Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with the offense of kidnapping. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed, holding that any error in failing to instruct the jury as to first degree unlawful imprisonment was harmless because the jury convicted Defendant of the greater charged offense and, thus, would not have reached the absent lesser offense. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) the circuit court should have given a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree; and (2) the failure to give the instruction was not harmless, overruling State v. Haanio to the extent that Haanio would hold such error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded. View "Flores v. State " on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to a five-year term of probation for the offenses of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree and prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia. The probationary sentence was granted to Petitioner as a first time drug offender pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-622.5. The sentence contained several terms and conditions. After the conclusion of Petitioner's probationary period, Petitioner filed a motion for an order of expungement. The circuit court concluded that Petitioner did not qualify for expungement of her felony convictions because, in committing other crimes during her probationary period, she had violated a term of her probation. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying Petitioner's motion, holding (1) for the purposes of expungement of a drug conviction, the requirement that a defendant sentenced to probation under section 706.622.5 has "complied with other terms and conditions" is satisfied if the defendant has completed her probationary term and has been discharged from probation; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, because Petitioner had completed her probation term, she had, in effect, complied with the terms and conditions of probation for purposes of expungement under section 706-622.5. Remanded for entry of an order granting Petitioner's motion.View "State v. Pali" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of robbery in the second degree, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used "force against the person of anyone present with the intent to overcome that person's physical resistance or physical power of resistance." Appellant, who took a handbag out of Nordstrom without paying for it, argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove he had used force with the intent to overcome two of the store's loss prevention officers' physical resistance or physical power of resistance." In this case, no specific unanimity instruction was given to the jury informing them that they were required to agree unanimously as to the identity of the person against whom Appellant used force. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's failure to give a specific unanimity instruction constituted plain error, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Getz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree, terroristic threatening in the second degree, and terroristic threatening in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his request for the written transcripts or the DVD video recordings of his codefendant's trial. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments, holding that Defendant demonstrated that the requested transcripts or DVD video recordings were necessary for an effective defense where the charges against Defendant and his codefendant arose from the same incident and involved identical facts, and the same key witness testified against Defendant and his codefendant at their respective trials. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

Petitioner was orally arraigned and charged with excessive speeding in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291C-105(a)(1). After a trial, the trial court found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the oral charge failed to allege the required intentional, knowing, and reckless states of mind and that the oral charge was therefore defective. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding (1) because the charge against Petitioner did not allege that Petitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, the charge failed to allege the requisite state of mind; and (2) the State failed to lay an adequate foundation to admit the laser gun reading of Petitioner's vehicle's speed into evidence during trial. Remanded. View "State v. Apollonio" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional no contest plea to operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The district court convicted Defendant over OVUII under Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1) and (a)(3). Defendant conditioned his plea on his ability to appeal his contention that the charge was defective because it did not allege a state of mind. Defendant's written submission of plea form, however, contained a conditional plea only to the section 291E-61(a)(1) method of proof. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated Defendant's convictions as to both section 291E-61(a)(1) and (a)(3) but determined that, on remand, the State could proceed to prosecute Defendant under the section 291E-61(a)(3) method of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed the ICA's judgment vacating the district court's judgment but directed that, on remand, the state was precluded from prosecuting Defendant under the section 291E-61(a)(3) method of proof, as, in the circumstances presented in this case, permitting the State to proceed with prosecution under section 291E-61(a)(3) would constitute a breach of the plea agreement in violation of Defendant's due process rights. Remanded. View "State v. Nakano" on Justia Law

Petitioners, residents of Maui, challenged the Maui County Council's (MCC) passage of two bills related to the development of a residential community on 670 acres of land in Wailea (Wailea 670 project), arguing that MCC and its committee, the Land Use Committee (LUC) failed to satisfy the requirements of the State open meetings law, known as the Sunshine Law. Specifically, Petitioners claimed (1) the recessing and reconvening of two meetings without providing additional notice and opportunity for public oral testimony violated the Sunshine Law; and (2) the circulation of memoranda among the board membership outside a duly noticed meeting violated the Sunshine Law. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of Respondents, MCC, County of Maui, and the land developer. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LUC and MCC did not violate the Sunshine Law by reconvening the two meetings beyond a single continuance without posting a new agenda and without accepting public oral testimony at every reconvened meeting; and (2) the MCC violated the Sunshine Law by distributing written memoranda among its members outside of a duly noticed meeting, but the violation did not require invalidation of MCC's passage of the Wailea 670 bills. View "Kanahele v. Maui County Council" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft in the second degree for allegedly offering to provide legal services and obtaining or exerting control over a retainer check by deception. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in sua sponte failing to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense as to her conviction. Defendant cited to State v. Stenger for the proposition that if she was laboring under a mistake of fact that could negate the state of mind necessary to commit theft, the trial court was required sua sponte to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) agreed based on Stenger and vacated the conviction. The State appealed, requesting that the Supreme Court overrule Stenger. After clarifying Stenger's holding, the Court reversed the ICA and affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not plainly err in omitting the mistake of fact jury instruction, as Defendant had not met her initial burden of adducing credible evidence of facts constituting the defense, and those facts were not supplied by the prosecution's witnesses. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded no contest to one count of assault in the first degree and one count of kidnapping as a class B felony. In its first minimum term order, the Hawaii Paroling Authority (HPA) set Petitioner's minimum term of imprisonment at eighteen months for each count. After Petitioner had been imprisoned for more than six months, the HPA held a second hearing to allow Complainant to testify. At the conclusion of the hearing, the HPA imposed a minimum term of five years imprisonment on each count. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the HPA violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection by reopening his minimum term hearing and by subsequently increasing his minimum term. The circuit court dismissed Petitioner's petition. Petitioner appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the HPA wrongfully withheld evidence from him prior to the second hearing. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA judgment and circuit court order, holding that the ICA erred in concluding that Petitioner waived his due process claim relating to the HPA's nondisclosure of adverse materials in Petitioner's HPA file. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "De La Garza v. State " on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of several drug-related offenses. At his sentencing hearing, Defendant was represented by a court-appointed deputy public defender. Privately retained counsel also appeared on behalf of Defendant and sought to substitute for the deputy public defender. Defendant's privately retained counsel requested a continuance to prepare. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion to substitution of counsel and a continuance as untimely. The court then sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's and circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court violated Defendant's constitutional right to counsel of his choice when it denied his motion for substitution of counsel and a continuance of the sentencing hearing, as the court did not properly balance Defendant's right to counsel of his choice against countervailing government interests. Remanded. View "State v. Cramer" on Justia Law