Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was stopped by police officers while driving his vehicle and was subsequently arrested for operating his vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. Defendant was asked to submit to a test for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. The police informed Defendant of his right to refuse to consent to a bodily search but told him if he exercised that right, his refusal to consent would result in a potential thirty-day term of imprisonment. The intermediate court of appeals upheld Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test and the statutory scheme imposing sanctions for withdrawing consent. Defendant appealed, arguing that the BAC evidence in this case was obtained in an unconstitutional manner and should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the result of Defendant’s breath test, the product of a warrantless search, was not admissible into evidence because voluntary consent was not demonstrated, and no other exception to the warrant requirement was applicable. View "State v. Won" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of committing robbery in the second degree. The jury was not required to find that Defendant had any prior convictions. The prosecution filed a post-conviction motion for the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and introduced into evidence the judgment for Defendant’s prior convictions. The circuit court took judicial notice on file for both of Defendant’s prior convictions and granted the State’s motion for imposition of mandatory minimum period of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that, in accordance with Alleyne v. United States, a jury should have considered the facts alleged in the prosecution’s motion for imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) repeat offender sentencing under section 706-606.5 enhances the penalty of the crime committed, and therefore, a defendant’s predicate prior conviction(s) must be alleged in the charging instrument; (2) a jury is required to find that the defendant’s prior conviction(s) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to trigger the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under section 706-606.5; but (3) these rules are given prospective effect only. View "State v. Auld" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The charging instrument did not allege that the offense took place on a public way, street, road, or highway. Two years later, the Supreme Court held in State v. Wheeler that operation of a vehicle on “a public way, street, road, or highway” is an attendant circumstance of the offense of OVUII and must be stated in the charge. Based on Wheeler, Defendant filed a petition to vacate and set aside the judgment under Haw. R. Penal P. 40, arguing that the complaint was fatally defective, thereby conferring no subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court. The district court denied the Rule 40 petition, concluding that Wheeler did not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the criminal jurisdiction of the district court is provided by Haw. Rev. Stat. 604; and (2) in this case, the district court had jurisdiction over the OVUII charge by satisfaction of the requirements set forth in chapter 604, and the fact that the OVUII charge failed to allege an element of the offense did not extinguish the criminal jurisdiction of the district court. View "Schwartz v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of one each each of harassment and trespass. After a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the complaining witness, which included restitution for a ten-day period when the complaining witness was unable to work due to her injuries. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the restitution order, holding that lost wages are not a compensable category of restitution pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-646. The Supreme Court vacated in part the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the district court’s order of restitution as it related to lost wages, holding (1) section 706-646 permits restitution for reasonable and verified lost wages in appropriate circumstances; and (2) the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Defendant to pay restitution for wages that the complaining witness lost as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct. View "State v. DeMello" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted in six counts, but only counts I and IV were at issue in this appeal. Two separate trials ended in mistrial on the relevant counts. After a second trial on counts I through IV, the circuit court again declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. The circuit court later concluded that it had erred by not accepting an apparent unanimous verdict of guilty on count II, reconvened the jury, and accepted the guilty verdict as to count II. The court subsequently granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss counts I, III, and IV. The court also granted Defendant’s motion to vacate count II based on juror misconduct and ordered a retrial on that count. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Defendant and the State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ICA correctly concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing counts I, III, and IV under the factors set forth in State v. Moriwake; (2) the ICA did not err in concluding that retrial of count II was not barred by double jeopardy; and (3) the ICA did not err in declining to address whether the circuit court erred in recalling the jury. View "State v. Deguair" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court found Defendant guilty of harassment. Defendant attended his sentencing hearing without his lawyer. After a brief colloquy with Defendant, the district court found that Defendant had validly waived his right to counsel. The court then sentenced Defendant to the maximum five-day jail term allowed for a term of probation for the harassment offense. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) upheld Defendant’s sentence, concluding that Defendant waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, holding that the record did not support a finding that Defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made. View "State v. Phua" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted for sex trafficking related crimes based on his conduct as a pimp for the complaining witness. Petitioner was present for voir dire and jury selection but failed to appear in court two days later despite instructions to do so. The trial was twice continued. After the second continuation, which lasted twenty-one days, the circuit court conducted trial in absentia. The intermediate court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for failing to object to disjunctive charging language in jury instructions; and (2) the trial court did not violate Rule 43 of the Hawai’i Rules of Penal Procedure or violate Defendant’s right to be present at trial by proceeding with trial despite Defendant’s absence. View "State v. Vaimili" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft of the proceeds of sale of the home of an individual for whom she was acting as a caregiver, changing the name of ownership of two joint accounts, and taking $8,000 from the joint account to pay off Chin’s car. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the actions of a jury foreperson in communicating with a main defense witness about possible employment was highly prejudicial. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the nature of the alleged deprivation did not rise to the level of being substantially prejudicial. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment on appeal and the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) in this case, the circuit court was required to investigate the circumstances surrounding the nontrivial communication between the defense witness and the juror; and (2) because the circuit court did not conduct such an investigation, it could not be said that Defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was not compromised. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Chin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to substitute retained counsel in place of his court-appointed counsel. The intermediate appellate court (ICA) affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for withdrawal and substitution of counsel, resulting in the denial of Defendant’s right to privately retained counsel of choice under Haw. Const. art. I, 14. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to continuous sexual assault of a minor under the age of fourteen and abuse of a family or household member. The family court accepted the plea agreement, found Defendant guilty as charged, and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. Before sentencing, the prosecutor submitted a letter and three exhibits to the probation office for inclusion in Defendant’s PSI report that included recommendations relevant to sentencing. The submission would have been forwarded to the Hawaii Paroling Authority for its consideration at the minimum term hearing. Defendant moved to withdraw his no contest plea, arguing that the prosecutor’s submission constituted a breach of the plea agreement. The family court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the family court’s findings and order, holding that the prosecutor’s submission of the letter and exhibits was a fair and just reason for Defendant’s withdrawal of his plea, and the State did not satisfy its burden to demonstrate substantial prejudice if the motion to withdraw the plea was granted. Remanded. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law