Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the offense of assault in the first degree as an included offense of the charge of murder in the second degree. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s and circuit court’s judgments, holding (1) assault in the first degree is an included offense of murder in the second degree; and (2) the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury upon the included offense of assault in the first degree. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Kaeo" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after license and privilege have been suspended or revoked for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. On appeal, the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the district court’s judgment, determining that the charge against Defendant was defective for failing to allege the requisite state of mind, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. Defendant filed an application for writ of certiorari, contending that the ICA gravely erred in failing to address his arguments that insufficient evidence sustained the conviction and that double jeopardy precluded retrial. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) a reviewing court is required to address an express claim of insufficiency of the evidence prior to remaining for a new trial based on a defective charge; but (2) substantial evidence supported the conviction in this case, and therefore, double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant John Walton and his codefendant, Courage Lee Elkshoulder, were indicted for attempted murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. The circuit court consolidated Walton’s and Elkshoulder’s trials and denied Walton’s and Elkshoulder’s motions for severance. During trial, Walton and Elkshoulder each argued that the other had stabbed the complaining witness. The jury found Walton guilty of both attempted murder and robbery but found Elkshoulder guilty only of assault and robbery. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Walton’s motion for severance, and, under the circumstances, Walton was prejudiced and denied a fair trial. View "State v. Walton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree for allegedly fondling the breast of the complaining witness while she slept. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of a police detective, a veteran of the Sex Crimes Detail, that probable cause existed for arresting Defendant because the officer’s testimony invaded the province of the jury by bolstering the complaining witness’s credibility where the officer was imbued with “an aura of expertise” due to his experience. View "State v. Calara" on Justia Law

William and Maryann Acker, a married couple, were involved in a string of crimes in California and Hawaii in 1978. In California, Maryann was convicted of Cesario Arauza’s murder. In Hawaii, William pleaded guilty to robbing Lawrence Hasker, and Maryann was found guilty of Hasker’s murder and other charges regarding the robbery of Joseph Leach. William later testified under oath in California that he was solely responsible for Hasker’s murder. In 2007, Maryann was granted a new trial in relation to the charge for Hasker’s murder and was again convicted of Hasker’s murder. Maryann challenged her retrial, claiming she was denied a fair trial for several reasons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that defense counsel opened the door to evidence concerning Maryann’s convictions in California, but the error was harmless; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maryann’s motion for mistrial; (3) the prosecution did not engage in misconduct; (4) the circuit court did not err in refusing to enforce a subpoena recalling William to testify in Maryann’s case; and (5) the circuit court’s jury instructions on murder and accomplice liability were not erroneous. View "State v. Acker" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of several drug-related offenses. The Hawaii Paroling Authority (HPA) fixed minimum terms of imprisonment and categorized Petitioner as a Level III offender. After the ICA reversed one of Petitioner’s convictions, the HPA reset Petitioner’s minimum terms to the same terms that had previously been imposed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Haw. R. Penal P. 40. The petition was denied. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a second Rule 40 petition challenging his minimum term and his status as a Level III offender. The circuit court denied the second petition, concluding that Petitioner waived his claims for not including them in his first petition. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments, holding (1) because Petitioner presented evidence that did not receive notice that, on remand, the HPA reset his minimum term to the same minimum term in time for him to have raised the issue in his first petition, Petitioner’s second petition should not have been denied without a hearing on the basis that his claims had been waived; and (2) inasmuch as Petitioner’s offenses did not meet the prescribed criteria to classify Petitioner as a Level III offender, the HPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Remanded. View "Fagaragan v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court convicted Defendant of exceeding the speed limit, finding that the State met its burden of proof that Defendant’s vehicle was traveling sixty-five miles per area in an area where the speed limit was fifty miles per hour. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in failing to sustain Defendant’s foundation and hearsay objections to the admission of a speed reading from a police officer’s laser gun. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed error in admitting the speed into evidence because the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the introduction of the laser gun reading. Remanded. View "State v. Amiral" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a no contest plea to a charge of sexual assault in the third degree. Defendant later tested positive for methamphetamine use in violation of his probation. Defendant’s probation officer subsequently filed a motion requesting a revocation of Defendant’s probation. During trial, the family court denied Defendant’s request for a continuance to obtain the testimony of a physician, who could have informed the court of whether Defendant was decompensating at the time of the violations. The court then revoked Defendant’s probation and sentenced him to five years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the family court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance and in revoking his probation where the evidence did not indicate that he willfully and inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his probation. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) inasmuch as Defendant satisfied the “good cause” standard in his request for a continuance, the family court abused its discretion in denying his request; and (2) in determining whether Defendant inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed by the probation order, the court must apply a test articulated within this opinion. View "State v. Villiarimo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the circuit court abused its discretion when it ruled that evidence of Petitioner’s prior assault conviction would be admissible to rebut the affirmative, mitigating defense of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED), which caused him to forego an instruction on the EMED defense. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the EMED defense when it is raised by the evidence even where neither party requests the instruction; (2) thus, a defendant may not waive an instruction on the EMED defense; and (3) therefore, the circuit court in this case was obligated to instruct the jury on the EMED defense upon determining that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the instruction, even where Petitioner waived the defense. Remanded. View "State v. Adviento" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants, father and son, were found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. The father (Defendant) appealed, arguing in relevant part that the prosecutor misstated the law on accomplice liability under Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-222 by separately defining certain terms used in the statute during closing argument and that the court should have given a cautionary instruction that the jury adhere to the court’s instructions on the law of accomplice liability. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the prosecutor orally modified the court’s accomplice instruction, and because the court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the modification, the prosecutor’s definitions of the accomplice instruction became the court’s instructions upon the law; (2) the instruction was a misstatement of the law on accomplice liability; and (3) the misstatement of law for which no curative instruction was given was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Basham" on Justia Law