Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man was accused of intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to his infant son in November 2014. Five days before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations for first-degree assault, the State filed a felony information in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, charging him with the offense. About a month later, the State filed a second felony information for the same offense in the Family Court of the Second Circuit. After filing the second information, the State moved to dismiss the first one, which the Circuit Court granted. The defendant was served with an arrest warrant issued in connection with the second information. Trial in Family Court was scheduled and continued several times over the next three years.The defendant moved to dismiss the second information in Family Court, arguing that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the first information because the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction and he was not served with the first arrest warrant. The Family Court denied his motion but allowed an interlocutory appeal. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the prosecution commenced when the first information was filed and that the statute of limitations was tolled.On review, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction when the first information was filed and was authorized to make the probable cause determination. The Court clarified that prosecution by information commences, for statute of limitations purposes, when the applicable court makes a finding of probable cause, not merely upon filing the information. The Court further held that a district court judge was properly authorized to make the probable cause determination under a standing order by the chief justice. The Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment, which upheld the Family Court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "State v. Amasiu" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of murdering his girlfriend after a violent altercation in their home. The defendant called 911, expressing both an apparent confession and suicidal intent. He was apprehended after returning home the next day. At the police station, he was advised of his rights using the Maui Police Department’s Miranda waiver form, which, at the time, did not include an explicit warning that he could stop answering questions or request an attorney at any time during interrogation. The defendant subsequently confessed during a custodial interview and did not attempt to invoke his right to silence or counsel.Proceedings in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit were delayed to evaluate the defendant’s mental fitness. After finding him fit, the court denied his motion to suppress statements, concluding he had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, despite his claims of mental distress and the absence of the so-called “fifth Miranda warning.” At trial, the jury found him guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the Miranda warnings given were constitutionally sufficient and the waiver voluntary.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. It held that, under the Hawai‘i Constitution, law enforcement must henceforth provide not only the traditional four Miranda warnings but also explicitly inform custodial suspects of their right to cease answering questions and request an attorney at any time. However, because this is a new constitutional rule, the court applied it prospectively only, not to the defendant’s case. The court affirmed both the conviction and sentence, holding that the defendant’s waiver was valid under the previous standard. View "State v. Garces" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man accused of kidnapping and sexually assaulting a woman in Maui in 1989. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony from an FBI agent, who analyzed hair and fiber samples. The expert testified that hair found in the defendant’s car was “consistent with” originating from the complainant, and that fibers found on her clothing were “consistent with” coming from the car’s seat cover and carpet. The defense challenged the complainant’s credibility but did not contest the expert testimony. The jury convicted the defendant, and he was sentenced to forty years. Nearly thirty years later, a letter from the Department of Justice revealed that the expert’s testimony about hair analysis overstated the science and was invalid. The defense then argued that both the hair and fiber testimony should be deemed unreliable based on scientific developments.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit held a hearing and found that the hair analysis testimony exceeded the bounds of science but ruled the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to other corroborative evidence. The court did not rule on fiber analysis. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, applying the State v. McNulty “newly discovered evidence” test. The ICA found that the fiber testimony was not impeached by the DOJ letter and considered the hair evidence cumulative, so it declined to address whether the new evidence would probably change the result at retrial.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that when scientific advances later invalidate expert testimony presented at trial, the “false evidence” standard applies, not the “newly discovered evidence” standard. The court found both the hair and fiber testimony materially false, took judicial notice of landmark scientific reports, and concluded there was a reasonable possibility the false evidence contributed to the conviction. The defendant’s due process rights were violated, and the court vacated the lower courts’ decisions, remanding for a new trial. View "Granillo v. State" on Justia Law

On February 12, 2023, a police officer observed the defendant commit multiple traffic violations and attempted a traffic stop. The defendant continued driving for over a mile before stopping at her home. The officer detected signs of intoxication and arrested her after she exited her vehicle, attempted to enter her house, and showed further indications of alcohol use. At the station, her blood alcohol content was found to be over 0.15. She was subsequently charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant as a highly intoxicated driver. The defendant moved to suppress evidence from her warrantless seizure and arrest.The District Court of the Third Circuit initially scheduled a hearing on the suppression motion for April 24, 2023. This was continued at the defendant’s request due to incomplete discovery, rescheduling the hearing to June 16, 2023. The State subpoenaed its primary witness, Officer Molina, nine days before the new hearing date. Four days prior to the hearing, the officer reported he was unavailable due to military training. The State moved to continue the hearing two days before the date, but the district court found the State had not exercised due diligence in securing the witness and denied the motion. Lacking other witnesses, the State could not oppose the suppression motion, and the district court granted suppression of all evidence.The Intermediate Court of Appeals applied its “Lee test” for continuances based on witness unavailability, found the State had exercised due diligence, and vacated the suppression order. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held the Lee test is unworkable and should not govern State motions to continue. The court established a new standard: such motions are first analyzed for due diligence under HRPP Rule 48; if due diligence is lacking but the statutory deadline has not expired, courts should use a totality of circumstances “good cause” analysis. Applying this, the court found good cause existed for a continuance and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Woody" on Justia Law

After a late-night police pursuit in Makaha, a white Honda being followed by several Honolulu Police Department officers crashed, causing severe injuries to its young occupants. Officer Joshua Nahulu was alleged to have driven the lead pursuit vehicle, with officers Erik Smith, Jake Ryan Bartolome, and Robert Gus Lewis III following. Witness accounts conflicted on whether police vehicles made physical contact with the Honda. However, an expert found no evidence of such contact. None of the officers stopped to render aid after the crash, and they only returned after other emergency responders had arrived. Nahulu was charged under Hawaiʻi’s “fled scene” statute, which requires a driver “involved in a collision” resulting in serious injury or death to stop and render aid. His co-defendants were charged with hindering prosecution and conspiracy.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding the statute’s language—specifically, “involved in a collision”—was not unconstitutionally vague and that the defendants had sufficient notice of the charges. The court ordered the State to clarify, through a bill of particulars, whether it alleged physical contact between Nahulu’s vehicle and the Honda; the State responded that it did not rely on such a theory.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi held that Nahulu could only challenge the statute as vague as applied to his conduct, not on its face, since the law does not implicate constitutional rights such as free speech. The court further held that “involved in a collision” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Nahulu and that the combination of the charging instrument and the bill of particulars provided sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions to dismiss. View "State v. Nahulu" on Justia Law

After being stopped for speeding late at night, the defendant exited his vehicle and was ordered to the ground by a police officer, who drew his firearm. The defendant initially complied but then fled, leading to a physical confrontation in which he and the officer exchanged blows. After further pursuit and struggle, a second officer arrived, and all three individuals ended up on the ground. The defendant was handcuffed, and as he was lifted to his feet, he stated, “I’m sorry. I was just trying to get a Zip Pac.” The defendant was charged with assault against a law enforcement officer in the first degree, based on allegations that he caused bodily injury to the officer while the officer was performing his duties.Prior to trial in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, the defendant moved in limine to exclude his statement, arguing it was involuntary. The prosecution conceded the defendant was in custody but denied that interrogation had occurred. The court denied the motion in limine, ruling the statement admissible as an “excited utterance” under Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence Rule 803(b)(2), and declined to hold an evidentiary voluntariness hearing. The prosecution asked the court to find the statement was not coerced, which it did, without an evidentiary hearing. The jury acquitted the defendant of the first-degree charge but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of assault against a law enforcement officer in the second degree. The defendant appealed, arguing error in the failure to hold a voluntariness hearing. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a voluntariness determination, rather than a hearing, was required.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that article I, sections 5 and 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution, and Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 621-26, independently require a pretrial evidentiary hearing to establish voluntariness before a factfinder hears an inculpatory statement. Because no such hearing occurred, the conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Tolentino" on Justia Law

A man was accused of violating privacy laws after he stood outside a vacation rental home and held his phone up to a high bathroom window where a teenage girl was showering. The girl saw the phone, a hand, and the top of a head, but neither the man nor the phone ever entered the bathroom; both remained outside. The man admitted to police that he attempted to record the shower area through the bathroom window and deleted the recording, but no recording was recovered.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit held a jury trial, during which the jury convicted the man of violation of privacy in the first degree under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 711-1110.9(1)(a). The defendant appealed, raising issues including jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, suppression, and indictment validity. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the conviction on the indictment issue but dismissed the indictment without prejudice, finding the evidence sufficient to convict. Judge Hiraoka dissented, arguing the statute required the device to be “in” the private place, which was not proven. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i later ruled the indictment was proper and remanded to the ICA to consider remaining issues. On remand, the ICA rejected all other points of error, and Judge Hiraoka reiterated his sufficiency argument.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed whether substantial evidence supported the conviction. The court held that HRS § 711-1110.9(1)(a) unambiguously requires the device or person to be physically “in” the private place. Since the evidence showed both the man and the phone remained outside the bathroom, the State failed to prove an essential element. The court reversed the conviction, vacated the ICA’s judgment, and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. Double jeopardy bars retrial. View "State v. Kaakimaka" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with assault after a neighbor identified him as the perpetrator of an attack on a sixty-nine-year-old woman at her home. The woman, whose primary language was Chuukese, provided a brief description of her attacker to the police. Her identification occurred during a field show-up at a nearby bus stop, where she was transported in an ambulance without a Chuukese interpreter. The defendant was the only person presented during the show-up, and he was handcuffed and accompanied by a uniformed police officer. The police were unable to instruct the woman that the perpetrator might not be present, due to a language barrier.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit held a hearing and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the identification, relying exclusively on the factors listed in Hawai‘i Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal (HAWJIC) 3.19. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that the circuit court failed to consider additional relevant factors listed in HAWJIC 3.19A and did not evaluate the effect of the suggestiveness of the show-up procedure on the reliability of the identification.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and clarified the standards for suppression of identification evidence in inherently suggestive show-ups. The court held that trial courts must, at minimum, consider relevant factors in both HAWJIC 3.19 and 3.19A, as well as the effect of suggestiveness on reliability. Applying these standards to the record, the court concluded that the identification was not sufficiently reliable and ordered that it be suppressed on remand. The court affirmed the ICA’s judgment vacating the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Jercy" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol after a breath test revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.113, above the legal limit. He was charged with Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII) and his bench trial began before a district court judge, who heard testimony from the State’s first witness. Before the trial was completed, that judge was elevated to the circuit court and was no longer able to finish presiding over the trial.After the first judge's departure, a second district court judge was assigned to the case. The second judge reviewed the prior record and continued the trial, denying any objection from defense counsel, who after consulting with the defendant, did not object to the substitution. The second judge heard the remainder of the State’s evidence, conducted a colloquy, and found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that his double jeopardy rights were violated by being tried before a second judge without a proper mistrial or on-the-record consent. The ICA affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the substitution or in the lack of an on-the-record colloquy.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that the district court plainly erred by continuing the bench trial before a new judge after jeopardy had attached, without declaring a mistrial or obtaining the defendant’s consent to terminate the first trial. The court determined that, after the first judge left, the defendant was effectively subjected to a second prosecution for the same offense, in violation of his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the district court’s conviction, and remanded the case for dismissal of the charge with prejudice. View "State v. Ellway." on Justia Law

A substitute teacher sexually assaulted a thirteen-year-old student on multiple occasions in a classroom, recorded at least two of the assaults, and shared one of the videos with adults in an online chatroom. The Federal Bureau of Investigation found child pornography on his phone and evidence of further distribution. The student confirmed multiple instances of abuse, which significantly impacted his mental health. The teacher was subsequently federally prosecuted and sentenced to seventeen and a half years for production of child pornography. In parallel state proceedings, he was indicted on several charges, pled guilty to three, and was sentenced to an aggregate thirty years in prison, with some terms ordered to run consecutively and concurrently.In the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, the court granted the State’s oral motion for consecutive sentences at sentencing but provided only a brief, generalized rationale focused on the teacher-student relationship and harm to the victim. It did not address the distinct nature of the offenses or provide a detailed explanation for departing from the presumptive concurrent sentencing. After the defendant appealed, the court issued a written order—drafted by the prosecution and adopted verbatim—offering a more comprehensive justification for the consecutive sentences. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the sentence, relying heavily on this post-sentencing written order.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s judgment and the portion of the circuit court’s sentence imposing consecutive terms. The court held that a sentencing court must state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences on the record at the time of sentencing, not in a later written order, and must not simply adopt the prosecutor’s arguments. The case was remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. View "State v. Bunag" on Justia Law