Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this action brought by Academic Labor United (ALU) requesting declaratory judgments that graduate assistants were foreclosed from exercising the collective bargaining rights provided to public employees under Haw. Const. art. XIII, 2 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 89, holding that there was no error.ALU, which represented graduate student employees of the University of Hawaii who wish to engage in collective bargaining, brought this suit arguing that a pair of 1972 decisions of the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board determined that graduate assistants were not "employees" under chapter 89 and were thus foreclosed from exercising collective bargaining rights. The circuit court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because ALU had not invoked Hawaii Administrative Rules 12-42-9 to clarify whether its members are employees under chapter 89 and had not exhausted its administrative remedies, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over ALU's action. View "Academic Labor United v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Haw." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Office of the Auditor lacked the authority to pierce the attorney-client privilege and obtain an audit's confidential communications and rejected the Office of the Auditor's jurisdiction and non-justiciability bars to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' (OHA) suit in this declaratory action.The OHA sued the Office of the Auditor after it was audited, seeking a declaratory judgment that neither Haw. Rev. Stat. 23-5 nor the Hawai'i State Constitution required OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment for OHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-5 did not require OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure pursuant to Haw. R. Evid. 503 and common-law principles. View "Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Kondo" on Justia Law

In this case challenging the constitutionality of administrative rules governing access to Mauna Kea's summit under Haw. Const. art XII, 7, the Supreme Court answered questions reserved by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit by holding (1) in a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative rules based on a violation of Haw. Const. art. XII, 7, the burden of proof does not shift to the government agency defendant and instead remains with the challenging party; and (2) the framework set forth in Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068 (Haw. 2000), applies to challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative rule based on an alleged violation of article XII, section 7, in addition to contested case hearings. View "Flores-Case 'Ohana v. University of Haw." on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the district court and intermediate court of appeals (ICA) erred in ruling that Defendant was not entitled to the requisite Miranda warnings when she was questioned by law enforcement officers, holding that "if a person is unable to leave a place of interrogation due to circumstances incident to medical treatment, determining whether the person is 'in custody' under a totality of circumstances requires an inquiry into whether the person was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and cause the officer to leave."State v. Ketchum, 34 P.3d 1006 (Haw. 2001), articulated that a person is "in custody" for constitutional purposes if the totality of the circumstances reflects that the point of arrest has arrived because probable cause to arrest has developed. State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 511 P.3d 782 (Haw. 2002), overruled Ketchum's bright-line rule and said that the existence of probable cause was only a factor in determining whether someone was entitled to Miranda warnings under the totality of the circumstances. Here, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Sagapolutele-Silva's abrogation of the Ketchum rule and held that the Ketchum rule remained in effect. The Court then held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was in custody well before probable cause developed, and therefore, the lower courts erred by holding that Miranda warnings were not required. View "State v. Hewitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendants' convictions for attempted murder in the second degree, kidnapping, and other crimes but remanded the case for a new extended term sentencing hearing and resentencing, holding that that extended term sentencing instructions and special interrogatories were prejudicially erroneous and misleading.The jury selection process in the underlying proceedings identified prospective jurors by a number, not name. On appeal, Defendants argued that the circuit court's jury selection method violated their constitutional right to a presumption of innocence and an impartial jury. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the convictions, holding that there was no constitutional violation. The Court, however, held that Defendants' life without the possibility of parole sentences for attempted murder could stand because the circuit court's extended term sentencing jury instructions and special interrogatories were prejudicially erroneous and misleading. View "State v. Lafoga" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming order of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss indictment against him, the court's judgment of conviction and sentence, and the later order of restitution, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.In his motion to dismiss the indictment against him, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by before the grand jury by improperly eliciting testimony that he had invoked his right to remain silent. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and Defendant entered a no-contest plea to assault in the first degree. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' decisions, holding (1) the prosecutor violated Defendant's due process right to a fair and impartial grand jury hearing by eliciting testimony that Defendant invoked his right to remain silent; and (2) the circuit court erred by ordering Defendant to pay $1,461,444 in restitution. View "State v. Borge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals' upholding Defendant's convictions for burglary in the first degree and other crimes, holding that the State caused an unreasonable delay in sentencing Defendant and that the unreasonable delay deprived Defendant of the opportunity for allocution.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the State caused an unreasonable delay in sentencing, thus depriving Defendant of due process and a sentencing proceeding that was fundamentally fair, in violation of Haw. Const. art. 1, 5 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; and (2) the State's unreasonable delay in sentencing Defendant deprived him of the opportunity to allocution, in violation of Haw. Const. art. I, 5. View "State v. Canosa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this election complaint asserting that the November 8, 2022 primary election ballot violated Haw. Const. art. II, 4 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 12-31 and that James Malish should have been included in the 2022 general election ballot because he was unopposed as a nonpartisan candidate, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.Plaintiffs Karl Dicks, an unsuccessful Republican candidate for the office of State Senator, District 17, and Malish, the only nonpartisan candidate in the primary election for the office of State Senator, District 9, brought this pro se complaint asserting that the primary election ballot unconstitutionally required selection of a political preference and that the manner in which it displayed a nonpartisan candidate could be construed to require declaration of a political preference when selecting a nonpartisan ballot. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the election complaint failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. View "Malish v. Nago " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ruled that the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) had jurisdiction to review the merits of Appellant's postconviction appeal even though the appeal was not properly taken from a final order, holding that the appeal's procedural defects stemmed from ineffective assistance of counsel.Appellant pled no contest to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. The ICA dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the appeal had not been taken from a final order. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's decision, holding (1) the order appealed from was not final, and the appeal did not give rise to appellate jurisdiction; and (2) this Court presumes prejudice to Appellant from his counsel's failure to take the procedural steps necessary to make the appeal that Appellant desired, and the appropriate remedy is consideration of the appeal on its merits. View "Suitt v. State" on Justia Law

In this petition for an extraordinary writ the Supreme Court held that when probable cause has been found after a preliminary hearing but the case is dismissed without prejudice due to a defect in the prosecution, Haw. R. Pen. P. 12(g) permits a court to hold a defendant in custody or continue bail for a specified time that is reasonable under the circumstances.After the court dismissed charges against Scott Deangelo, it ordered under Rule 12(g) that Deangelo remain in custody for ninety days while the State sought a grand jury indictment. Deangelo brought this challenge to Rule 12(g), arguing that it violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Haw. Rev. Stat. 803-9(5), which requires an arrested person to be taken before a qualified magistrate for examination within forty-eight hours of arrest. The Supreme Court held that Rule 12(g) is constitutional and that the time specified must be reasonable in light of all of the circumstances. View "Deangelo v. Souza" on Justia Law