Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, four plaintiffs, Sonia Davis, Jessica Lau, Lauralee Riedell, and Adam Walton, challenged the actions of the County of Maui, the County of Maui Office of the Mayor, and other related defendants. The dispute arose from a sweep of a large encampment of houseless individuals in Maui County in September 2021. The plaintiffs had requested a contested case hearing before the sweep, which was ignored, and the sweep proceeded as planned, leading to the seizure of Davis and Lau's personal property.The plaintiffs asserted they were denied procedural due process under the state and federal constitutions when the county seized their personal property without proper notice or an opportunity to be heard. The County moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest in continuing to store their belongings on County land. The circuit court granted the motion as to Riedell and Walton, who had not lost property during the sweep, but denied the motion as to Davis and Lau, who had.The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that plaintiffs possessed a property interest in their personal items protected by the Constitution of the State of Hawaii. Therefore, the due process clause required a hearing before the County could seize the plaintiffs’ property. The circuit court properly granted the County’s motion to dismiss Riedell and Walton’s claims because they did not lose property during the sweep and properly denied the County’s motion to dismiss as to Davis and Lau, who did. View "Davis v. Bissen" on Justia Law

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Christopher Wilson was charged with offenses related to carrying a firearm and ammunition in public without the appropriate license in Hawaii. In response, Wilson challenged the constitutionality of the relevant Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 134-25 (2011) (pistol or revolver) and § 134-27 (2011) (ammunition), arguing that these laws violated his rights under the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and its equivalent in the Hawaii constitution, article I, section 17. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed the charges, agreeing with Wilson's argument. The State appealed the dismissal.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii concluded that Wilson was only entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the laws he was charged with violating. As such, Wilson could challenge HRS § 134-25 and § 134-27, but not HRS § 134-9, which pertains to licenses to carry firearms and which Wilson had not attempted to comply with.The court found that the text, purpose, and historical tradition of the Hawaii Constitution do not support an individual right to carry firearms in public. The court reasoned that the language of article I, section 17, which mirrors the Second Amendment, ties the right to bear arms to the context of a well-regulated militia. It does not extend this right to non-militia purposes. The court also considered Hawaii's history of strict weapons regulation and the intent of Hawaii's framers.Based on these considerations, the court held that HRS § 134-25 and § 134-27 do not violate Wilson's right to keep and bear arms under article I, section 17 of the Hawaii Constitution and the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court vacated the lower court's dismissal order and remanded the case back to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, the court ruled on the suppression of text message evidence in a sexual assault prosecution. The defendant, Dylan River James, allegedly admitted to the sexual assault during a text conversation with the alleged victim, who was directed by the police to contact him. The lower court suppressed these text messages, agreeing with James' argument that his rights to self-incrimination and counsel were violated. The lower court reasoned that the alleged victim was acting as a government agent, and thus, James should have been given Miranda warnings.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i vacated the lower courts' decisions. The court ruled that James was not in custody at the time of the text exchange, and thus, Miranda warnings were not required under either the federal or state constitutions. The court also ruled that James' right to counsel had not yet been attached, as adversarial judicial criminal proceedings had not yet been initiated.The court further held that the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) made an error in concluding that it did not have appellate jurisdiction over the lower court's order denying the State's motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court stated that the State's right to appeal from an order granting a defendant’s motion to suppress includes a right to appeal from a related order denying the State’s motion for reconsideration. The case has been remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this action brought by Academic Labor United (ALU) requesting declaratory judgments that graduate assistants were foreclosed from exercising the collective bargaining rights provided to public employees under Haw. Const. art. XIII, 2 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 89, holding that there was no error.ALU, which represented graduate student employees of the University of Hawaii who wish to engage in collective bargaining, brought this suit arguing that a pair of 1972 decisions of the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board determined that graduate assistants were not "employees" under chapter 89 and were thus foreclosed from exercising collective bargaining rights. The circuit court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because ALU had not invoked Hawaii Administrative Rules 12-42-9 to clarify whether its members are employees under chapter 89 and had not exhausted its administrative remedies, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over ALU's action. View "Academic Labor United v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Haw." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the Office of the Auditor lacked the authority to pierce the attorney-client privilege and obtain an audit's confidential communications and rejected the Office of the Auditor's jurisdiction and non-justiciability bars to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' (OHA) suit in this declaratory action.The OHA sued the Office of the Auditor after it was audited, seeking a declaratory judgment that neither Haw. Rev. Stat. 23-5 nor the Hawai'i State Constitution required OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment for OHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-5 did not require OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure pursuant to Haw. R. Evid. 503 and common-law principles. View "Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Kondo" on Justia Law

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In this case challenging the constitutionality of administrative rules governing access to Mauna Kea's summit under Haw. Const. art XII, 7, the Supreme Court answered questions reserved by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit by holding (1) in a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative rules based on a violation of Haw. Const. art. XII, 7, the burden of proof does not shift to the government agency defendant and instead remains with the challenging party; and (2) the framework set forth in Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068 (Haw. 2000), applies to challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative rule based on an alleged violation of article XII, section 7, in addition to contested case hearings. View "Flores-Case 'Ohana v. University of Haw." on Justia Law

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In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the district court and intermediate court of appeals (ICA) erred in ruling that Defendant was not entitled to the requisite Miranda warnings when she was questioned by law enforcement officers, holding that "if a person is unable to leave a place of interrogation due to circumstances incident to medical treatment, determining whether the person is 'in custody' under a totality of circumstances requires an inquiry into whether the person was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and cause the officer to leave."State v. Ketchum, 34 P.3d 1006 (Haw. 2001), articulated that a person is "in custody" for constitutional purposes if the totality of the circumstances reflects that the point of arrest has arrived because probable cause to arrest has developed. State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 511 P.3d 782 (Haw. 2002), overruled Ketchum's bright-line rule and said that the existence of probable cause was only a factor in determining whether someone was entitled to Miranda warnings under the totality of the circumstances. Here, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Sagapolutele-Silva's abrogation of the Ketchum rule and held that the Ketchum rule remained in effect. The Court then held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was in custody well before probable cause developed, and therefore, the lower courts erred by holding that Miranda warnings were not required. View "State v. Hewitt" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendants' convictions for attempted murder in the second degree, kidnapping, and other crimes but remanded the case for a new extended term sentencing hearing and resentencing, holding that that extended term sentencing instructions and special interrogatories were prejudicially erroneous and misleading.The jury selection process in the underlying proceedings identified prospective jurors by a number, not name. On appeal, Defendants argued that the circuit court's jury selection method violated their constitutional right to a presumption of innocence and an impartial jury. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the convictions, holding that there was no constitutional violation. The Court, however, held that Defendants' life without the possibility of parole sentences for attempted murder could stand because the circuit court's extended term sentencing jury instructions and special interrogatories were prejudicially erroneous and misleading. View "State v. Lafoga" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming order of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss indictment against him, the court's judgment of conviction and sentence, and the later order of restitution, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.In his motion to dismiss the indictment against him, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by before the grand jury by improperly eliciting testimony that he had invoked his right to remain silent. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and Defendant entered a no-contest plea to assault in the first degree. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' decisions, holding (1) the prosecutor violated Defendant's due process right to a fair and impartial grand jury hearing by eliciting testimony that Defendant invoked his right to remain silent; and (2) the circuit court erred by ordering Defendant to pay $1,461,444 in restitution. View "State v. Borge" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals' upholding Defendant's convictions for burglary in the first degree and other crimes, holding that the State caused an unreasonable delay in sentencing Defendant and that the unreasonable delay deprived Defendant of the opportunity for allocution.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the State caused an unreasonable delay in sentencing, thus depriving Defendant of due process and a sentencing proceeding that was fundamentally fair, in violation of Haw. Const. art. 1, 5 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; and (2) the State's unreasonable delay in sentencing Defendant deprived him of the opportunity to allocution, in violation of Haw. Const. art. I, 5. View "State v. Canosa" on Justia Law