufficient notice to the defendant; and (2) the complaint in this case met due process requirements regardless of whether the disjunctively charged acts were synonymous or non-synonymous. View "State v. Codiamat" on Justia Law

The State indicted Petitioner on kidnapping and assault in the second degree. A jury found Petitioner guilty of kidnapping and of the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. Petitioner filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing (1) the State failed to prove venue was proper in this case; and (2) the Class A felony kidnapping should be reduced to Class B kidnapping because the complainant did not sustain serious or substantial injury as shown by the jury acquitting Petitioner of assault in the second degree. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) because several witnesses testified that the offense occurred on the island of Oahu, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate the first judicial circuit was the correct venue; and (2) while the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that substantial bodily injury was caused by Defendant in order to disprove the mitigating defense that reduces the offense of kidnapping from a Class A felony to a Class B felony, the State disproved one of the three elements of the Class B mitigating defense beyond a reasonable doubt to establish that Defendant was not entitled to the defense. View "State v. Bailey " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree. The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction of first degree assault but affirmed his conviction of second degree robbery, holding (1) Petitioner could not be convicted of both robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree inasmuch as the element of infliction of severe bodily injury was common to both offenses, the jury relied on the same conduct of Petitioner to satisfy this element for both offenses, and the findings incorporated in the verdicts were inconsistent; and (2) a specific unanimity instruction was not required in this case. View "State v. Santiago" on Justia Law